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Abstract
This thesis empirically analyses two case studies of markets associated with high-tech
goods or services. In both cases the analysis includes an extensive literature review and
in-depth study of market characteristics. These serve to inform the investigations and
also provide technical background.
The first part of the thesis examines the international distribution of the Apple
iPhone and the incentives of the manufacturerto distribute the product exclusively to
mobile network operators. The study uses a novel application of a double-hurdle model
to analyse a cross-sectional dataset of 187 countries featuring industry-specific and
demographic variables drawn from both off-the-shelf sources and from an analysis of
several hundred individual sources of evidence. The results show that the mechanisms
determining the duration of exclusivity agreements differ from those factors determin-
ing their initial imposition. In addition, it is shown that the level of competitiveness
and concentration in the downstream market are significant determinants of both the
decision to sell in a country and the duration of any exclusivity agreements. The pres-
ence of competing technological standards is also shown to result in longer periods of
exclusivity indicating slower diffusion of the product in these countries.
The second part of the thesis empirically examines the incentives of individuals to
switch provider of their household communication services in the presence of bundling
of services. The study uses a random effects probit method to analyse survey data of
2,871 households’ communication subscriptions. The results indicate that when service
subscriptions are bundled there is a significant reduction in the likelihood of an indi-
vidual switching their provider. Furthermore, this effect is intensified when the bundle
includes services in which the provider specialises.
The results of both studies are consistent with economic predictions of, respectively,
the use of key differentiators by firms to gain competitive advantages, and the use of
bundling to create switching costs for consumers. Both studies represent significant
contributions to the study of vertical restraints, and consumer switching behaviour.
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Foreword
”Technology... is a queer thing. It brings you great gifts with one hand, and it stabs
you in the back with the other.”
- C.P. Snow, New York Times, 15 March 1971
In the past decades the world has experienced seismic changes in the way humans in-
teract with one another and engage with the world around them. Driven by exponential
advances in technology we are now able to consume information in volumes that were
previously impossible. We communicate in ways that were previously unimaginable,
or otherwise the stuff of science fiction. Even within the lifetimes of young people, the
world has evolved, and continues to evolve with little sign of abatement.
This constant state of change in which we exist is often coined the ‘information’ or
‘digital’ revolution. In many senses it is more revolutionary than the industrial revolu-
tion of the 18th century. Though the industrial revolution was limited to a handful of
the world’s economies, it shaped the development of the world. Indeed, the so-called
industrial revolution is still to reach some corners of the world. Our information rev-
olution, however, is not limited by such geographical boundaries, and may yet shape
the global society beyond to an extent which dwarfs earlier developments. Even within
the most developing of countries technology is permeating and changing the lives of the
worlds poorest by enabling new avenues of commerce and communication.
While these leaps in technology come bearing great gifts, they are also accompanied
by new challenges. These are challenges for firms, individuals, and those organisations
charged with protecting the interests of individuals.
Technological change has changed immeasurably the way in which commerce is car-
ried out, and the goods and services which people demand. The insatiable appetite
for newer and better products, coupled with the ways in which we wish to purchase
means that firms must continually evolve and adapt. Product innovation is a contin-
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uous process, driven by fierce competition, with firms trying to find a niche market
or novel delivery method which will ensure their survival. High profile cases of ‘fallen
giants’ such as Nokia, or high street chain Woolworths, illustrate keenly that historical
significance represents no barrier to failure.
The rate of change of technology also presents difficulties for consumers. Rapid ad-
vances mean that knowledge of products and markets is rapidly out of date. Swamped
by the complexity of new products and channels of delivery, decision making becomes
ever more precarious and more choices made under uncertainty.
The increased complexity of technology creates challenges for regulators and au-
thorities tasked with the protection of consumers. The relentless advances require the
understanding of the economic effects of an increasing range of practices by firms, and
the ability to identify the benign from the pernicious.
This thesis is set against this backdrop and explores two cases which highlight the
uncertainty inherent in the current climate.
In the first part the thesis studies distribution strategies made by, Apple, the manu-
facturer of a high-tech product. It examines how competitive restraints and the envi-
ronment into which it sells the product determine its decision to supply exclusively to
particular downstream firms, and the conditions under which this can break down.
The second part of the thesis investigates the challenges faced by consumers in their
purchases of communication services. The advances in both the way with which in-
dividuals consume information, and the information individuals choose to consume,
means that household subscribe to an increasing range of technologies. The way in
which these are delivered is also evolving, resulting in complexity in prices and effects
which impact on consumers’ ability to make optimal decisions.
The empirical analysis of both the above cases examines the challenges faced by par-
ties in the current environment of technical progress. Each study is accompanied by a
technical chapter outlining the main characteristics of the technology and industry and
a review of the relevant literature.
4
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Introduction
The marketing of the Apple iPhone between 2007 and 2010 involved a strategy of the
imposition of conditions upon the mobile network operators that were to sell the device
to final consumers. A key component of this strategy was the allocation of exclusive
distribution agreements for distributors in some countries. Furthermore, where these
restraints were imposed, these varied in duration - ranging from months up to several
years.
There exists a well developed literature discussing the theoretical motivation for the
implementation of vertical restraints, specifically concerning exclusive territories. How-
ever, there has thus far been little attention paid to dynamic applications of exclusive
distribution or the optimal duration of any agreements.
This chapter has several main objectives. The first is to test the understanding of
the conditions under which exclusivity agreements are entered into. The second is to
investigate the drivers of duration of such agreements, specifically the case where these
deviate from the drivers of the initial decision to supply exclusively. In a separate inves-
tigation the current chapter also investigates factors which determined those countries
in which agreements were made to sell the iPhone.
In achieving its aims the distribution of the iPhone is first examined using a custom
dataset which demonstrates the patterns of distribution which existed. This is followed
by a review of the applications of, and policy approach toward, vertical restraints,
and an analysis of the literature concerning territorial exclusivity. An empirically in-
formed overview of the market structure of the mobile phone industry follows which sets
out context, stylised facts, and key technical information to inform the investigation.
The chapter concludes with an empirical investigation in which the distribution of the
iPhone is analysed using a cross-sectional dataset featuring key variables informed by
the literature, and which reflect the prevailing characteristics of mobile telecommuni-
cations.
7
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1. Vertical Restraints and iPhone
Distribution
The early distribution of the iPhone was subject to exclusive distribution agreements
of varying duration in a number of the countries in which it was sold. The following
section sets out this pattern of distribution which was observed during the initial years
of the iPhone’s availability. The section contains some technical terminology which is
addressed in greater detail in section 2.1. The following sections also introduce vertical
restraints, this is followed by a review of the existing literature focussed on exclusive
distribution.
1.1. The Distribution of the iPhone
The iPhone, which was launched in 2007, was electronics manufacturer Apple’s first
foray into the production of mobile telecommunication handsets. Previously the firm
had been identified with, amongst others, home computers and portable personal music
players. The iPhone featured a relatively novel touch-screen user interface, an aesthetic
design which was very similar to Apple’s other successful products, and heavily pro-
moted the firm’s online application store1 which supplied small inexpensive software
add-ons for the handset. In the final quarter of 2012 the iPhone accounted for 9.2% of
global handset sales by volume2.
The data used in this overview analysis is sourced from a dataset constructed by
the author. This dataset contains information on the countries in which the iPhone
launched, the network operators which sold the device, and the dates that each op-
erator started selling. The dataset was constructed over a prolonged period through
an exhaustive analysis of press releases, industry news, and local news articles; in
1Which drew heavily on the firm’s previous success at selling music online.
2Gartner [2013]
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total around 300 separate sources were used. The dataset and its source material is
reproduced in appendix B. A detailed description of the data gathering is in section 3.2
The marketing of the iPhone was different from that of many other handsets. Where
it is common practice for mobile phone handsets to be subsidised when purchased with
a fixed term network subscription, the iPhone was generally less subsidised than ri-
val manufacturers’ handsets. Apple also proceeded with a strict annual schedule for
the updating of the hardware, producing four varieties of handset between 2007 and
February 2011; figure 2.5 in section 2.4 (page 33) shows that some other manufacturers
produced hundreds of handset varieties in the same period.
Figure 1.1.: Distribution strategies
Source: Author’s own research
In addition to these strategies, the distribution of the iPhone followed a pattern of
distribution where it was sold exclusively by a single network operator in some ter-
ritories. Of these exclusivity agreements, some were temporary and characterised by
differing durations in different territories, while others were on-going. Although exclu-
sive distribution of premium handsets has been selectively employed for several years3,
the popularity and profile of the iPhone has enabled the collection and analysis of high
quality data concerning the pattern of its distribution. This has enabled the present
analysis of the choice of countries in which the phone was sold, and the determinants
of exclusivity agreements and their subsequent duration.
3Zhu et al. [2011] offer a short overview of exclusivity agreements in the US.
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Figure 1.1 indicates the distribution of agreement type across territories where the
iPhone has been made available since 2007. It shows that exclusivity agreements were
favoured over having competing retailers, and that in roughly half of these cases this
exclusivity was temporary.
In addition to the differences in exclusivity, the launch of the iPhone was staggered;
it did not simultaneously launch in all countries. Figure 1.2 illustrates the pattern of
distribution across different time periods; Exclusive indicates that a firm in the country
had a period of exclusive distribution, while Competitive indicates that more than one
firm in that particular country simultaneously sold the iPhone at launch.
Figure 1.2.: Exclusive versus competitive distribution of iPhone at launch
Source: Author’s own research
Figure 1.2 shows the general trend in favour of exclusivity and is dominated by a
spike in the third quarter of 20084; this quarter represents a period of international
roll-out of the iPhone. Although the early distribution was dominated by exclusivity
agreements, they still continued to be entered into after 2008.
Figure 1.3 indicates that, in addition to the staggered entry and selective exclusiv-
4The second spike in 2011 is largely result of the simultaneous introduction of the iPhone to a number
of small Caribbean countries (including, amongst others, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, and St
Lucia).
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Figure 1.3.: Date of first iPhone distributor and time until next entrant
Source: Authors own research
ity, the duration of the exclusive distribution agreements also varied between different
countries. Some, such as Germany or the US, did not have a second vendor of the
iPhone for around three years from the date of the original exclusive operator, while
others had a second vendor of the iPhone market after several months. This variability
is present even between countries where the iPhone was launched in a similar time
window.
The present investigation seeks to explain what determined these patterns of exclusiv-
ity, and what determined the choice of countries. The chapter continues by examining
the motives for, and policy approach toward, vertical restraints.
12
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1.2. Vertical Restraints
Interactions between firms take place either horizontally between firms at the same
stage in the vertical supply chain, or otherwise vertically between firms at different,
usually contiguous, stages in the production process. The firm’s attempts to achieve
its objectives (classically viewed as - but not limited to - profit maximisation), given
the nature of competition with horizontal rivals, often conflicts with the incentives of
other firms in the vertical chain.
In conventional analysis of horizontal competition firms take their costs, level of de-
mand, and mode or intensity of horizontal competition as a given and maximise their
profits based upon these constraints. Often firms act without considering the effect
that their actions have on the combined profit of the vertical structure as a whole.
Pricing decisions at one point in a vertical chain can affect pricing decisions (and thus
quantity of the product demanded) at other levels. The failure of the vertical chain
is typified in the theory of double marginalisation outlined by Spengler [1950] where
successive self-interested profit-maximising monopolists in vertical chain disregard the
interdependencies between theirs and others pricing decisions resulting in lower com-
bined profit than would be achievable through co-ordination or integration.
In the vertical chain some firms produce and sell intermediate goods or service which
are used as inputs in the production of other other products. Katz [1989] remarks that
because, unlike in final goods markets where individual purchases are made by a large
number of buyers, transactions of intermediate goods are characterised by sizeable or-
ders made between large buyers and sellers, each with divergent incentives. In this
setting the assumption of a simple linear price (as assumed in final gods markets) is
unrealistic and firms often employ more sophisticated pricing mechanisms.
Such sophisticated pricing schemes are an example of vertical restraints; a suite of
practices that can be used one firm to influence the decisions of other firms in the
supply chain. These are typically employed to increase the profit of the vertical chain
but can be used to influence other objectives such as innovation. Vertical restraints are
so-called because they are rules or conditions that restrain the behaviour of firms to
a particular set of actions. Rey and Verge´ [2003] outline the most common restraints
which include the imposition of controls on final selling price, limitations on quantity,
restrictions on territory in which a firm can operate or sell, or conditions on the supply
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of inputs; though any rule which limits the behaviour of a vertical partner is a vertical
restraint. Restraints are furthermore often characterised by penalties imposed for non-
compliance.
Other deviations from simple linear pricing such as the imposition of non-linear tar-
iffs or conditional wholesale discounts are considered by some to be vertical restraints
since they can influence the decisions of the downstream partner. These differ however
in that there is no defined punishment for non-compliance unlike the case of vertical
restraints – this is reflected in the approach of antitrust authorities vis-a-vis restraints
where penalties can be imposed.
1.2.1. Exclusivity Clauses
One particular set of vertical restraints imposed on firms involves restricting the num-
ber of firms in the vertical chain with which that particular firm can deal; these are
termed exclusivity agreements. There are two types of exclusivity agreement which
may be implemented by an upstream supplier:
Exclusive dealing requires that the retailer only purchase a relevant input from the
particular supplier at the expense of its rivals. This can have the effect of foreclosing
the demand for the rival of the upstream firm, but may also have efficiency motives if
the upstream firm has economies of scale in the cost of production. The exclusionary
nature of exclusive dealing contracts is discussed at length in both Aghion and Bolton
[1987] and Rasmusen and Ramseyer [1991].
Exclusive supply (also known as exclusive distribution or territorial exclusivity) de-
scribes the situation where the final market is segmented and a certain portion allocated
to specific downstream retailers. This can be either in terms of geographical area, or
different customer types (where it is possible to discriminate between different groups
of consumers). Such market segmentation, by allocating a monopoly position in a cer-
tain segment, can have (amongst other outcomes) the effect of reducing downstream
intra-brand competition. This reduces the extent to which downstream firms compete
against each other to sell products produced using the input of the upstream firm.
Territorial exclusivity agreements are relatively common especially amongst franchis-
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ing organisations where the franchiser will allocate the franchisee a certain catchment
area; in effect guaranteeing the downstream partner a certain level of demand.
1.2.2. The policy Approach to Vertical Restraints
The approach of policy makers toward vertical restraints (and vertical agreements in
general) is different to that for horizontal agreements. Horizontal agreements are per
se illegal and assumed to be anticompetitive, this is not the case for vertical restraints.
Some vertical agreements can be shown to increase consumer welfare and, as such,
some types of vertical restraint are viewed on a case by case basis. Notably exclusive
distribution agreements are illegal in some countries, notably where a dominant firm
restricts access to an essential input.
The contrasting argument for a more permissive stance toward vertical restraints is
reflected in the attitudes of antitrust authorities in both Europe and the US – where
policy has veered between per se prohibition of all restraints (prior to 1999 in Europe
and 1985 in the US), and the lenient scenario whereby most vertical restraints are freely
allowed (between 1985 and 1993 in the US). The introduction in Europe of Commission
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, and the abolition in the US of the 1985 Vertical Re-
straints Guidelines meant that both territories now employ a rule-of-reason approach
except in the case of resale price maintenance (price setting) or mandated minimum
prices. However, even to this effect, Lafontaine and Slade [2005] note that not only
are the effects of price controls replicable through a suite of alternative restraints, but
moreover that price controls (like any other vertical restraint) can be used to enhance
efficiency in a way which does not harm consumers.
Vertical restraints pose a problem for anti-trust where they either facilitate collusion
in a given horizontal market, or otherwise result in partial or complete foreclosure of
related markets. Rey and Verge´ [2003] highlight cases in the EU in which Nintendo
(2003) and Grundig (1966) were both fined for restricting downstream competition by
restricting parallel trade – placing cross-border resale restrictions on their products.
The authors also highlight the case of Pronuptia (1986), censured for its use of resale
price maintenance, which was found to have facilitated collusion between its branches.
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1.2.3. Defining Apple’s Restraints
It is not possible to observe the contractual terms which were agreed between Apple
and network operators, however it is possible to observe the outcome of those contracts.
To this effect figure 1.4, which offers a stylised depiction of the iPhone distribution,
indicates that an exclusivity agreement exists between manufacturer M1 and operator
R1 – the direction of this exclusivity determines the appropriate focus for the analysis.
Figure 1.4.: Stylised exclusivity arrangements
The exclusivity agreement that exists between M1 and R1 does not preclude R1
from carrying substitute products from other firms (although M1 only deals with R1,
R1 deals with both M2 and M3 ). Although the substitutability of different mobile
phones is not a trivial assumption, being that they are differentiated products, firms
which sold the iPhone continued to sell phones made by rival manufacturers. It would
be possible to narrow the market definition to that of just the iPhone, in which case
a ‘de facto’ exclusive dealing arrangement existed (being that Apple was (and is) the
monopoly supplier of the product). However, the definition of the iPhone as one prod-
uct in a broader set of mobile telephones eliminates the exclusive dealing theory and
leads instead to the view that this is a case of exclusive distribution.
The exclusive distribution restraint imposed by Apple determines the appropriate
literature and theories relevant to the analysis of the conduct; this is a case of an up-
stream firm choosing only to deal with a single downstream firm. Theories relating to
exclusive dealing (such as Aghion and Bolton [1987]) are not appropriate since there
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are no clear limitations imposed on downstream firms’ dealings with other upstream
rivals. In the following sections both the theoretical and empirical literature relating to
exclusive distribution is reviewed in order to understand those factors which are likely
to be influential in the decisions of the upstream firm to impose a territorial exclusivity
restraint.
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1.3. Existing Research into Exclusive Distribution
The scope of this part of the thesis is in the understanding of exclusive distribution
restraints imposed on sellers of the Apple iPhone. The following review focusses on
the broad literature, both theoretical and empirical, which investigates the use of ex-
clusive distribution agreements. The theoretical literature is broadly focussed on two
main themes; exclusivity restraints to resolve divergent incentives in intra-brand com-
petition, and exclusivity as a means to soften upstream competition in the presence of
intra-brand competition. The empirical literature is more varied in scope and draws
relevant conclusions from a range of different real-world investigations.
This chapter is focussed on the case of intra-brand competition and thus the main
literature review is focussed in this area. There are however important contributions
from the literature concerning inter-brand competition and so this literature is briefly
considered. The findings of the empirical literature are benchmarked against the theo-
retical literature and considered in the context of the present investigation.
1.3.1. Intra-brand competition
The literature on intra-brand competition focusses on the case where an upstream firm
faces no upstream rivals and sells intermediate products to downstream firms. In this
case the upstream firm has the ability to impose a range of restraints to influence the
decisions of downstream firms and better align their incentives with its own.
The case that an upstream firm does not impose restrictions on the downstream
market does not imply that the downstream market is otherwise competitive. On the
contrary, it is downstream market imperfections which motivate the upstream firm to
implement restraints.5 In one of the earliest examples Spengler [1950] lays the foun-
dation for the study of vertical restraints through the introduction of the vertical ex-
ternality inherent in vertical chains. The author illustrates the failure of linear pricing
in successive markets to deliver the same profit as would be achievable by a vertically
integrated monopolist. In this instance attempts to profit maximise at successive levels
of a vertical chain, given the input costs faced by firms, results in final prices higher
5A standard result in many of the following papers [Mathewson and Winter, 1984; Rey and Tirole,
1986] is that when a downstream market is perfectly competitive, this competition eliminates down-
stream intra-brand profits and enables the upstream firm to secure the vertically integrated profit
by setting a linear wholesale price equal to the monopoly final price.
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than the equivalent monopoly level. This is ‘double marginalisation’ and is key in the
argument that vertical restraints can be welfare enhancing.
Two key papers which both examine the rationale for the implementation of different
restraints are Mathewson and Winter [1984] and Rey and Tirole [1986]. Both seek to
explain the use of restraints in a vertical setting with a single upstream monopolist
selecting how to contract with one or more downstream agents.
In Mathewson and Winter [1984] the authors propose the minimum set of vertical
restraints, including exclusive distribution, which can be used to elicit the equivalent
vertically integrated monopoly profit benchmark (or similarly a single upstream firm
selling into a perfectly competitive (free entry) retail market). The authors specify a
circular model of downstream competition where retailers must advertise their product
across an endogenously chosen radius of influence. Under attempt to use simple linear
tariffs Mathewson and Winter [1984] highlight three externalities: double marginali-
sation; horizontal pricing and undercutting; and information (or advertising) spillovers.
The double marginalisation effect occurs because upstream firms are limited to linear
pricing. The upstream firm aims to make profit by setting a wholesale price in excess
of cost; as a result downstream final prices to consumers are too high. This finding
matches the double marginalisation effect of Spengler [1950].
Horizontal externalities in the Mathewson and Winter [1984] model stem from ad-
verse selection on the part of the downstream firms. The information spillover means
firms do not fully appropriate the full benefits of their advertising effort and conse-
quently advertise too little. The price externality, given the presence of competition
and negative cross-price elasticity, prompts firms to price too low in order to attract
marginal customers which would otherwise be served by a downstream rival. This effect
is known as the upstream firm cannibalising the demand for its own product.
Mathewson and Winter [1984] show that when there is no advertising spillover the
use of a multi-part tariff, in conjunction with closed territorial distribution (retailers
are not competing to attract customers from rivals’ territories), eliminates both hor-
izontal and vertical externalities. However, with spillovers in advertising, despite the
lack of horizontal price externality, the retailer still does not appropriate the full benefit
of their advertising and thus advertises too little. In this case only the guarantee of
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a retail margin through price controls can incentivise the correct amount of advertising.
Implicit in Mathewson and Winter [1984] is the assumption that, while selling and
buying activity can be segmented into closed territories, advertising effort cannot. The
implementation of the authors’ interpretation of closed territory distribution does not
appropriate the full ‘integrated’ level of profit because of the advertising informational
externality, it does solve the horizontal pricing externality. Thus exclusive distribution,
when combined with a suitable two part tariff, results in a superior outcome to that
which would be elicited in its absence.
The advertising dilemma in Mathewson and Winter [1984] is one of adverse selection;
competing firms do not advertise optimally because they believe that they will not ap-
propriate the full benefits of their advertising. The dilemma is similar to Lafontaine
and Slade [2005] in their approach. These authors cite a separate form of adverse
selection as the cause for the implementation of vertical restraints; where upstream
manufacturers require downstream dealers to make costly investments. The allocation
of an exclusive territory can guarantee a downstream firm a minimum level of demand,
thus removing the risk from their investment and aligning the interests of both up- and
downstream parties.
A different approach to Mathewson and Winter [1984] is used in Rey and Tirole
[1986] which seeks to understand the logic underlying the use of particular vertical
restraints using a simpler vertical arrangement. Their model has a single upstream
monopolist, but with a downstream under which firms compete in price along a stan-
dard Hotelling line.6 The authors focus on the comparison of two types of restraint;
resale price maintenance (mandating downstream prices) and exclusive territories.
A key feature in Rey and Tirole [1986], which is utilised throughout much of the sub-
sequent literature, is the principal-agent nature of a vertical retail chain. Often informa-
tion is decentralised – an upstream manufacturer may not have immediate knowledge
of the downstream market conditions. Under such conditions attempts to impose ver-
tical restraints upon downstream firms, based upon assumptions of demand or supply
conditions, may not result in extraction the full potential profit. Vertical restraints im-
posed by an upstream firm may even be rejected by downstream firms. Rey and Tirole
6For the bulk of the analysis the authors specify the Hotelling travel cost to be zero – resulting in a
case of pure undifferentiated Bertrand price competition
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[1986] model this uncertainty across two variables in the model: demand uncertainty;
and uncertainty in the unity cost of sale faced by a downstream firm. This uncer-
tainty introduces a participation constraint on the downstream since there will be a
subset of contractual restraints which will leave downstream firms with negative profits.
When considering which, if any, restraint to impose, when downstream firms are risk
averse the manufacturer must consider insurance properties to ensure the participation
of the downstream partner. Resale price maintenance is better at dealing with de-
mand uncertainty while allocation of an exclusive territory (in addition to a two-part
tariff) yields higher upstream profit than resale price maintenance under cost uncer-
tainty. With risk aversion, however, a competitive downstream market delivers better
outcomes than either. When the stipulation that retailers are risk averse is relaxed
and they become risk neutral (but still undifferentiated), then decentralisation of final
pricing decisions by granting of an exclusive territory with a two-part tariff leads to a
superior outcome.
This illustrates the standard result that when imperfections are introduced into the
downstream market, specifically when retailers are differentiated, the effectiveness of
competition to resolve vertical issues is diminished.
O’Brien and Shaffer [1992] reach the same conclusion as Mathewson and Winter
[1984] that in order to achieve the first-best profit the upstream firm must eliminate
the horizontal pricing externality. Furthermore, the authors show that this can be
achieved either through resale price maintenance (which they show to eliminate all ver-
tical and horizontal externalities), or otherwise through the use of exclusive distribution.
The O’Brien and Shaffer [1992] result is contingent upon the non-violation of the
territorial exclusivity agreement. Specifically the authors show that it must not be in
the upstream firm’s interest to tacitly encourage this violation. In the arrangement
of an exclusive territory there exists a moral hazard problem in that, once a two-part
contract is agreed, the upstream firm has the incentive to ‘sell the market a second
time’. This results in negative profits for the firm which agreed the initial contract.
The credibility issue inherent in the establishment of exclusive territories also informs
the analysis of Boyd [1993], discussed in section 1.3.3 in relation to the empirical liter-
ature.
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There is a separate moral hazard problem in that, once a contract has been agreed,
a downstream firm may have the incentive and ability to profitably sell outside their
allotted territory. This results in rationing of a fixed quantity across two territories
rather than one. The governance of exclusive territories is examined by Dutta et al.
[1994] who propose a model similar to that of Rey and Tirole [1986] where the upstream
monopolist sells an input to two downstream competitors using a two-part tariff and
allocates to each an exclusive territory. Similarly Dutta et al. [1994] also include un-
certainty in both the cost of sale for downstream firms and the level of demand. As
per the earlier paper, this offers the upstream firm the incentive to decentralise deci-
sion making. In addition to a uniform marginal cost of sale for downstream firms, the
authors also also propose that firms can engage in costly demand enhancing activities.
Dutta et al. [1994] find that in equilibrium the upstream firm tolerates a certain
degree of ‘bootlegging’ (the sale by one downstream firm into the rival’s territory). A
small amount of bootlegging is preferable to the case in which no territories are al-
located, or where there is zero enforcement of the territories. Both of these result in
full intra-brand competition with zero investment in demand-inducing services. The
authors also show that as demand becomes more sensitive to reseller services, the in-
centive to strictly enforce this bootlegging limit increases to ensure that firms do not
‘cheat’ on the agreement and bootleg more.
This literature has demonstrated that intra-brand retail competition may not elicit
the first-best profit for the upstream firm. In this instance vertical restraints, specifi-
cally exclusive distribution, can be used to remedy extant issues of moral hazard and
adverse selection and align incentives of up- and down-stream firms.
1.3.2. Inter-brand competition
The literature mentioned thus far primarily concerns itself with the case of intra-brand
competition and the restraints used by an upstream monopolist in order to maximise
profits given different configurations of downstream competition. The introduction of
inter-brand competition means an upstream firms must consider not only the sales of
their own products, but the strategies of their upstream rivals. Upstream firms face the
choice of not only whether to distribute through a single downstream retailer, but also
the decision of whether to use a common downstream agent with their upstream rival.
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Because the current investigation is focussed on inter-brand competition only the key
findings of the inter-brand literature are outlined in the following passages.
Rey and Stiglitz [1995], Lin [1990], and O’Brien and Shaffer [1993]7 all indicate that
competing upstream retailers prefer to deal exclusively with their own downstream
firms – avoiding having a common downstream agent. By minimising downstream
inter-brand competition this softens the competitive constraint they impose on one
another. Focussing on the softening of upstream competition, Saggi and Vettas [2002]
find that upstream firms choose to exclusively distribute; where firms deal with multi-
ple downstream agents this induces the rival to behave more competitively.
A feature common to all the literature above (both intra- and inter-brand) is that
upstream firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers to downstream agents. Trivedi [1998] and
Dobson and Waterson [1996] both examine the case where power is more balanced and
consider the incentives for downstream firms. Both papers indicate that in some cir-
cumstances a single downstream firms prefers to carry products from all upstream firms.
Subramanian et al. [2012] is relevant to the current paper as the authors specifically
examine exclusivity agreements with respect to the Apple iPhone and mobile telecom-
munications. Like the above papers, Subramanian et al. [2012] examine the case where
an exclusivity agreement is in the mutual interests of both the upstream telephone
manufacturer and the downstream network operator.
The authors, like Rey and Stiglitz [1995], utilise a simple two-upstream, two-downstream
model, but where downstream firms are differentiated according to a uniform interval
of consumers – intended to capture elements of quality differentials such as difference
in signal strength. The authors also specifically model features of mobile telecoms such
as consumer heterogeneity in the amount they use their phone. Like Rey and Stiglitz
[1995], Subramanian et al. [2012] show that under certain scenarios a handset man-
ufacturer may choose exclusivity in order to induce a rival to increase its wholesale
prices, thus softening competition. However, unlike that paper, the authors also fo-
cus on mutual incentives, as opposed to a take-it-or-leave-it approach. Subramanian
et al. [2012] find that network operators may find it advantageous to enter exclusiv-
ity since limiting the available handsets to their rivals may raise their rival’s input costs.
7O’Brien and Shaffer [1993] is a critique of Lin [1990] and utilises the same model.
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The findings above occur under specific bounds of relative quality between hand-
sets. Subramanian et al. [2012] also find that likelihood of exclusivity agreements is
increasing in the propensity of consumers to use wireless services (the baseline usage
by individuals), increasing in the overall quality of the network with the exclusivity
agreement, but decreasing in the degree of handset differentiation8.
1.3.3. Empirical literature
In addition to the theoretical literature there exists an empirical literature which ex-
amines the imposition of exclusive territories. This is mainly split into two themes: the
welfare effects of exclusivity restraints; and the motivation for strategic delegation of
downstream pricing decisions versus vertical integration.
Sass and Saurman [1993] study the relationship between brewers and beer whole-
salers and the impact on price of different state laws concerning territorial exclusivity.
Using a cross-section of twenty four states Sass and Saurman [1993] find that exclu-
sivity agreements serve to increase prices, indicating the expected effect of reduced
intra-brand competition. The authors also show, however, that where exclusive ter-
ritories are mandated, the estimated demand for beer is higher; suggesting that, as
per Lafontaine and Slade [2005], territorial exclusivity can provide guarantees to firms
which incentivises otherwise costly sales effort.
Though focussed on vertical integration, Lafontaine and Slade [2007] shares many
features in common with the current as it investigate upstream firms’ incentives to
impose vertical restraints. The authors identify the key drivers of the vertical integra-
tion decision from a theoretical model and review the prevailing empirical literature
to ascertain whether predictions made in theory are also supported by the empirical
evidence.
Instead of using a cross sectional analysis Brenkers and Verboven [2006] utilise a nat-
ural experiment to estimate the welfare effects of a change in legislation toward vertical
restraints. The case studied involves the sale of cars in the EU where in 2002 it was
proposed to abolish rules permitting territorial exclusivity and restrict manufacturers
8Understandable since increasing the degree of differentiation, reduces the substitutability of products
- meaning that handset wholesale prices in absence of exclusivity are higher and less reactive to the
prices of the rival.
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to policies which aimed to intensify intra-brand competition and reduce cross-border
price discrimination. The authors applied the observed data to a nested Logit model to
estimate a demand function, then utilise the observed coefficients to estimate welfare
post-liberalization. Brenkers and Verboven [2006] find that the abolition of territorial
exclusivity which would permit firms to freely compete would deliver welfare gains of
between 1.6 billion and 8 billion Euros. The authors remark, however, that these figures
exclude the potential efficiencies which can be achieved through vertical co-ordination
such as the incentivisation of sales effort.
Zhu et al. [2011] seek to measure the welfare consequences of the long-term exclu-
sivity agreement between Apple and network operator AT&T for the distribution of
the iPhone in the US. Unlike the present investigation the authors do not examine
the motives for the exclusivity agreement. The authors utilise research data on mobile
telephone use from 2007 and 2008 to estimate a random coefficient Logit model for com-
mon handsets and contract subscription bundles in order to estimate the demand for
mobile services. The authors next estimate the supply function using utilising whole-
sale and final consumer prices. By developing a counterfactual analysis based upon the
estimated margins at operator and manufacturer level, the authors estimate that the
reduction on intra-brand competition created by the exclusivity of the iPhone resulted
in a welfare loss of between $210 million and $326 million.
Boyd [1993] is a rare paper which theoretically and empirically examines the motiva-
tion of an upstream firm to engage in exclusive territorial distribution. In this instance
the author uses litigation cases based around vertical restraint of trade to determine
whether an upstream firm imposed resale price maintenance, exclusive territories or
both on their downstream retailers. Boyd [1993]9 observes that, like Rey and Tirole
[1986], resale price maintenance and exclusive distribution may not be perfectly substi-
tutable. The author uses the theoretical example of repeat purchase goods which may
have quality or functionality revised often relative to purchase (a durable electronic
good for example), and the opposite where revised functionality may occur rarely rel-
ative to purchase (petrol or any other consumable). In the latter case, once an initial
purchase is made then a consumer is aware of attributes and thus has no need of sales
effort – resulting in reduced derived demand. For these products a manufacturer prefers
to employ territorial exclusivity even with an associated double marginalisation. Where
technology changes with each purchase, and purchasers purchase their first unit from
9And also Boyd [1996].
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a high sales effort outlet, resale price maintenance is preferred as retailers compete in
sales effort to attract customers. The empirical analysis in Boyd [1993] also bears this
prediction out – indicating that in routine repeat purchase good cases the prevalent
vertical restriction is territorial exclusivity.
1.3.4. Contribution
There is a wealth of theoretical literature which focusses on incentives for the imposition
of various vertical restraints. The literature which considers intra-brand competition
heavily focusses on the use of restraints to resolve divergent incentives at different
stages of production. The inter-brand literature instead examines the use of restraints
to soften competition between upstream firms. Also within the scope of inter-brand
literature is that which examines not just restraints imposed upon downstream firms,
but also the case where they are mutually beneficial. Both branches of the theoretical
literature serve to inform variables which can be included in empirical investigation, as
per Lafontaine and Slade [2007].
The empirical literature has taken several approaches, focussing on both welfare
effects and incentives. However there are few examples where the incentives for the im-
position of exclusive distribution are empirically examined, perhaps only Boyd [1993].
The present investigation, with its econometric approach, improves the understand-
ing of exclusivity in a number of ways. It adds to the limited empirical literature on
determinants of exclusive distribution, also including an analysis of entry. More cru-
cially, this paper is the first paper which questions the optimal duration of exclusivity
contracts from either theoretical or empirical spheres. In doing so, the results of the
paper suggest that the explanation of duration as some extension of the process which
determines initial exclusivity is flawed.
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2. The Mobile Telecommunications
Industry
The empirical study of the distribution of the iPhone requires an understanding of the
product and the environment in which it was sold. As such the following sections de-
scribe in detail the nature of the product, the industries which provide these goods and
services, and the characteristics of the markets through which mobile telecommunica-
tions services and associated equipment are sold. A specific function of these sections
is also to introduce technical concepts and terminology which are used throughout the
remaining chapters.
2.1. A Background to Mobile Telecommunications
The development of current mobile phone technologies first began in the 1960s with the
development of early cellular systems which for the first time, though experimentally,
enabled large numbers of users to connect to the same network [Gru¨ber and Verboven,
2001]. Although commercial cell-based systems began to launch in the 1980s there
were many incompatible technologies in use, each championed by different countries;
this meant that travelling between different countries with a single mobile phone was
impossible when it was first introduced.
In 1992 European countries began to implement a uniform technology for the broad-
cast of mobile phone signals known as GSM.10 The use of a common technology meant
that all European networks operated using a single technological standard – allowing a
subscriber from one country to make and receive calls while ‘roaming’ in other European
countries. The technology also made more efficient use of radio frequencies; enabling
many more users to simultaneously use a network. The improvement in technology in
10GSM was originally an acronym for ‘Groupe Spe´cialMobile’ but this was later changed to ‘Global
System for Mobile Communications’
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this period was mirrored in other developed countries and enabled the post-1995 mass
diffusion of mobile telecommunications.
The rapid technological progress in the wireless transmission of calls, messages, and
mobile internet since these early standardisation exercises has led to increased relia-
bility and quality such that consumers in advanced economies are willing and able to
substitute away from traditional fixed-line telecoms in favour of their mobile phone.
Indeed, the fixed line telephone which had dominated long distance communication
since the second world war was soon overshadowed as the global number of mobile
telephone subscriptions exceeded fixed line for the first time in 2002 as indicated in fig-
ure 2.1. The same graph further indicates the the absolute number of global fixed-line
connections begins to fall after 2007, indicating that mobile phones usage is not only
increasing relative to fixed-line, but that it is also replacing the older technology.
Figure 2.1.: Fixed line1 versus mobile2 telephone subscriptions 1982-2009
Source: 1ITU 2010, 2WCIS 2010
It is not only in the developed world that mobile telephones have become popular.
Where the high cost of infrastructure combined with relatively low levels of wealth and
income had stifled the expansion of fixed line communications in expansive developing
countries, the comparatively low cost of building a mobile network led to rapid adop-
tion in developing countries and the ‘leapfrogging’ of traditional technology [Waverman
et al., 2005; The Economist, 2009]. Figure 2.2 indicates that lower middle-income coun-
tries began adopting mobile telecoms at around 2000 and, moreover, that adoption in
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lower income countries was accelerating by 2009.
Complementing the improvement in broadcasting technology was an improvement in
telephone handsets in the late 1990s as traditional manufacturers of communications
and broadcasting equipment increasingly diverted resources toward creating products
which would appeal to consumers. Early leaders in this market were those firms which
had been active in developing the technological standards by which mobile networks
could operate. They were able to leverage this advantage into the production of mo-
bile telephone handsets which were increasingly portable and which adopted consumer-
centric design features - many of which became common across different manufacturers’
handsets [Koski and Kretschmer, 2007].
Since the 1990s the co-evolution of technology in mobile telecommunications has con-
tinued as improvements in speed and reliability of services are introduced by mobile
networks, while handset manufacturers continue to include support for these innova-
tions in their handsets; thus driving demand for these improved network services in a
virtuous circle of product innovation. The continuing appetite for cell broadcast mo-
bile telecommunications, and the evolution of technology to adapt to offer an increasing
array of services, means that new markets continue to be exploited - both in terms of
new adoption in developing countries, and also new market segments to be exploited
Figure 2.2.: Global mobile subscriptions by World Bank country income categories
1981-2009
Source: WCIS 2010
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in the developed world.
The following sections offer a stylised view of the structure of the consumer-focussed
mobile telephony industry with the emphasis placed on the main parties of interest in
the case of the iPhone; handset manufacturers and mobile network operators. A subse-
quent analysis of the the market structure of both networks and manufacturers follows,
with specific appreciation of the mode of competition. Finally the section concludes
with a detailed analysis of the patterns of exclusivity of the iPhone which motivate the
paper.
2.2. Technology and Competing Standards
The operation of a mobile telephone network requires that all equipment associated
with it, both at a consumer level and also that engaged in the centralised broadcast of
signals, conforms to a single technological specification; otherwise known as a techno-
logical standard. This standard determines the mode by which signals are broadcast,
the type and frequency of the signal, and the technology of the handset which must
send and receive the signal.
According to David and Steinmueler [1994] the purpose of a common standard can be
subdivided into three possible functions; a standard for reference to ensure a product
is of a specific design, a minimum quality standard (which ensures a product is of a
certain quality), and compatibility standards which ensure interoperability. Telecoms
standards fit into the first category and the latter; the name of the technology is a
reference signal that allows a consumer to determine whether a handset will be com-
patible with the network - enabling confident purchases where a consumer might have
multiple options, and also (from a production perspective) ensures the device complies
to a list of technical list of specifications to ensure interoperability with other devices.
Although, in GSM, Europe adopted a single technological standard for mobile telecom-
munications there are alternatives - some of which have become obsolete, and some of
which are technologically equivalent and currently used in non-European countries.
The main alternative to GSM is known as CDMA11. CDMA and GSM were developed
in a similar time period and are functionally almost identical; they primarily differ in
11An acronym for ‘Code Division Multiple Access’.
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the specifics of how they break down and broadcast mobile signals - this makes them
natively incompatible. Because this lack of compatibility is common between differ-
ent technological standards technical solutions are often established to remedy this.
Indeed, in some countries (notably the US) where there are multiple competing stan-
dards, Church et al. [2008] highlight a fourth function of a standard - allowing the
design and use of technologies enabling interconnectivity between different standards.
Both Funk [2009] and Selian [2000], the latter with a GSM focus, offer papers chart-
ing the development of these current commercial systems and specifically the pre-
consolidation stage where many countries operated their own proprietary mobile phone
standard. From these disparate national systems both Garrard [1997] and Funk and
Methe [2001] chart the rise of the uniform standards; particularly contrasting the use
of committees to design and implement a single standard such as in Europe, versus the
US where the choice of standards was commercially led.
Support for mandated standardisation is mixed; both Gru¨ber and Verboven [2001]
and Li and Lyons [2012] suggest in their empirical analyses that having a common
mobile technology increased the speed of diffusion relative to the case with competing
standards.12 Haug [2002] offers anecdotal evidence of the benefits stemming from the
large-scale adoption of the single GSM standard; noting that the economies of scale
involved in the production of equipment for the standard led to lowered final handset
prices. These lower prices led to increased adoption outside of the original geographic
base of the standard - particularly in poorer countries - this effect is evident in figure
2.2. David and Steinmueler [1994] alternatively report uncertain results based upon
whether a common standard is internalized by small groups of firms or by the whole
market; the former case may result in unintended anti-competitive effects if the market
power of the incumbent firms is too strong.13 Church et al. [2008] also suggest that
standard setting organisations can be remote from the market - resulting in standards
which are less well suited to market demand relative to those products of a competitive
process.
Finally, standards may lead to network effects or switching costs for subscribers;
these are discussed further in section 2.6.
12Gru¨ber and Verboven [2001] also find that it was the implementation of GSM technology that al-
lowed many more simultaneous users which enabled the introduction of multiple competing network
operators, which in turn proved to be the engine behind the mass adoption of mobile technology.
13This is relevant in analysis of the early handset market shares in section 2.4
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2.3. Vertical Industry Structure
The use of mobile telecommunications depends upon two components; a handset with
which to make and receive calls (or perform the broader functions of a mobile phone),
and a network which will broadcast the signals which enables users to be connected to
each other or connected to content such as the internet. These requirements broadly
determine the industry structure as being comprised of two separate components; hand-
set manufacturers and network operators (referred to as operators) - these are indicated
in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3.: Vertical structure (arrows indicate direction of goods)
The interpretation of the vertical industry structure is influenced not only by the
interactions of firms with final consumers, but also by the interactions between the
manufacturers and operators. Because of the above requirements, a consumer must
acquire a handset and enter into a relationship with a network operator - where, much
like in many other communication services, the subscription to a mobile network is not
normally a one-shot purchase but instead entails a longer term subscription with the
operator meaning that individuals keep the same phone number.
In order to acquire a mobile handset an individual consumer has several options; they
may purchase one directly from the manufacturer through its own sales channel, pur-
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chase one from a retailer, or purchase one through a network operator. Alternatively,
a subscription to a network can be entered into through the operator themselves, or
otherwise through an independent retailer.
Network subscriptions are generally one of two types; they can be either be of a fixed
term with a monthly subscription fee which typically includes a built-in allowance in
terms of number of minutes, data use, or text messages (this is known as post-pay since
any usage in addition to that included is paid for after the event), otherwise subscribers
enter into pre-pay agreements where users add credit to their account up front and us-
age is billed to this credit at a pre-agreed rate. When not contracted directly with
the network operator pre-pay subscriptions are routinely sold in a range of different
retailers, often over the counter in supermarkets, but fixed-term agreements tend to be
sold by specialist retailers acting as agents for the mobile network.
While the direct purchase of a handset from a manufacturer is typically a one-shot
agreement, the purchase through a network typically involves the purchase of a bundle
of phone and network subscription featuring a subsidy on the price of the handset. This
is either as part of a bundle with a fixed-term post-pay subscription agreement where
an individual may pay only a small amount or even nothing upfront for the phone, or
otherwise where there is a small discount to the retail price and the phone is restricted
for use only with the network in question; this latter subsidy is generally associated
with pre-pay agreements not subject to a fixed term and where future revenue streams
are less certain. Purchases of handsets through retailers may be either without re-
striction or subsidy (a standalone product which can be used ith an existing mobile
subscription, or otherwise may involve sale of a phone-subscritpion bundle.
That the bundling of products is unidirectional (handsets bundled with contracts,
but not vice versa) influences the interpretation of handset manufacturers being up-
stream of network operators and providing an input into the business of the operators.
This assumption on the structure of the market informs the subsequent analysis.
2.4. Competition between Handset Manufacturers
Mobile handsets are durable goods, necessary in order to access a mobile network, and
are characterised by a high rate of product innovation. Owing to this innovation it is
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customary that users of mobile phones tend to replace their handset periodically; this
is closely linked to the fixed term nature of subscriptions to mobile networks and the
subsidy of handsets for new subscribers.
The manufacture of mobile telephone handsets is an industry dominated by a small
number of firms, most of which are large electronics manufacturers with interests in a
range of fields such as televisions, computers, or communications infrastructure. Al-
though there are regional variations, the same handset manufacturers compete against
each other in almost all countries. The largest market participants in handeset manu-
facturing are also persistent over time as indicated in figure 2.414 which indicates that
Nokia, Samsung, and LG have consistently been amongst the largest manufacturers in
terms of handset sale volumes.
Figure 2.4.: Share of quarterly global handset sales by volume (Q3 20001, Q4 20042,
Q1 20103, Q4 20124)
Source: 1BBC News, 2cellular-news, 3E-week Europe, 4Gartner
The firms that manufacture mobile handsets compete in a number of ways including
price, patenting activity, handset proliferation, and through the creation of horizontally
differentiated ecosystems such as application stores; this latter area is discussed in the
relation to network effects and switching in section 2.6.
14In figure 2.4 Sony-Ericsson was known as Ericsson prior to a joint venture in 2001, and is now Sony,
following the Sony purchase of Ericsson’s stake in 2011. Furthermore, where a manufacturer is
shown as having a 0% market share it may have had a very small market share and be included
within the ‘Others’ category.
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There are a number of papers which have studied pricing of mobile handsets; Barros
[2006] does so from the perspective of final prices to consumers and the use of subsidies
by mobile operators to incentivise consumers to lock themselves into fixed term con-
tracts - this is discussed further with respect to the strategies of operators in section 2.5.
More relevant evidence from the perspective of manufacturers is provided by Costello
[2010] and Valletti [2000] who respectively indicate that manufacturers are making slim
or negative profits in their handset divisions, and that there is evidence that prices are
declining at both wholesale and retail level.
The high speed of innovation and technological advancement in mobile telecoms
(which was discussed in relation to the competing standards in section 2.2) presents
the opportunity for firms to engage in patenting; both in terms of essential patents -
those required for the operation of a mobile network, and also patenting of features on
handsets which appeal to consumers.
The number of high profile patent cases involving manufacturers of mobile telephone
handsets, typified by Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. et al. at the
Northern District Court of California (C 11-1846 and C 12-0630), is an indication of
the investment that firms have made in using patenting in order to gain a competitive
advantage over rivals. In a number of cases this has resulted in a ban on sales of par-
ticular handsets or equipment in particular territories following a finding that a patent
has been violated. The importance of patents in gaining competitive advantages is also
manifested in the investment decisions of firms with patent stockpiling being credited
for a number of high-profile horizontal mergers.15
There is evidence that the patenting activities of firms has been a determinant of the
historical market shares held by different firms. Both Bekkers et al. [2002] and Koski
and Kretschmer [2007] highlight the parallels between the early market shares of Nokia,
Ericsson and Siemens, and the firms’ investment in patenting activities surrounding the
GSM standard; this is particularly relevant for pre-1997 ‘essential’ patents - those that
are mandatory for the operation of handset. To this effect Koski and Kretschmer [2007]
also highlight that the advance in technology from 2G GSM to 3G created a water-
shed moment where new technological opportunities presented the opportunity for new
15Notably the acquisition of Motorola by Google, and also the full merger of Sony and Ericsson’s mobile
divisions in 2012.
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Figure 2.5.: Handet varieties by leading manufacturers January 2007 - February 2011)
Source: GSM Arena (February 2011)
innovative entrants to gain a foothold in the market; highlighted in figure 2.4 by the
aggressive entry of Samsung and LG between 2000 and 2004, and the decline of many
of those firms which had previously held significant market shares.
In addition to patenting activities which protect innovation, mobile handset manufac-
turers also engage in product proliferation - producing large numbers of handsets with
minimal differentiation; Schmalensee [1978] states that, in producing large numbers of
varieties, incumbents can stifle entry by making it difficult for potential rivals to reach
a minimum efficient scale. This type of behaviour is shown in figure 2.5 which shows
the large numbers of individual handsets which were marketed by the manufacturers.
Further to the above, Koski and Kretschmer [2007] discuss the emergence of dominant
designs which are introduced by a single firm, become imitated, and finally become the
norm for phone designs; specifically, the authors state that since the late-1990s man-
ufacturers sought to differentiate themselves not just through size and weight, but
increasingly through innovation in features. The authors also state that these features
which were innovative in the 1990s (such as alarm clock or games) became standardised
across handsets by 2002.
Until 2007 mobile telephone handsets had maintained a broadly uniform design fea-
turing a small screen and a physical keypad with buttons which had to be pressed in
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Figure 2.6.: Proportion of handsets featuring large screens (%)
Source: GSM Arena (June 2013)
order to operate the phone. Toward the end of this period manufacturers began to
include large screens on their phones which replaced buttons; this style of handset soon
overtook the previous approach. Figure 2.6 indicates that, while the total number of
handsets released annually increased over the period 2005 to 2011, the proportion of
these featuring a larger screen (greater than three inches diagonally) also increased16
The significance of figure 2.6 is two-fold; it highlights the incentives for patenting
through the potential for the extraction of royalties in mobile handset design, and it
indicates that advantages gained through innovation can be transient and that substi-
tute products will rapidly adopt innovations.
2.5. Competition between Network Operators
Mobile telephone networks are operated on a national basis where each national market
has a small number (typically less than five) operators which compete to attract sub-
scribers to their service. While the manufacturers of handsets are often active in other
complementary markets, network operators are often active in the provision of other
communication services such as broadband or fixed line telephone services. Although
16The criteria for selection of handsets in figures 2.5 and 2.6 was that they had a screen with a diagonal
distance in excess of three inches; consequently these may also include some non-touchscreen devices
which had unusually large screens.
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operators compete at a national level in each territory, the industry is dominated by
multinational firms which operate networks in a number of countries.
Because mobile telephone signals are broadcast using frequencies, much like a con-
ventional FM radio, any firm that wishes to operate a mobile network must, like a
radio station, operate on its own frequency. This ensures that, like radio stations,
each network can broadcast their services without interference from the signals of rival
networks. These technical considerations mean that the operation of mobile networks
must be tightly regulated because the usable bandwidth (the total number of possible
frequencies) is finite and must be rationed.
As a result of this rationing, the entry of mobile network operators into a given
market is through the allocation of licences which allow an operator to broadcast over
a specific set of frequencies. In general the number of licences which are issued in a
country has been determined by the technology available; the introduction of GSM and
CDMA technologies permitted many more users to simultaneously use the available
frequency bandwidth, which enabled greater numbers of firms.17
Figure 2.7.: Cumulative distribution of operator numbers 1984-2009
Source: WCIS 2010
Figure 2.7 shows the total number of countries with mobile telecommunication net-
17The UK initially had a national duopoly but this was increased to four firms following the introduction
of digital networks in 1993.
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works broken down by the number of network operators within the country. The graph
indicates that in most countries the general trend was for a single monopoly network
operator until the mid-1990s. This is confirmed by Gru¨ber and Verboven [2001] who
indicate that, of 118 countries which adopted an early analogue standard (pre-GSM
or CDMA), 88 initially licensed a single monopoly operator. Of the later-adopting
countries which skipped the analogue technology and implemented a digital GSM or
CDMA network, 48 out of 87 issued multiple licences to competing providers.
The way in which licences are issued has varied between countries such that in smaller
countries (such as the UK) licences are nationally issued subject to an auction or oth-
erwise through some alternative selection process18. In larger countries regulators have
historically implemented licensing at a regional level, though these licensing arrange-
ments have frequently led to a subsequent consolidation of separate regions; this was
the case in Russia and the US - Parker and Ro¨ller [1997] explain that the US actually
had 305 non-overlapping markets where each had two operators with one licence in each
territory being determined by lottery19, though India still has strict regionalisation.
Competition between mobile network operators is credited with increasing the diffu-
sion of mobile telecoms [Li and Lyons, 2012; Gru¨ber and Verboven, 2001] and mobile
network operators are observed to compete to attract subscribers in a number of ways
including price competition, vertical and horizontal product differentiation including
the use of exclusive handsets and handset subsidies, or the bundling of mobile telecom-
munications with other complementary communication services. Valletti and Cave
[1998] offers a detailed analysis, with evidence, for different manifestations of compe-
tition in UK telecommunications. Several broad themes in network competition are
introduced below.
Network operators compete in price along a number of different dimensions including
differences in upfront unit costs for a minute of call, and different bundles of minutes,
text messages and data. Valletti and Cave [1998] observe that early variety in tariffs (the
monthly subscription price) was aimed at market segmentation between business users
and consumers, but more recent evidence has highlighted the difficulties in comparing
equivalent tariffs owing to the complexity and number of variables that must be taken
18Binmore and Klemperer [2002] offer an overview of the UK’s licensing procedures from early ‘beauty
contests’ to the 3G auctions in the year 2000.
19In reality a period of consolidation and acquisition meant that cellular operators were active in an
average of 19 separate markets.
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into account [Hatton, 2005]. There is further complexity in comparing equivalent costs
of pre-pay and post-pay tariff where even pre-pay tariffs may feature non-linear pricing.
Network operators compete to differentiate themselves both vertically and horizon-
tally. Where a network seeks to differentiate itself vertically this can either be through
better coverage than its rivals (which would result in a greater number of people able
to access the network, and also reduced likelihood that a user will be unable to use
the network whilst travelling), or otherwise through improved technology such as faster
data speeds. Horizontal differentiation can be in the form of additional non-telecom
perks for subscribers such as discounted concert tickets20, or discounted access to mu-
sic subscriptions. Handset subsidies or exclusivity are also ways networks differentiate
themselves and are designed to attract new users to a network, offset the inconvenience
and lock-in associated with minimum term contracts, or incentive use of particular
services; Barros [2006] finds that subsidies decrease with the increased market share of
the network operator, and that they are increasing when the network operator is trying
to introduce new services.21
The bundling of mobile telecommunications with other communication services such
as broadband is a common mode of competition which is dealt with extensively in the
second half of the present thesis (page 87 onward). Frequently these bundles are sold
at a discount to the separate selling prices which makes them attractive to consumers,
but they are also associated with a decreased willingness to switch provider22; meaning
that they serve both the purposes of customer acquisition and retention. The results
in section 6.3 (page 151) further confirm the impact of bundling products in reducing
switching of provider.
Although clearly a vertically-linked industry, instances of vertical integration between
handset manufacturers and network operators are rare; though there are a number of
instances where a network operator will offer a private-label mobile phone.
20These types of offers are often associated with credit card companies or non-monetary benefits
associated with certain bank accounts.
21Barros [2006] uses the example of the introduction of 3G technology (an improved digital standard)
and the subsidy of phone handsets which could use this technology.
22Ofcom [2008] features a consumer survey using focus groups in which consumers stated an unwill-
ingness to unbundle communication services once they subscribed to bundled products.
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2.6. Switching costs and network effects
Both handsets and mobile networks are characterised by the presence of network ef-
fects and switching costs. Both these phenomena are addressed more fully in the second
part of the thesis but they are briefly outlined below with specific reference to mobile
telecommunications.
Network effects mean that the value of the product to an individual is not just in
their own consumption, but also in the consumption by others; this can be true of
subscribing to a mobile network, or using a particular brand of handset. Switching
costs alternatively make it costly to switch from consumption of one brand to another;
they are particularly prevalent where consumption is characterised repeated purchases
or by long-term relationships such as subscriptions, or durable goods.
Network effects can be characterised as being either direct or indirect; a direct net-
work effect is a direct benefit that stems from the number of users – an example is
the adoption of telephones where the benefit an individual subscriber receives is not
only related to their own adoption, but also to the adoption by others whom they can
call. Direct network effects are particularly present in the early stages of adoption of
technologies and are frequently associated with introductory offers designed to boost
early adoption.23 Indirect network effects are created by where adoption or use of one
product leads to an increase in the quality of an associated product; well-known exam-
ples include the case of video game consoles where the benefit from increased adoption
is that more companies are attracted to produce games.
Network effects arising from the choice of mobile network operator are primarily di-
rect, though there are some issues and types of horizontal differentiation which give
rise to indirect network effects.
Direct network effects stem from the adoption of mobile telecommunications in gen-
eral since, like all forms of communication, the adoption by others benefits all sub-
scribers. More specifically, network effects arise from the choice of standard (as per
section 2.2), and the choice of mobile network.
23This is often the case where the adoption of technology has some ‘tipping point’ where a certain rate
of adoption must be reached, and without which a technology or product will fail.
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The implementation of a single GSM standard in Europe was intended to max-
imise the benefit to individuals of a single technology for mobile telecommunication -
cross-border compatibility meant that users benefited from the geographical scope of
GSM services [Haug, 2002]. Where there are multiple competing standards in mobile
telecommunications this does not necessarily guarantee that users of one standard ben-
efits from overall adoption of the service; this is dependent upon the interoperability
of the technologies.
Within a single standard, there may be network effects in relation to the mobile
network operator to which individual subscribes. The primary source of these network
effects stems from price differences associated with calls between subscribers to the
same network operator (known as ‘on network calls’ ), and calls between subscribers
to different networks; these extra costs stem from interconnection charges which are
charged by either the receiving network or the calling network depending upon the reg-
ulatory environment24. In Europe the interconnection charge is paid by the individual
making the call (as opposed to the US where individuals may have to pay to receive a
call) and is known as a termination rate - the rate charged to the calling network by the
receiving one in order to terminate the call. Figure 2.8 indicates that these termina-
tion rates have declined over time on average,25 but that there still existed disparities
between different countries.
Where it costs a subscriber more to call between mobile networks this creates local
network effects where, rather than the total subscriber base, the benefits of being a
subscriber to a mobile network stem from co-ordination with individuals that an in-
dividual is likely to call, rather than the total number. To this effect both Birke and
Swann [2005] and Corrocher and Zirulia [2009] investigate the extend to which an indi-
vidual’s choice of mobile network operator linked to that of their peers; both find that
the network choices of peers affect an individual’s choices.
There are limited indirect network effects relating to an individual’s choice of network
provider though, where networks engage in horizontal differentiation such as subscriber
special offers, network size is likely to lead to improved range or quality of these benefits.
24This depends upon whether there is a regime of calling party pays (CPP) or receiving party pays
(RPP); there has been some investigation into wider effects of these payment regimes - notably
Littlechild [2006].
25The data includes a sample of 31 European countries.
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Figure 2.8.: European termination rates 2006-2009
Source: European Regulators Group
The network effects associated with an individual’s choice of handset are dominated
by indirect effects, though there are some simple local network effect associated with the
likelihood that a peer has a particular peripheral or charging plug for the phone. The
introduction of phone operating ecosystems, much like standard computer operating
systems, means that third-party software developers can be attracted by the number
of users of a particular phone - leading to greater publishing of applications; this is an
example of the logic frequently applied to video game consoles. Church et al. [2008], in
their theoretical investigation, illustrate that there exist positive adoption externalities
from indirect network effects under plausible conditions that there are economies of
scale in production of software, entry to the associated market is free, and that con-
sumers value variety; they use the example of a computer and associated third-party
software.
Where network effects are an incentive for an individual to adopt a particular hand-
set or mobile network, they can equally create a cost for individuals seeking to switch
away from a network or handset. Foregone beneficial network effects are not the only
source of switching costs; Xavier and Ypsilanti [2008], Valletti and Cave [1998], and
Baker [2007] state that individuals wishing to switch their subscription from one mobile
operator to another may face financial early exit charges (if still within the minimum
contract period), administrative burdens in transferring numbers, pricing obfuscation
which increases search costs, or technical incompatibility between equipment which may
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result in a financial cost. These switching costs arising from incompatibility of equip-
ment arise from to sources; where a handset is fixed to a particular mobile network, and
where, in the case of competing standards, a handset is specific to a particular technol-
ogy [Gru¨ber and Verboven, 2001]. The costs associated with new handset purchases are
often ameliorated by the mobile networks which bundle handsets with minimum-term
subscriptions to the network - often with substantial subsidies; this is regarded as one
of the key competitive strategies for mobile operators [Valletti and Cave, 1998; Valletti,
2000; Barros, 2006].
2.7. Summary
The previous sections show that the scope of mobile telecommunications is global and
that both mobile network operators and handset manufacturers compete in a number
of ways. These observations inform the variables that are included in the later analysis.
The chapter has also provided a technical background to help the reader understand
the concepts and terminologies which are central to the investigation.
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3. Analysis of Entry and Exclusivity
The current investigation explores the determinants of the distribution pattern pursued
by a single upstream manufacturer, Apple, in the context of intra-brand competition.
The literature and characteristics of the market show that there are a number factors
which must be taken into account including the market structure, demand, and the
type and level of technology in each country. The following sections outline the theory
behind the econometric approach, the data, and finally the model specifications and
results.
3.1. Econometric Methodology
The supply decision of Apple, the manufacturer can be simplified as a multi-stage
decision process. Specifically, the decision to enter a market; the decision to supply
exclusively; and, in the case that exclusive distribution is chosen, the decision over the
duration of such exclusivity. The decision over the duration over which to extend an
exclusivity agreement is necessarily subject to the decision to supply exclusively.
The decision process is depicted in figure 3.1, below, where the term piin is an ex-
pression for the likely profit Apple would achieve by entering the market.
In the simple analysis it is assumed that at each decision point the manufacturer
chooses the option which provides the greatest surplus subject to two constraints: it
earns non-negative profits; and the network retailer(s) to which it makes an offer to
must make at least as much profit as its outside option provides. The downstream
constraint is intuitive since the iPhone is one of a number of phones the operator can
sell, the operator may make greater profit by selling alternative models. Both these
conditions are logical; firms will not enter an agreement which leaves them worse off,
and Apple has the outside option of not entering the market (assumed to deliver zero
profits).
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Figure 3.1.: Apple’s market entry decision
The decision over whether to deal exclusively is driven by the factors which were iden-
tified in the prevailing literature such as adverse selection on the part of downstream
firms, or market imperfections and uncertainty. Exclusive distribution agreements may,
alternatively, be necessary in order to incentivise the participation of downstream firms
(or, more accurately, a downstream firm). Linked to Lafontaine and Slade [2005] is the
notion that a certain market size must be guaranteed to a single downstream firm in
order for them to participate; notably in the presence of downstream fixed costs. In
this case one might expect a small, or particularly undeveloped, market to be unable
to support two competing downstream firms, in which case the downstream non-zero
profit participation constraint would not be satisfied for two downstream firms.
There is, however, little in the background material to inform a-priori expectations
concerning the durability of exclusivity agreements. In this respect Boyd [1993] is rel-
evant as the author highlights that the optimal vertical restraint imposed on a down-
stream firm may vary over time according to the product cycle.
The entry decision is determined by the revenue from entry, either by exclusive or
competitive means, and the costs that Apple is likely to face in selling into a mar-
ket. Costs of entry might include transportation of the product, expenses to protect
intellectual property, or fixed costs associated with adapting a device for a particular
territory.
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In order to more formally understand the decisions in figure 3.1 the decisions are split
into two distinct stages (this is reproduced in figure 3.2). For any country or territory if
at stage B piin = max(piexc, picomp) > 0 then at stage A the decision is taken to enter the
market. Given that entry has occurred the most profitable strategy is pursued subject
to the outside-option profit constraint for the downstream firms(s).
Figure 3.2.: Apple’s market entry decision
The analysis is performed in two stages, the entry choice of the upstream manufac-
turer at A, and the exclusivity decision at B. The two stages are modelled indepen-
dently,which means they are estimated separately with the investigation at stage B
executed against the subsample of countries where the iPhone was sold.
The observer will not that the decision nodes at stages 2 and 3 are estimated using
a single process. This is necessary as a result of distributional issues surrounding the
analysis of censored data. This is discussed at length in section 3.1.2.
For each country (i) the profitability which drives decisions in A and B is some func-
tion of the characteristics of the country (demographics), the market and competition,
and the technological profile of the country. Following from the assumption of indepen-
dence of the stages earlier there is no restriction that, for instance, the demographic
determinant of entry is identical to demographic determinants of exclusivity. This un-
structured approach abstracts from particular profit functions for either upstream or
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the downstream firms.
Entryi = f (demographics1,i,market1,i, technology1,i)
Exclusivityi = f (demographics2,i,market2,i, technology2,i)
Duration|Exclusivityi = f (demographics3,i,market3,i, technology3,i)
The following sections outline the models used to estimate the likelihood of Apple’s
selling into a country, and the excusivity decisions of the manufacturer.
3.1.1. Entry Decision
The propensity of Apple to sell phones into a specific market is likely to be some func-
tion of both the characteristics of the country and the market:
Entry propensity = I (Country size, Country population, Country income, Country region,
Market competitiveness, Number of firms, Market technology) (3.1)
While the above factors influence the entry decision it is not possible to observe the
true entry function on which the propensity to enter the market is based. Instead we
observe, based upon the characteristics of the country, whether (or not) the iPhone was
actually launched. In this respect the observed entry decision is a binary yes/no based
upon some underlying latent profit function.
Binary Choice
In order to formally analyse the launch of the iPhone a Probit model is employed based
upon the random utility framework of Greene [2012].
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In each country ‘i ’, where there are j = 1, 2, ..., N operators. The maximum potential
profit which can be extracted by Apple by contracting with ‘n ≤ N ’ network operators
is indicated by the expression ‘max
∑n
j=1 pii,j ’. At this point it is not necessary to define
the exact number n, only to understand that in each country there exists some optimal
level of n ≥ 0 which delivers the highest level of profit. The determination of n is the
subject of the second half of the investigation.
Defining Πi,out as the profit for Apple if it chooses not to sell into a country, and
Πi,in as the profit gained upon entry:
Πi,out = 0 (3.2)
=
Πi,in max
n∑
j=1
pii,j = x
′
iα+ εi (3.3)
From equation (3.2), Apple’s profit from non-entry is equal to zero. Equation (3.3)
indicates that the profit from entry into i is dependent upon a vector of characteristics
(xi). These characteristics are associated with a fixed set of coefficients (α) and an
error term which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity between countries - εi.
Since Apple will enter a market if it makes non-negative profit, the probability of
such entry can be expressed:
Prob[Entryi = 1|xi] = Prob[Πi,in > 0]
= Prob[(x′iα+ εi) > 0|xi] (3.4)
Probit Estimation
Apple is basing their entry decision based upon unobserved and unknown upstream
and downstream profit functions, hence the true profitability cannot be observed. The
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actual decision to enter is observed and can be expressed as a binary variable (1=enter,
0= no). From (3.4), which is based upon the underlying profit function, it is possible
to use a relevant set of observed variables to estimate the decision by Apple to enter
market i as some latent variable Ei:
Ei = x
′
iα+ εi
Thus, much like the net utility calculation of (3.4) the decision to switch is implicitly
illustrated by the condition:
Enteri =
{
1 if Ei ≥ 0
0 if Ei < 0
}
(3.5)
Thus, from (3.5) and (3.5) the probability that Apple enters a country is:
Prob[Ei ≥ 0] = Prob[εi > −x′iα] (3.6)
By assuming the error term εi to be normally distributed according to εi ∼ N [0, 1] ,
which is symmetrical, the above can be rewritten:
Prob[Ei ≥ 0] = Prob[x′iα > εi] (3.7)
In imposing the standard normal distribution on the error term the Probit model is
being used, as such, the standard normal distribution function is used in calculating
the probability of entry (Ei > 0):
50
Analysis of Entry and Exclusivity
Prob[Enteri = 1] =
∫ x′iα
−∞
φ(Ei)dEi = Φ(x
′
iα) (3.8)
Where φ is the standard normal distribution and Φ the cumulative density function
for the standard normal distribution; where Φ(Ei > 0) > 0.5, creating a positive proba-
bility of entering. The Probit model is calculated using maximum likelihood estimation.
3.1.2. Exclusivity and Duration
The current study empirically examines the duration of exclusive distribution agree-
ments made by Apple in the initial years of the availability of the iPhone. This analysis
of exclusivity presents a challenge to the econometrician. Because there are a large
number of countries in the sample in which exclusivity was not pursued this means
that any variable examining the duration of exclusivity across the sample will contain
many zeros. Although the presence of zeros in a dataset per se does not itself create
difficulties, the issue in this instance is that the zero values represent a censoring of the
dataset. They constitute an artificial minimum value imposed on the duration variable.
Censoring or Limiting of Datasets
Data is considered to be censored or limited when an otherwise continuous variable has
a probability mass at one or more points [Wooldridge, 2002]. To illustrate the effect of
a censored or truncated variable figure 3.3 shows two distributions for the variable x.
Distribution I is normally distributed, while II shown the same variable truncated at
some value x
Distribution II shows a probability mass at the imposed lower bound x. This prob-
ability mass results in distortions to the mean of the variable and intuitively results in
biased estimated coefficients when using the variable in analysis. When using a trun-
cated dependent variable Tobin [1958] observes that the concentration of observations
at the limiting value makes conventional OLS multiple regression inappropriate since
this will violate a number of the regression assumptions concerning the distribution of
error terms.
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Figure 3.3.: Truncated variable x
Data which is commonly censored includes data on purchase and consumption deci-
sions - or any variable where there is a positive probability of a zero result. In the case
of consumption purchases negative values are unrealistic (a consumer rarely makes a
negative purchase of, for example, tomatoes). The problem with analysing the contin-
uous nature of this lower censored data is that there may exist a subset of observed
zeros that, given the characteristics of the individual, would actually seek to make a
negative purchase (they really dislike tomatoes).
There have been a number of solutions proposed to address the problems associated
with the estimation of coefficients when analysing a censored continuous dependent
variable. The models which have been proposed operate by splitting the estimation of
the sample between those observations which are censored and those which are not.
The censored Tobit model [Tobin, 1958] addresses this issues of censorship. Like the
Probit model explained in 3.1.1 it assumes that the censored variable which is observed
(Duration) is actually related to some underlying latent variable, D, such that:
D = xβ + u, u|x ∼ Normal(0, σ2)
Duration = max(0, D)
In this instance the underlying latent variable is only observed subject to the passing
of the zero threshold, but there is a positive probability mass at zero. The Tobit model
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proposes the following likelihood function which, when maximised, yields estimates of
the vector of coefficients, β::
f(Duration|x) = {1− Φ(xβ/σ)}1(D=0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
[
(2pi)−
1
2σ−1 exp
{−(y − xβ)2/2σ2}]1(D>0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(3.9)
In (3.9) the likelihood function has two components; the likelihood that D = 0 indi-
cated by A, and the likelihood that D > 0 shown by B.
In the case of data which is censored at zero, the shortcoming of the Tobit model is
that both the probability the D > 0, and the value of D for any value D > 0 are deter-
mined by the same mechanism and the same vector of parameters. This restriction is
logical in an example where consumption of a good is solely some function of income
and zero consumption of the good the result of financial constraint. However, in many
cases the relationship between the two stages is not so clear.
Using again the example of consumption; suppose that desired consumption of the
good is not only determined by income, but also determined by some parameter of
personal taste unrelated to income (hair colour, for example). In this instance there
would be a subset of individuals (possibly with brown hair) which would never choose
to consume a positive quantity of the good, irrespective of their income. There is no
link between passing the threshold and the final value of the variable.
In this case we are still interested in the value of the continuous variable. It is still
necessary to control for the censored distribution of the continuous variable, but the
binary variable which determines the passing of the threshold value is determined by
some separate process.
3.1.3. Cragg’s Tobit Alternative
Cragg [1971] proposes a two-stage or ‘double-hurdle’ alternative to the simple Tobit
model in which the two stages (binary and continuous) can be determined by different
processes.
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In the relevant case of censoring at zero (as per the Duration variable), in order
for the continuous variable to record a positive value two conditions must be met.
The first condition dictates that the process determining the binary process must yield
a positive response. The second condition rules that, subject to the first condition
being met, the process determining the continuous variable is sufficient to deliver a
positive outcome. Thus an observed value of zero may be the result of just one of
these conditions not being met, while a positive value requires the satisfaction of both
conditions. In the earlier simple case of consumption, the consumer would require a)
the specific hair colour to indicate that they would be willing to consume the product,
and also sufficient income to guarantee its purchase.
f(X,D|x1, x2) = {1− Φ(x1γ)}1(X=0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A[
Φ(x1γ)(2pi)
− 1
2σ−1 exp
{−(y − x2η)2/2σ2}Φ(x2η/σ)−1]1(D>0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(3.10)
In applying Cragg’s model to the present case. The observed continuous duration
variable is still denoted D, but a separately introduced binary variable is included, X,
which is equal to 1 in the case that D is positive and zero otherwise. In this case X
represents the presence of exclusivity.
The likelihood function for the Cragg [1971] double hurdle model indicated by equa-
tion (3.10), like the Tobit, has two components; the probability that X = 0 (A), and
the likelihood that D > 0 given the censored continuous duration variable (indicated
by the expression B). From (3.10) the maximum likelihood estimate of γ is the same as
the Probit estimator discussed in section 3.1.1. Part B of (3.10) is readily identifiable
as a probability-weighted truncated normal distribution. The term Φ(x2η/σ)
−1 ensures
that the density of the truncated normal integrates to one.
Notable in Cragg’s model is that the process determining the hurdle result and the
positive value are different; they depend upon different vectors of variables (x1, x2),
each with its corresponding vector of coefficients (γ, η). Where x1 = x2 the model per-
mits the same dependent variables to act in different directions at different stages in the
model if γ 6= ησ . This allows for the separability of the determinants of the durability
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of exclusivity agreements to differ from those variables determining the imposition of
exclusivity.
Notably, the Tobit can be viewed as a special case of Cragg’s model where γ = ησ .
This forms the basis of the Lin and Schmidt [1984] Lagrange multiplier test which tests
this restriction to determine the appropriateness of the Tobit specification.
In summary, while the Tobit model remains a method for overcoming problems as-
sociated with a truncated distribution, Cragg’s alternative is a true two-stage model
which allows for the separability of the the impact of different variables at different
stages in the model.
The following sections outline the data and specifications of the model which are to
be tested under the different methodologies. The results are reported and discussed
later in section 3.4.
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3.2. Data
In order to make inferences on the determinants of entry, exclusivity, and the duration
of exclusivity agreements this investigation uses a dataset gathered from a number of
sources; it contains variables from off-the-shelf datasets and also data which has been
collected. The data is summarised in table 3.1 while the correlation coefficients for
the variables are shown in Appendix A. There are no instances where variables are
perfectly correlated.
Table 3.1.: Variable summary
Variable Source n Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
iPhone launched (1=yes) Author’s research 187 0.449 0.499 0 1
Exclusivity (1=yes) Author’s research 84 0.726 0.449 0 1
Duration (days) Author’s research 84 695.619 614.764 0 1836
Log Land Area WB 187 11.265 2.692 3.332 16.611
Log Pop. Density WB 187 4.23 1.535 -1.986 9.805
Log GDP/Capita WB 187 8.441 1.568 5.222 11.839
Africa Google 187 0.278 0.449 0 1
North America Google 187 0.144 0.352 0 1
South America Google 187 0.059 0.236 0 1
Asia Google 187 0.225 0.418 0 1
Aus & Oceania Google 187 0.059 0.236 0 1
Europe Google 187 0.235 0.425 0 1
Num. Firms WCIS 187 3.503 1.938 1 14
HHI WCIS 187 0.477 0.198 0.169 1
Competing Standards WCIS 187 0.118 0.323 0 1
Mobiles per 100 ITU 187 82.156 44.938 1.02 232.068
Vendor Position WCIS 61 1.738 0.854 1 5
Delay from launch Author’s research 84 461.167 153.69 0 900
3.2.1. Dependent Variables
The data for all dependent variables in the analysis was collected by the author over
a period of several months in late-2010 and early-2011. After this period checks were
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regularly made to monitor for additions to the data or, where information had been
missing, new data. Collection of the data required a methodical review of press re-
leases, industry news, and local news sources; in total around 300 individual pieces of
evidence were considered. Data collection was focussed in a number of areas; whether
the iPhone was launched in a given country, the date of launch in that country, whether
it was sold exclusively through a single network operator, and the date at which any
exclusivity expired. In addition the identity of the firm which gained exclusivity was
recorded in order to be able to match up the collected iPhone data with other datasets.
The collected iPhone dataset is reproduced in appendix B which features a complete
list of the websites that were used in production of the dataset.
The elicited variables and the process of collection is outlined below:
Identity of iPhone Countries
Data on the countries in which the iPhone was distributed is the dependent variable
used when examining what motivates Apple to sell into particular countries. The de-
cision to sell the iPhone in a country is represented as a binary variable with a value
of 0 or 1 for each country in the sample.
To identify those countries in which iPhone was distributed the official Apple web-
site was consulted. The website features a specific set of pages for each country where
Apple products are locally sold. If the iPhone was available in a country then these
pages would either allow the purchase of the phone (with an accompanying airtime
contract) or offer a link to the distributor partner’s website (or websites where there
were multiple distributing operators). If the iPhone was not officially available in a
country then the option to purchase the phone would not be displayed.
In total 109 countries were identified in which the iPhone is launched through at least
one official network partner. Of these countries a subset of 84 was isolated where the
iPhone was both launched before 2010 (the period covered by the available datasets)
and where the countries also have complete information in the main datasets we use.
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iPhone Exclusivity
Whether the iPhone was launched exclusively with a single network operator forms the
binary first hurdle in the two stage model investigating exclusivity and its duration.
Press releases were favoured as the primary source of evidence in order to determine
whether the iPhone was launched exclusively in a country. These press releases were
primarily issued by Apple, but sometimes from the relevant network operator. In a
very small number of cases it was necessary to rely upon national or industry press. It
was found that in 23 of the 84 countries in the usable sample the iPhone was launched
competitively with more than one official network partner. In the remaining 61 coun-
tries the iPhone was launched exclusively.
Appendix B indicates the sources of evidence that were used.
Duration of Exclusivity
The duration of any exclusivity is the truncated continuous variable used as the second
hurdle in the two-stage exclusivity-duration model.
In order to identify the duration of any exclusivity it was necessary to determine,
first, the launch date of the iPhone in the relevant countries, and, secondly, the date
that the next subsequent vendor started selling the phone. Again, press releases were
employed; the initial launch date was in almost all cases included in either Apple’s or
the network operator’s press release. For the dates of second and later vendors there
was a greater reliance on press releases from the operator themselves. Finally, as before,
in some isolated cases it was necessary to consult local press or industry news sources
to learn launch dates.
Using information on dates, the duration variable was calculated as the number of
days between the initial launch by an exclusive operator, and the date at which a sub-
sequent operator started selling the iPhone. In the case that the iPhone was launched
initially with multiple network operators (competitively) then the duration variable is
equal to zero.
The details of all eventual vendors is shown in the dataset in appendix B.
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Where exclusivity is ongoing (there is still an exclusive network operator) the dura-
tion of exclusivity was taken as the days between launch and September 2013. While
this represented an artificial censoring of the data it did not have a probability mass (as
at zero) due to the heterogeneity in launch dates. To ensure robustness of the results a
second upper censoring was tested which specified the duration for ongoing exclusivity
as the days between launch and September 2014 (an extra 365 days); there were no
significant differences in the results.
From the above investigations, the identity of the launch operator(s) was isolated;
this enabled the matching of the iPhone-specific data with the datasets pertaining to
firm-level telecommunications data.
3.2.2. Independent Variables
In order to analyse the determinants of the exclusivity and duration three off-the-shelf
datasets were used: World Bank (WB) data on land characteristics and demographics;
the World Cellular Information Service (WCIS) dataset on firm-level mobile telecom-
munications; and International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data on country-level
telecommunications indicators. Where necessary the internet search engine Google was
also consulted for consistency in determining the geographic location of some countries.
Table 3.1 specifies the source of the respective variables.
Because variables needed to be complete for all countries, this influenced the specific
choice of variable but, even taking the most complete variables available, the number
countries included in the study was reduced from all countries in the world to a work-
able sample of 187.
Demographic Control Variables
In order to control for the underlying economic and physical characteristics of the coun-
tries in the study a range of variables are included.
Country Size and Population Density
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In order to control for any effect related to country size and the population, both land
area and population density are included. Land area and population density are likely
to affect the cost and returns on investment of implementing or upgrading a mobile
network. Both these statistics are included in log-form to correct for a left-sided bias.
Country per Capita GDP
The per capita GDP of a country can be considered to be a proxy for demand and
thus affects the likelihood of a firm carrying out business in that country. Country GDP
is included in the form of GDP per capita in current US dollars. Per-capita GDP has
a long right-tail, as such the natural log of per-capita GDP is included in the analysis.
Continent Dummy Variables
In order to capture any region-specific variation in policy, or demand characteristics,
dummy variables are included indicating in which continent a country is located. Cen-
tral American countries are considered as part of North America, while many Pacific
Islands are considered to be part of Oceania with Australia. In the interests of consis-
tency where there was ambiguity the search engine Google was consulted and the most
prevalent answer from the search results included.
Market structure
In addition to broad demographic effects which are likely to affect the mutual desirabil-
ity of Apple of network operators to sell the iPhone, the characteristics and competi-
tiveness of the individual markets is predicted to determine the likelihood and duration
of any exclusivity arrangements. Market-level data is primarily sourced from the ITU
and WCIS datasets.
Number of Firms and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)
For each country data concerning the number of active licensed operators and the
HHI is included for the year and quarter when the iPhone was launched. If the iPhone
was not sold in a country during the study period, the HHI and firm numbers infor-
mation is included for the final quarter of 2009. Given that many countries since the
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introduction of mobile telecommunications have experienced significant consolidation
in the number of mobile operators, an operator is considered to be active if they have
a positive number of subscriptions.
For each country (i) the HHI is calculated using each active operators’ share of the
total subscriptions in that country, denoted si,j where j represents the operator:
HHIi =
N∑
j
si,j
The level of competition within a country is likely to affect the value to a firm of
selling the iPhone. If a market is concentrated then the lack of competition may mean
that a dominant firm can earn greater profits from selling non-iPhone handsets relative
to firms in highly competitive markets. For network operators in competitive markets
the iPhone may act as a key competitive differentiator - making it relatively more valu-
able to these firms relative to firms facing little competition.
Technology
Variables are included which indicate both the type of technology which is being used
in each country and also the penetration of mobile technology.
Competing Standards
As discussed in section 2.2 there are a number of technological standards that are used
to transmit mobile telecommunication signals (the main two being GSM and CDMA).
These standards render some mobile handsets incompatible with some networks. Sec-
tion 2.2 indicates that the presence of competing standards leads to switching costs for
subscribers in addition to those which would normally exist when switching networks
based upon the same technology.
The iPhone was initially incompatible with CDMA networks and was only launched
with CDMA compatibility in February 2011. Given the time limitations of the dataset
this means that the study is limited only to the launch of the GSM model.
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A dummy indicator is included equal to 1 (zero otherwise) if there is more than one
compatible standard in operation within a country. Because in many countries there
are a number of legacy standards from the early stages of mobile phone development
with a very small number of subscribers, the competing standards dummy considers
a single standard country to be one where the dominant standard has over 90% of
subscriptions. When considering a single standard the competing standards variable
considers the entire family of that standard; for example, when considering GSM sub-
scriptions, both GSM and the subsequent W-CDMA standard are included.
Mobile Penetration
In order to capture the use of mobile phones in each country a variable is included
which indicates the number of mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. This variable
indicates how widespread the use of mobile phones is and, thus, the potential size of
the market.
Other Variables
Two variables are included which are used only in the two-stage model investigating
exclusivity and duration to provide further information about the iPhone launch and
the firm which is allocated exclusivity.
Vendor Position
Vendor position is used to investigate whether the market position of the firm which
is allocated exclusivity determines the duration of the exclusivity agreement. Neces-
sarily it is only observed in the case that an exclusivity strategy was pursued.
Time
The variable ‘Delay from launch’ is included which represents the number of days
between the initial launch of the iPhone in the US in 2007, and the launch of the
iPhone in each country. This time aspect is designed to capture the effect of uncertainty
(common to many of the theoretical models of section 1.3) diminishing over time. It is
62
Analysis of Entry and Exclusivity
necessarily included only for those countries where the iPhone was launched.
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3.3. Econometric Specification
The empirical investigations in the next section focus on two themes: the decision of
Apple to sell the iPhone in a particular territory; and the decision to contract exclu-
sively to sell through a single network operator. In both cases a cross-section of up
to 187 countries is analysed using the demographic and telecommunications-specific
variables outlined in the previous section.
This section outlines the specification of the models which are tested using the econo-
metric methodologies of section 3.1. Also outlined is the rationale for testing using both
a full and restricted sample, and also descriptions of some of the robustness testing
which is applied to the results.
3.3.1. Entry
In analysing the entry decision section 3.1 explained that the approach being taken is
to treat the entry decision as binary where a value of 1 implies the iPhone was sold in
a particular country, zero otherwise. To this effect a Probit model is employed.
The analysis examines several specifications of the entry model; focussing on the case
where only demographic control variables are considered, up to a model containing both
demographic and telecommunication variables. Denoting Ei as the underlying latent
variable determining launch in country i, the specifications used are as follows:
(A) Ei = α0 + α1LogLandAreai + α2LogPopDensityi + α3LogGDPCapitai + εi
(B)
Ei = α0 + α1LogLandAreai + α2LogPopDensityi + α3LogGDPCapitai+
+
α9∑
α4
Continenti + εi
(C)
Ei = α0 + α1LogLandAreai + α2LogPopDensityi + α3LogGDPCapitai+
+
α9∑
α4
Continenti + α10Num.Firmsi + α11HHIi + εi
(D)
Ei = α0 + α1LogLandAreai + α2LogPopDensityi + α3LogGDPCapitai+
+
α9∑
α4
Continenti + α10Num.Firmsi + α11HHIi + α12Comp.Standardsi+
+α13MobilesPer100i + εi
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In each of the specifications (A) to (D) variables are iteratively added to the re-
gression to identify their additional influence on the decision to sell the iPhone. The
coefficients α4 to α9 represent the influence of the dummy variables asscociated with
the region in which the country is based.
Population effects
The sample of 187 countries used in the investigation contains a number of countries
with low populations. Where a country has a low population, or a small size, then it is
likely that operators in these countries are not faced with the same set of constraints;
the choice set of the firms in terms of investment, or the nature of competition, is likely
to be different.
As such, the above regressions (A) to (D) are repeated with a restricted sample where
the population is in excess of 499,000. Any significant change in the results will indicate
that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is different for
the subset of smaller countries. The results from these restricted-sample regressions are
included as specifications (E) to (H); they are unchanged in structure from the above
but for the reduced sample size.
Goodness of Fit
The above specifications (A) to (D), and (E) to (H), are constructed by iteratively
adding relevant variables to determine their effect. Because the absolute value of the
log-likelihood is non-increasing in the number of variables there exists a danger of ‘over-
fitting’ the model through the inclusion of irrelevant variables. Burnham and Anderson
[2004] observe the trade-off between parsimony which can result in biased models, and
those over-fitted models where significance is lost or otherwise there is spurious identi-
fication of significant effects. In order to illustrate that the addition of extra variables
results in a better fitting model Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) is employed. The
AIC improves with associated decreases in the absolute value of the log-likelihood, but
(all else being equal) degrades with the size of the model as measured by the number
of included variables.
In a maximum likelihood model, such as the probit, the AIC formula is expressed
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as below, where a smaller value of AIC implies a better fitting model:
AIC = 2Df − 2 ln(L)
Where Df represents the degrees of freedom of the model and ln(L) is the log-
likelihood of the model.
For all of the regressions (A) to (H), the specification of the models is tested and the
results reported.
3.3.2. Exclusivity
Two regression techniques are used in the investigation of exclusivity; the Tobit model
and Cragg’s Tobit alternative. The Tobit is restrictive in a number of assumptions
but by testing these assumptions it allows inferences to be made about whether the
determinants of the durability of exclusive supply arrangements are the same factors
which influence its initial imposition. The Cragg model conversely allows much greater
flexibility.
The Tobit model
The Tobit model is used to determine whether the same relationship governs both the
decision to supply exclusively and the duration of the exclusivity. The specification of
the Tobit model employed is shown below:
(I)
Durationi = β0 + β1LogLandAreai + β2LogPopDensityi + β3LogGDPCapitai+
+
β9∑
β4
Continenti + β10Num.Firmsi + β11HHIi + β12Comp.Standardsi+
+β13MobilesPer100i + β14LaunchDelay + εi
Section 3.1 describes that the Tobit model is used to overcome issues relating to the
truncation of a continuous variable by utilising a hurdle where Durationi > 0. This
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restricts the analysis in that the same process must govern both whether Durationi ex-
ceeds zero, and its ultimate magnitude. The relationship between drivers of exclusivity
and duration form one of the key strands of investigation, thus this assumption is tested
using the Lagrange Multiplier test of Lin and Schmidt [1984] and results discussed.
With the same rationale as in the case for entry, the Tobit model is performed with
both the full sample of 84 countries where the iPhone was launched, and the population-
restricted sample of 81 countries; resulting in, respectively, specifications (I) and (J).
Cragg’s Tobit alternative
In addition to the Tobit model Cragg’s Tobit alternative is also used to investigate
exclusivity; this allows separability of the processes which govern exclusivity, and those
determining its duration. Cragg’s model utilises both a probit form for the initial exclu-
sivity decision, and a truncated normal regression for the continuous duration variable.
As such, each of the following specifications has a regression representing each of the
components; where Xi is the underlying latent variable determining exclusivity in coun-
try i, and Durationi the length of the exclusivity period:
The regressions (K), (L), and (M), based upon Cragg’s Tobit alternative, are also
replicated for the restricted sample; denoted (N), (O), and (P).
The following section outlines and interprets the key results from the various models.
A discussion of the results with respect to a-priori expectations follows.
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(K)
Xi = γ0 + γ1LogLandAreai + γ2LogPopDensityi + γ3LogGDPCapitai+
+
γ9∑
γ4
Continenti + εi
Durationi = η0 + η1LogLandAreai + η2LogPopDensityi + η3LogGDPCapitai+
+
η9∑
η4
Continenti + υi
(L)
Xi = γ0 + γ1LogLandAreai + γ2LogPopDensityi + γ3LogGDPCapitai+
+
γ9∑
γ4
Continenti + εi
Durationi = η0 + η1LogLandAreai + η2LogPopDensityi + η3LogGDPCapitai+
+
η9∑
η4
Continenti + η10Num.Firmsi + η11HHIi + η12Comp.Standardsi+
+η13MobilesPer100i + η14LaunchDelay + η15VendorPos. + υi
(M)
Xi = γ0 + γ1LogLandAreai + γ2LogPopDensityi + γ3LogGDPCapitai+
+
γ9∑
γ4
Continenti + γ10Num.Firmsi + γ11HHIi + γ12Comp.Standardsi+
+γ13MobilesPer100i + γ14LaunchDelay + εi
Durationi = η0 + η1LogLandAreai + η2LogPopDensityi + η3LogGDPCapitai+
+
η9∑
η4
Continenti + η10Num.Firmsi + η11HHIi + η12Comp.Standardsi+
+η13MobilesPer100i + η14LaunchDelay + η15VendorPos. + υi
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3.4. Results and Discussion
The results from the investigation indicate that, as proposed, there are distinctions
between the mechanisms which determine imposition and duration of exclusivity re-
straints. Furthermore, in examining the duration of the agreements there is significant
evidence that both the level of competition and the presence of competing standards
have a positive relationship with the duration of exclusivity.
As outlined in the preceding sections, two investigations are carried out: determi-
nants of entry; and determinants of exclusivity. In each case a different but appropriate
method of econometric analysis has been employed. Furthermore, in each case investi-
gations were carried out on both a full sample of countries, and also a restricted sample
which eliminated those with a population less than 500,000. The results for both sam-
ples are included below.
3.4.1. Population Effects
The decision to investigate two samples - separated by population - is driven by the
prediction that the operation of mobile telecommunications is subject to different con-
straints in smaller countries vis-a-vis larger ones. These constraints are likely to be
different distributions of income, different challenges in terms of network infrastruc-
ture, and differences in the nature or strength of competition.
In order to test this prediction the sample of countries is split into subsets of ‘small’
(according to an upper population limit of 499,999 for a small country) and other coun-
tries. For each of the subsets of countries the set of continuous variables analysed in
the models (which is assumed to be a proxy of the different constraints firms face) is
compared. This is subjected to a Mann-Whitney test to determine whether they are
drawn from the same distribution.
The Mann-Whitney test is used to determine whether a set of observed results are
comparable to a wider distribution. It is set against a null hypothesis that they are
drawn from the same underlying distribution. In the case that the underlying distribu-
tions of the variables are determined to be significantly different from each other the
null hypothesis is rejected.
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Table 3.2.: Mann-Whitney test of population restriction
Variable Mean Small Mean Others MW U P> |U |
Log Land Size 7.038 12.01 7.442 0.000***
Log Pop. Density 4.656 4.155 -2.412 0.016**
Log GDP per Capita 9.269 8.295 -2.912 0.004***
Mobiles per 100 94.099 80.052 -1.73 0.084*
Num. Firms 2.036 3.761 5.556 0.000***
hline
Table 3.2 indicates that the mean values for the variables are different between the
smaller and other countries’ continuous variables. The Mann-Whitney U -value for each
of the variables is also significant at a 1% level in the case of land size (smaller pop-
ulation countries are also smaller), GDP per capita (smaller countries are richer on
a per capita basis), and the number of competing network operators (less in smaller
countries).
These results support the additional analysis of a restricted sample. For robustness
different population thresholds were also considered, but ultimately rejected based upon
a balance of Mann-Whitney scoring and intuition on what the population censoring is
designed to achieve.
3.4.2. Entry Decision
A Probit model is utilised to examine the binary nature of Apple’s decision to sell their
iPhone in particular countries. It includes both demographic and telecommunication-
based independent variables. As mentioned above, the model is tested using a full and
a restricted sample. The results are shown in table 3.3 while the marginal effects for
specifications (D) and (H) are shown in table 3.4.
Table 3.3 indicates that under both the full and restricted sample, irrespective of
model specification, the coefficients associated with raw demographic variables (α1, α2,
and α3) are significant at the 1% level. The probability of the iPhone being sold was
higher in those territories which were bigger, more densely populated, and richer in
terms of per capita GDP.
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GDP was included as a proxy for the overall level of demand within a country and
has the expected sign. Countries with a higher level of demand are likely to be more
profitable, both downstream and consequently upstream.
Higher population density means that infrastructure cost per user is lower, however
the link between this and the economic rationale for the introduction of the iPhone is
not clear. Where the fixed cost of infrastructure per user is lower this would reduce the
cost associated with network infrastructure upgrades (if needed). However the likely
explanation is that these networks are simply better developed.
Land size, having controlled for population density and GDP, does not immediately
lend itself to a theory supporting the sale of the iPhone. Land size is negatively corre-
lated with both GDP per capita and population density (see Appendix A).
In terms of geographic controls, countries in Asia were less likely to sell the iPhone,
relative to Europe – the geographic base variable. This confirmed the patterns which
were observed in the data.
In terms of telecom-specific variables, α11 - the coefficient associated with HHI is
significant at either 5 or 10% level in, respectively, specifications C and D (and also G
and H ). The inclusion of a variable representing the number of firms means that HHI
is interpreted as a measure purely of the inequality of firm markets shares.
Persistent inequality in firm market shares can be perceived as where markets are
less competitive. This links the notion of market competitiveness with firms’ likelihood
(or lack of) of selling the iPhone. The rationale for this outcome may lie in the iPhone
as a competitive tool; networks hope to attract customers by selling the iPhone. If this
is not the case then networks may feel little need to sell the iPhone. On the basis that
every sale of an iPhone has an opportunity cost in terms of another variety handset
that could be sold. If competition is not strong, and the unit profit from an iPhone
is less than other available handsets, then the incentives to sell the iPhone will be weak.
None of the other telecommunications-specific coefficients are significant at 10% or
higher in any of the specifications. Given the interpretation of the variable ‘Mobiles
per 100’ as an indicator of the development and penetration of the mobile market, this
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suggests that this had little bearing on the sale of the iPhone in a given country.
Result 1 The determinants of the sale of the iPhone in a given country is dominated
by basic demographic factors of land size, population density, and GDP per capita. Of
the telecom specific variables included, only the measure of inequality of firm sizes is
significant; indicating that the iPhone was less likely to be sold in concentrated markets.
Entry Probit Goodness of Fit
In comparing the model specifications, because the log-likelihood is non-decreasing in
the number of variables added, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) is used. This
moderates the log-likelihood based upon the number of variables which are added to
avoid spurious conclusions from proliferation of explanatory items. The AIC statistic,
where smaller is better, indicates that the model improves with the addition of the
extra variables, even where individually the variables are insignificant.
The smaller AIC results indicate that under both restricted and unrestricted samples
the full models ((D) and (H)) provide the best explanation of the data. Although the
telecom-specific variables are of limited significance, the model performs better with
their inclusion.
Entry Probit Marginal Effects
The marginal effects for a unit change in the included variables on the probability are
included in table 3.4.
The significance of the marginal effects naturally mirrors the results in the table 3.3.
They show that an increase of 20% in the HHI of a country (i.e. from 0.2 to 0.4) would
reduce the probability of the iPhone being sold by around 10%. Unit increases in the
log demographic variables indicate an increased likelihood of the sale of the iPhone by
between (approximately) 10 and 15%. One must be wary of interpreting these results
too literally. The demographic variables are transformed and as such a unit increase
does not imply a linear increase in their respective underlying value.
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Table 3.4.: Entry Probit Marginal Effects
Full sample Restricted sample
Marginal effect (D) (H)
Log Land Area
0.117*** 0.103***
(0.015) (0.023)
Log Pop. Density
0.145*** 0.129***
(0.025) (0.032)
Log GDP/Capita
0.132*** 0.132***
(0.028) (0.033)
Africa
-0.004 0.041
(0.089) (0.099)
North America
0.058 0.21*
(0.096) (0.124)
South America
0.149 0.184
(0.131) (0.139)
Asia
-0.221*** -0.184**
(0.078) (0.088)
Aus & Oceania
0.088 0.142
(0.217) (0.259)
Europe (omitted) (omitted)
Num. Firms
-0.03 -0.026
(0.023) (0.026)
HHI
-0.502** -0.539*
(0.251) (0.287)
Competing Standards
-0.133 -0.129
(0.1) (0.111)
Mobiles per 100
0 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Standard errors in parentheses
* (p <0.1), ** (p <0.05), *** (p <0.01)
3.4.3. Exclusivity and duration
The study of exclusivity is formed of two parts: evidence that the determinants of
the imposition of exclusive distribution agreements differ from those determining its
duration; and the study of the drivers of both stages examined with respect to the
theoretical predictions.
Modelling exclusivity and duration as a two distinct components in the same process
requires a different approach to standard regression models. Thus, in this investigation
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two-stage models are used; the Tobit model, and Cragg’s Tobit alternative. Two stage
models allow the analysis of truncated or censored variables. Specifically, where a vari-
able is censored at zero a two-stage model allows analysis of the conditions required
breach the zero threshold, and the subsequent analysis of determinants of the final
magnitude of the variable.
The Tobit approach
One of the core aims of this part of the thesis is to determine whether the duration
of an exclusivity agreement is determined by the same variables which determine its
imposition. The core assumption of the Tobit model is that a single process governs
both the breach of the threshold and the final magnitude of the dependent variable. By
testing the Tobit assumptions using the Lin and Schmidt [1984] Lagrange Multiplier
test it can be determined whether separate processes are in action in exclusivity. The
results from the Tobit estimation are shown in table 3.5 where model (I) represents
the unrestricted sample of countries and (J) the limited sample. The Likelihood Ratio
test scores are also included for each specification, measured against the null that the
dependent variables have no explanatory power.
The findings from the Tobit model can only be accepted in the case that the Tobit
is the correct specification and thus that a single process governs both stages of the
model. In the present investigation this would imply that exclusivity and its duration
are governed by the same mechanism. In order to test this assumption the Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) test of Lin and Schmidt [1984] is used. The results are shown in in
table 3.6 which compares the LM test score against the null that the Tobit is correctly
specified.
The LM test scores for both restricted and unrestricted model are significant at
greater than 1% level. This means that we reject the null hypothesis that the Tobit is
correctly specified and instead assume that the results of the two hurdles (exclusivity
and duration) and governed by separate processes.
Result 2 The imposition and the duration of exclusive distribution agreements are
governed by different processes. Where the conditions for imposition are strong this
does not imply that the resulting exclusive distribution agreement will be durable, and
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Table 3.5.: Tobit exclusivity model
Duration of exclusivity
Independent Full sample Restricted sample
variables Coefficient (I) (J)
Log Land Area β1
-145.435*** -219.833***
(50.962) (56.823)
Log Pop. Density β2
-206.696** -278.421***
(81.301) (82.879)
Log GDP/Capita β3
-166.968** -103.387
(81.621) (81.813)
Africa β4
478.504 425.414
(289.752) (283.316)
North America β5
-460.381* -551.255**
(264.564) (261.742)
South America β6
-1127.745*** -1103.342***
(311.925) (300.845)
Asia β7
73.9 129.327
(249.364) (243.808)
Aus & Oceania β8
-553.277 -645.667
(525.507) (509.215)
Europe β9 (omitted) (omitted)
Num. Firms β10
35.115 55.039
(53.93) (52.687)
HHI β11
1623.16* 1631.735*
(870.271) (851.644)
Competing Standards β12
595.601** 578.71**
(272.922) (263.654)
Mobiles per 100 β13
0.791 -1.942
(2.776) (2.901)
LaunchDelay β14
-0.397 -0.338
(0.575) (0.555)
Constant β0
4113.576*** 4947.083***
(1403.69) (1396.699)
σˆ
573.745*** 552.837***
(55.418) (54.2)
n 84 81
LogLikelihood -493.347 -474.317
LR 46.36 50.55
P(LR)> χ2(13) 0 0
Standard errors in parentheses
* (p <0.1), ** (p <0.05), *** (p <0.01)
vice versa.
Because the Tobit specification is rejected the analysis of the results is suitably brief.
In table 3.5 there are a number of variables which are found to be significant. The co-
efficients associated with the key demographic control variables are all negative, though
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Table 3.6.: Tobit Lagrange Multiplier Test
Sample LM Score 10% 5% 1%
Full (I) 21.474 4.41 6.118 10.189
Restricted (J) 22.49 4.268 6.374 11.681
GDP per capita is only significant in the non-restricted sample of countries (at a 10%
level). The non-separability of exclusivity and duration decision in the Tobit implies
that expected duration is shorter given larger and densely populated countries. The
same conclusion can be drawn of both countries in North and South America relative
to Europe (the base category for geographical location).
Both coefficients for market concentration (HHI) and the presence of competing stan-
dards are positive and significant (at 10% and 5% levels respectively). These results are
representative of the market structures in the presence of either heavy concentration
or where there are multiple technological standards in operation.
On the basis of both log likelihood and likelihood ratio test scores the restricted sam-
ple model, as in the rest of the analyses, is a better fit relative to that for the full sample.
Cragg’s Tobit alternative
The rejection of the Tobit specification in Result 2 motivates the use of Cragg’s Tobit
alternative which allows different processes to govern each stage of the analysis. Like
the Tobit, Cragg’s model still controls for the truncated nature of the duration variable.
Table 3.7 shows the results for Cragg’s Tobit alternative applied to the exclusivity
and duration data. The two hurdles are estimated separately using first a Probit ap-
proach, and second a linear regression of a truncated normal variable, calculated using
maximum likelihood. For the full sample and the restricted sample of countries three
specifications are tested: a demographic-only model; a full model using all variables;
and a hybrid with telecommunication variables in the second stage. For each of the
specifications Akaike’s Information Criterion is reported in addition to the overall log
likelihood (LL). The likelihood ratio test scores for the first-stage Probit are also re-
ported. The variable σˆ is the estimate of the variance of the second-stage censored
regression.
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Table 3.7.: Results from Cragg’s Tobit alternative
Exclusivity and duration hurdle
Independent Full sample Restricted sample
variables Coefficient (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N)
Tier1=Exclusivity
Log Land Area γ1
-0.172* -0.172* -0.15 -0.311** -0.311** -0.421**
(0.103) (0.103) (0.224) (0.132) (0.132) (0.182)
Log Pop. Density γ2
-0.438** -0.438** -0.422* -0.664** -0.664** -0.777**
(0.211) (0.211) (0.127) (0.26) (0.26) (0.31)
Log GDP/Capita γ3
0.052 0.052 0.11 0.153 0.153 0.329
(0.176) (0.176) (0.236) (0.194) (0.194) (0.26)
Africa γ4
0.874 0.874 0.872 1.134 1.134 0.731
(0.778) (0.778) (0.909) (0.833) (0.833) (0.927)
North America γ5
0.034 0.034 -0.363 0.071 0.071 -0.583
(0.529) (0.529) (0.658) (0.553) (0.553) (0.721)
South America γ6
-1.613*** -1.613*** -2.009*** -1.653*** -1.653*** -2.096***
(0.6) (0.6) (0.68) (0.622) (0.622) (0.716)
Asia γ7
0.884 0.884 0.849 1.233* 1.233* 1.21*
(0.597) (0.597) (0.687) (0.677) (0.677) (0.734)
Aus & Oceania γ8
-1.408 -1.408 -2.069* -1.827* -1.827* -2.612**
(1.007) (1.007) (1.232) (1.066) (1.066) (1.283)
Europe γ9 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Num. Firms γ10
-0.023 0.022
(0.129) (0.138)
HHI γ11
3.499 2.495
(2.642) (2.796)
Comp.Standards γ12
0.858 0.755
(0.659) (0.649)
Mobiles per 100 γ13
0.001 -0.011
(0.008) (0.009)
LaunchDelay γ14
0 0
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant1 γ0
4.137 4.137 1.916 5.88* 5.88* 6.148
(2.811) (2.811) (4.08) (3.098) (3.098) (4.711)
Tier2=Duration
Log Land Area η1
-76.987** -119.593*** -119.593*** -92.806** -141.301*** -141.301***
(36.946) (40.616) (40.616) (37.575) (41.359) (41.359)
Log Pop. Density η2
-72.171 -101.311* -101.311* -83.284 -115.459** -115.459**
(60.294) (60.82) (60.82) (58.909) (58.963) (58.963)
Log GDP/Capita η3
-164.834*** -251.131*** -251.131*** -149.987*** -225.75*** -225.75***
(51.201) (62.828) (62.828) (50.402) (60.67) (60.67)
Africa η4
374.605* 362.06* 362.06* 388.781* 331.024* 331.024*
(203.497) (193.699) (193.699) (199.185) (190.646) (190.646)
North America η5
6.195 -393.143* -393.143* -12.165 -464.744** -464.744**
(177.525) (219.451) (219.451) (173.141) (215.427) (215.427)
South America η6
32.453 -132.501 -132.501 27.818 -171.443 -171.443
(309.551) (305.363) (305.363) (301.408) (295.451) (295.451)
Asia η7
-72.642 -195.048 -195.048 -84.968 -215.177 -215.177
(168.507) (181.683) (181.683) (164.431) (176.102) (176.102)
Aus & Oceania η8
478.191 -21.862 -21.862 431.281 -112.918 -112.918
(410.114) (440.621) (440.621) (400.611) (428.996) (428.996)
Europe η9 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Num. Firms η10
94.47** 94.47** 98.852** 98.852**
(42.03) (42.03) (40.711) (40.711)
HHI η11
1077.373* 1077.373* 1281.305** 1281.305**
(637.755) (637.755) (626.579) (626.579)
Comp.Standards η12
508.144** 508.144** 530.46** 530.46**
(231.921) (231.921) (223.771) (223.771)
Mobiles per 100 η13
2.443 2.443 1.684 1.684
(2.15) (2.15) (2.144) (2.144)
Delay from launch η14
-0.239 -0.239 -0.269 -0.269
(0.42) (0.42) (0.406) (0.406)
Vendor Position η15
-88.503 -88.503 -65.115 -65.115
(64.626) (64.626) (64.134) (64.134)
Constant2 η0
3602.241*** 4281.804*** 4281.804*** 3724.546*** 4358.935*** 4358.935***
(851.357) (1016.889) (1016.889) (842.981) (988.622) (988.622)
σˆ
391.029*** 348.274*** 348.274*** 382.296*** 337.668*** 337.668***
(41.749) (35.981) (35.981) (40.813) (34.884) (34.884)
n 84 84 84 81 81 81
LL -484.995 -478.225 -475.627 -465.661 -458.762 -455.986
LR 19.36 19.36 24.55 23.51 23.51 29.06
P(LR)> χ2 0.013 0.013 0.026 0.003 0.003 0.006
AIC 1007.991 1006.45 1011.253 969.322 967.52 971.972
Standard errors in parentheses
* (p <0.1), ** (p <0.05), *** (p <0.01)
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Before analysing the results of Cragg’s Tobit alternative in depth, there are a num-
ber of observations which can be made concerning the model specification. First, the
restricted sample models are a better fit of the data than the unrestricted (as measured
by the absolute value of the log likelihood and AIC) - this again vindicates restricting
the sample. Second, the Likelihood Ratio scores indicate that the demographic-only
specifications for the first stage are more effective than the full model under both full
and restricted samples. Third, associated with the differences in the LR test scores
for the first-stage; the AIC statistic indicates that specifications (J) and (M) provide a
better fit than their counterparts for the two samples. Given that Akaike’s Information
Criterion penalises the inclusion of irrelevant variables, it can be concluded that the
addition of telecom-specific variables in the first stage do not add to the explanatory
power of the model.
The following analysis of the variables focusses on the restricted sample results,
though consideration is given to the full sample where appropriate.
In the first stage the determination of an exclusive distribution agreement the vari-
ables associated with both land area (γ1) and population density (γ2) are negative and
significant in all specifications. This fits with the stylised facts from the observed data
where large countries often have regional telecommunication networks - such that ex-
clusivity deals may be made on a regional basis. Secondly, this fits with the notion that
there is less scope for free-riding on promotional effort, as per Mathewson and Winter
[1984], in large sparsely populated countries. This is a reasonable assumption since
spillovers in information will be more pronounced where population density is highest.
The persistence of the significance of some geographical identifiers across specifications
confirms trends which were present in the data such as the tendency of not entering
into exclusive distribution in South America.
No telecommunications-specific variables proved to have a statistically significant im-
pact on the probability of the introduction of an exclusive distribution agreement. In
the theoretical literature [Rey and Tirole, 1986] suggests that demand or cost uncer-
tainty will influence the choice of exclusivity. Given the use of ‘LaunchDelay’ as a proxy
for the passage of time, over which uncertainty would be resolved, it was expected that
this would have significance. The near-zero result on the time from launch (γ14) em-
phatically denies this prediction.
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The results pertaining to the duration of an exclusivity agreement present a number
of variables which are significant; both demographic and telecom-related. The paucity
of literature concerning the determinants of duration in exclusivity agreements limits
the scope for a-priori expectations regarding the and magnitude or sign of the coeffi-
cients. The results are discussed below.
Even for controlling for regional differences, which are likely to be highly correlated
with some demographic measures, all key demographic indicators are negative and sig-
nificant at 5% or better. Comparatively larger, more populous, and wealthier countries
are likely to have shorter duration exclusivity restraints.
One issue that Apple may have faced in its exclusive contracting arrangements is
that relating to switching costs or barriers to switching which are covered in detail in
the literature relating to switching in section 4.2.1. To this effect section 2.1 explained
that the nature of subscriptions and long-term relationships in mobile telecommunica-
tions mean that switching costs are particularly prevalent. By contracting with a single
network operator Apple may have limited its potential market to only those currently
subscribed to that operator and those willing to switch. Where incomes are higher the
opportunity cost of such exclusivity is likely to be higher. Similarly in larger countries
with regional patterns of provision the barriers to switching will be very high for indi-
viduals in areas not intensively covered by the exclusive supplier.
A second interpretation for the significance of GDP lies in taking an alternative view.
Where GDP per capita is very low the potential market may be small and network in-
frastructure underdeveloped. In which case, if there are fixed costs for an operator in
providing infrastructure to support iPhone, the market may only be able to feasibly
sustain a single provider to guarantee a return on necessary investment, as per La-
fontaine and Slade [2005].
Geographic indicators are also significant to varying degrees; indicating that, relative
to Europe, North American (including Caribbean and Central America) countries were
likely to have shorter duration, while African countries longer, though their inclusion is
motivated by a need to control for regional policy rather than draw conclusions based
upon their result.
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Telecom Variables and Duration
A number of telecom-specific variables are significant in the second stage of Cragg’s
model. Similarly to the Tobit in table 3.5, coefficients associated with market concen-
tration and competing standards (η11 and η12, respectively) are persistently significant
at a 5% level. In addition the number of firms active in the market is also significant
at a 5% level - indicated by the coefficient η10.
Competing Standards
Where a market has competing standards, the different technological standards are
often used by different firms. The earlier discussion focussed on competing standards
as a source of switching costs in mobile telecommunications; competing standards ex-
aggerate the switching costs that already exist concerning changing provider.
The use of the iPhone as a competitive lever to differentiate a firm relies upon the
ability of that firm to attract customers from rival providers. Where switching costs
exist this will delay or inhibit consumers from switching to that operator which offers
the iPhone. The nature of switching costs in telecommunications is also closely linked
to the nature of fixed-term subscriptions. They are not constant over time and will
be lower at periods near the end of the fixed-term. It naturally follows that, in the
presence of such switching costs, an exclusive provider may require a longer period of
exclusivity in order to fully exploit the competitive advantage inherent in offering the
iPhone.
Concentration and Firm Numbers
By controlling for firm number in the market in all the approaches (through the in-
clusion of the relevant variable) HHI can be interpreted as being primarily the measure
of inequality of firm sizes. Thus, from the entry investigation in table 3.3, we observed
that markets with unequal market shares were less likely to sell the iPhone. From
table 3.7 HHI has no bearing on the actual likelihood of exclusivity but, conditional on
the case that exclusivity is imposed, this exclusivity is likely to be significantly longer
in markets characterised by uneven market shares. The insignificance of the variable
indicating the market position of the firm that sells the iPhone (η15 means that there
is no pattern that either the dominant firm in the market, nor smaller firms are selling
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the iPhone). This makes the drawing of conclusions over the competitive aspects of
the observed long duration.
In addition, where a market is unevenly distributed, long-term contracting with a
dominant provider may provide access to the majority of the market, reducing the need
to contract with further networks after a time.
A strong result is that the coefficient associated with the number of firms (η10) is
positive and persistently significant at 5% across specifications. Where there are many
firms, this is significantly likely to increase the duration of exclusivity restraints. This
result on firm numbers has more basis in the information spillover theories from the
literature such as Mathewson and Winter [1984]. The finding supports the view that
where there are more firms competing, spillovers in advertising are highest. In this case
Apple has the incentive to maintain exclusivity to ensure that firms expend appropriate
effort in advertising.
None of the remaining industry-specific variables are significant, this prompts the
final result of the investigation:
Result 3 The decision to deal exclusively is dominated by demographic variables, whereas
the duration of exclusivity is determined by a range of variables relating to technical
and competitive aspects. Specifically, where the number of networks competing in the
market is highest we observe longer exclusivity periods. Longer periods of exclusivity
are also associated with market concentration and competing standards.
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Conclusion
This part of the thesis set out with several objectives: to understand the determinants
of Apple’s decision to sell the iPhone in certain countries; to understand the deter-
minants of the decision and duration of any exclusive distribution agreements; and to
show that the decision to deal exclusively and decisions over duration are not necessar-
ily on-and-the-same decision.
In the process of the achieving the above objectives the investigation has returned
three key results:
Result 1 The determinants of the sale of the iPhone in a given country is dominated by
basic demographic factors of land size, population density, and GDP per capita. Only
the measure of inequality of firm sizes is significant of the telecom specific variables,
indicating that the iPhone was less likely to sold in concentrated markets.
Result 2 The imposition and the duration of exclusive distribution agreements are gov-
erned by different processes. Where the conditions for imposition are strong this does
not imply that the resulting exclusive distribution agreement will be durable, and vice
versa.
Result 3 The decision to deal exclusively is dominated by demographic variables,
whereas the duration of exclusivity is determined by a range of variables relating to
technical and competitive aspects. Specifically, where the number of networks compet-
ing in the market is highest we observe longer exclusivity periods. Longer periods of
exclusivity are also associated with market concentration and competing standards.
Of these results the most striking is number two. This questions the prevailing
assumption of duration of exclusive distribution as some function of the original exclu-
sivity.
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The significance of market-specific variables is strongest when examining the duration
of exclusivity. In this case there was evidence that switching costs - proxied by compet-
ing standards - result in longer exclusivity which is a natural result when considering
customer inertia in switching providers. Similarly the variables concerning competition
and market inequalities both suggest the use of the iPhone as a competitive lever, and
also support the predictions of the literature concerning adverse selection in advertis-
ing. The remaining results are generally insignificant and subject to interpretation.
In conclusion, this paper has empirically demonstrated the existence of multiple pro-
cesses in the imposition of exclusivity restraints. This result highlights the scarcity of
the literature which examines optimal duration of vertical restraints and represents a
springboard to further research in the area.
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The Impact of Service Bundling on
Consumer Switching Behaviour:
Empirical Evidence from UK
Communication Markets
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Introduction
One of the key outcomes from the continuing advances in communication technology
is the propensity for households and individuals to subscribe to an increasing range
of communication services. These can include broadband internet, subscription-based
television services (pay-TV), or landline telephones. Greater deregulation of commu-
nications markets, coupled with the increased convergence in technologies, have led to
individual companies to provide greater numbers of these services. One of the emer-
gent strategies employed by large UK providers of household communications is to offer
subscribers a ‘bundle’ of services, often a discount on the equivalent combined selling
price
Research by the both UK communications regulator Ofcom, and the FTC in the
US, has suggested that households which subscribe to a bundle are less likely to switch
provider for one or more of these bundled services. This is because such bundling
creates ‘switching costs’ for consumers. Where switching costs exist consumers can be-
come locked-in to the choices they make, which subsequently ‘hinders customers from
changing suppliers in response to changes in efficiency’ [Farrell and Klemperer, 2007].
This part of the thesis empirically analyses consumer switching data to investigate
whether bundling of services is used by integrated communication firms to create switch-
ing costs. It analyses a survey-elicited dataset of 2,871 households’ subscriptions to
communications services, whether they bundle their products, and their switching be-
haviour. The services which are covered by the study are those above (broadband,
pay-TV, and landline) in addition to mobile telephone services. While there exists a
large volume of literature examining switching behaviour amongst consumers, there is
very little that explores the link between product-bundling and consumers’ switching
decisions. This thesis significantly adds to this slim empirical literature and builds on
the literature on switching costs by including supplier identities and duration of sub-
scriptions to services - variables rarely included.
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The remainder of this paper offers a description of bundling and switching strategies
and the policy context, followed by a review of relevant literature. There is an overview
of the UK communications market which provides context to the investigation. Finally,
a third chapter outlines the econometric methodology, data, and results. A discussion
on the significance of the results concludes.
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Large communication firms in the UK are increasingly offering customers bundles of
services. This means that, where individuals previously subscribed to a number of
services with different providers, there is a trend to purchase multiple services from a
single provider. The present investigation investigates both how bundling of services
affects the decisions of individuals to change provider in the context of switching costs,
and also the effect this bundling has on the competitive environment.
4.1. Switching and Bundling
This section briefly introduces the concepts of switching costs and bundling, and also
outlines the policy approach of regulators and competition authorities - illustrated by
some high profile cases. A more formal review of the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture follows in the next section.
4.1.1. Bundling
Product (or service) bundling is one of a series of practices employed by firms which
facilitates the sale of a number of goods to a single customer. Bundling is defined by
Stremersch and Tellis [2002] as the sale of two products together, where there also exists
separate markets for each. This is distinct from other similar practices such as Tying
of products which makes the purchase of one good contingent on another. It is also
distinct from the extreme example of ‘full line forcing’ which requires customers to pur-
chase an entire range of products - this is more prevalent in intermediate goods markets.
Common examples where products are bundled includes the sale of shampoo and
conditioner as a set, selling a toothbrush with the toothpaste, or the current case of
communication services. In all cases there are distinct markets for the component prod-
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ucts.
Bundling is a practice which is solely employed by firms and does not occur naturally
in nature. It can be used as a competitive tool to assert dominance in one or more
markets, or otherwise it can be used to incentivise consumers to alter their purchasing
habits.
4.1.2. Switching Costs
Consumers face switching costs when they change supplier for a product or service.
Switching costs occur because, prior to consumption of a good, a consumer must ex-
pend resources in addition to the purchase price. This can be in terms of learning
how to use a computer program, research a new brand, or finding a new supplier. In
this sense Valletti [2000] defines them as ‘resources, in addition to the purchase price,
spent to consume the product when such resources cannot be recovered if the consumer
changes supplier’; these additional costs are sunk.
They are particularly prevalent where the relationship between consumer and sup-
plier is characterised by frequent interactions such as repeat purchases. They also occur
when the nature of a relationship is long-term such as in fixed-term subscriptions - rel-
evant to the current case. Klemperer [1995] describes the sunk costs inherent in the
consumer-supplier relationship as sufficient to cause ‘ex-ante homogeneous products to
become, after the purchase of any one of them, ex-post heterogeneous’.
Unlike bundling of products, switching costs can occur naturally. Individuals form
psychological attachments to particular brands, or otherwise in many products there
is an inevitable and unavoidable learning process which requires sunk effort from the
consumer. They can, however, be exaggerated or created by firms in order to restrict
consumer switching; these theories are outlined fully in the next section.
4.1.3. The Policy Approach to Bundling and Switching
In both the US (under the Sherman Act, 1890) and Europe (under Article 102 of the
TFEU) bundling and tying practices are treated under a rule-of-reason approach. In
both cases it must be shown that the tying conditions were an abuse of a dominant
position by a firm. In both jurisdictions there have been a number of high-profile
92
Switching, Bundling, and Policy
cases brought against firms which have been seen to be leveraging monopoly power
to foreclose associated markets. In the US in the case of Eastman Kodak v. Image
Technical Services, inc26 it was found that Kodak were abusing their dominant position
in photocopiers to foreclose competition in aftersales services. In the EU in the cases
of Microsoft27 and TetraPak28 it was found that the defendants were abusing their
dominant position in the supply of, respectively, bundled media players software, and
the tied purchase of cartons for TetraPak machines.
Regulatory concern over switching is mainly focussed in the area of consumer protec-
tion. There have been recent moves by a number of UK sector regulators to champion
policies which would facilitate consumer switching including the endorsement of price
comparison websites, production of helpsheets, and introduction of policies to stream-
line processes. In recent years, typified by Ofcom [2008], there has been greater scrutiny
of the role of bundling in switching costs, though there is still a shortage of meaningful
analysis. The activities of Ofcom in relation to switching and bundling are outlined in
discussion of survey data in the next section.
The following section focusses further on the theoretical and empirical literature con-
cerning bundling and switching costs.
26Case S54 U.S. 451
27Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission
2892/163/EEC
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4.2. Existing Research
This part of the thesis concerns bundling and switching, thus this review of the existing
literature focusses on three areas: that surrounding switching and search costs; that
which examines the motivation of the firm to engage in product bundling; and thirdly
the empirical literature investigating drivers of consumer switching behaviour. One out-
come of this review is that there exists a paucity of studies that explicitly explore the
link between the bundling of products and its impact on consumer switching behaviour.
4.2.1. Switching and Search Cost Literature
Switching costs are a field of interest for regulators and economists since they repre-
sent a friction in an otherwise competitive environment. They restrict the changing of
supplier when otherwise, absent switching costs, a buyer would switch as a result of
unexpected changes in price or quality.
Farrell and Klemperer [2007] offer a broad overview of the major assertions in the
field of switching and search costs and also offer some brief intuition into the role of
bundling in switching costs. The authors define switching costs as existing where a
buyer makes a purchase repeatedly and will find it costly to switch from one supplier
to another - where consumers can become ‘locked’ into the purchase of a series of prod-
ucts - an effective long-term contract governed by a series of shorter term agreements.
This repeat-purchase element is particularly relevant in the study of service bundling
where, as per Prince and Greenstein [2011], subscription to services implies a ‘relation-
ship’ between provider and consumer - a service subscription is rarely a one-off purchase.
With sufficient economies of scope in production, consumers can become locked into
purchasing bundles of goods from a single supplier since price savings which are com-
mon with bundles can offset the sense that a consumer is ‘locked in’.
Of further relevance, Klemperer [1984, 1987] observes that switching costs are often
created or exaggerated by firms. These can include charges for the termination of a
contract or set up charges at a new provider, repeat purchase discounts, or loyalty
cards where the switching consumer forgoes their accrued benefits. The motivation for
this behaviour is that switching costs makes consumers less price sensitive [Klemperer,
1984]. This leads to overall higher prices because consumers are less able to switch away
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in response to negative changes in terms. The creation of switching costs are studied in
several relevant case-studies in the study of mobile telecommunications - where there
exist numerous different sources of barriers to switching. Xavier and Ypsilanti [2008]
(in the UK), and Baker [2007] (in the US), identify issues of early exit charges, a cum-
bersome administrative burden in switching, changing of telephone number or email,
technical incompatibility, or forced return of existing equipment - all of which create
switching costs.
Switching costs can also have a dynamic impact which results in cyclical behaviour
by firms. Both Klemperer [1984] and Chen [1997b] observe that the presence of switch-
ing costs can have the effect that firms alternate between a bargain then ripoff strategy
in order to attract and subsequently exploit customers. Farrell and Shapiro [1988] also
examine dynamic competition though in an overlapping generations setting. Where
there is a turnover of customers (some ‘die’ and some are ‘born’) the authors find
that incumbents have an incentive to exploit their ‘tied’ customer base rather than
compete for newly born customers. With sufficient economies of scale in production
the incumbent may also attempt to serve new customers resulting in the exclusion of
new entrants to the market. The effectiveness of multi-period strategies is heavily con-
tingent on whether consumers have foresight - meaning they predict rip-off pricing in
some second period and are less attracted by low first-period prices. The effectiveness
of multi-period strategies is also dependent on whether firms are able to distinguish
between existing and new customers since this allows them to exercise price discrimi-
nation over the two different groups.
The notion of bargain-ripoff pricing is reinterpreted in Cabral [2008] as a decision
made by a firm which must balance the two effects of ‘investment’ to attract new cus-
tomers, and ‘harvesting’ to take advantage of existing customers which must pay to
switch away. In this generalised setting the author finds that at small levels switching
costs reduce overall price levels, but at higher levels they lead to overall higher prices.
Related to switching costs is the issue of search or ‘shopping’ costs. Farrell and Klem-
perer [2007] observe that shopping costs can cause individuals to make sub-optimal
product choices. Examples of this include deliberate price complexity, or product pro-
liferation where consumers must exert excessive effort in order to identify market in-
formation - even regarding their own usage [Miravete, 2009; Narayanan et al., 2007].
Pricing obfuscation which may distort the perceptions of consumers’ likely benefit from
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switching is also addressed by Valletti and Cave [1998] in their review of the UK mobile
communications industry. There are also more benign sources of shopping cost such as
cognitive shortcomings which are common in markets where the product is intrinsically
complex. These can be resolved through appropriate policies such as mandating the
way information is presented, or encouraging price-comparison services as mentioned
in the previous section.
Introducing the notion of bundling to the switching literature, Klemperer [1992]
suggests that the presence of shopping costs mean multi-product firms can soften com-
petition through mutual carrying of identical product lines. In the author’s model,
where consumers seek to purchase all varieties of goods, but face a cost to travel be-
tween different vendors, firms can offer all products and extract as surplus some of
the cost the consumer would otherwise have faced in travelling between vendors. This
interface between bundling and switching forms one of the primary motivations of the
present paper since in this instance it is firm’s mutual benefit to bundle products.
4.2.2. Bundling Literature
A bundle of products is described by Stremersch and Tellis [2002] as being two (or
more) separate goods being sold in a single package from a single supplier. The term
‘separate’ implies that there exists separate markets for the standalone products and
thus that some consumers may wish (and are able) to buy the goods separately.
The authors also define two types of bundling. Price bundling involves the selling of
two goods at a discount to their separate selling prices. Product bundling is where the
functionality of the products may improve as a result of the bundling and thus con-
sumer valuations of the bundle may be higher than the sum of the separate valuations,
even where the bundle is not offered at a discount.
From a service-specific approach Ofcom [2008] (discussed later, in relation to empir-
ical findings) observes that consumers place value on the ease associated with taking a
bundle of goods from one manufacturer; this may be in terms of a unified bill in the
case of home communication services, or otherwise through guaranteed interoperability
associated with software bundles such as Microsoft Office.
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Further to the bundle definition of Stremersch and Tellis [2002], though there may
exist separate markets for constituent products in the bundle this is not a guarantee
that all firms will choose to offer them individually. Indeed, firms can offer ‘pure’ or
‘mixed’ bundling. Pure bundling is where a firm chooses to solely offer goods as a bun-
dle. Mixed bundling is where firms also sell the constituent products separately. Issues
of pure- versus mixed-bundling represent a strategy choice on the part of suppliers.
If all firms choose to only offer pure bundling then the Stremersch and Tellis [2002]
definition is violated because for several goods to be classed as a bundle they must be
available separately. An example of this is a pair of shoes which is considered a single
item despite their being two objects - because there does not exist a separate market
for left shoes (nor right). The distinction between pure and mixed bundling dictates
many outcomes in the literature concerning the competitive effects of bundling [Chen,
1997a; Thanassoulis, 2011].
Although bundling can be used as a means of price discrimination in order to extract
more consumer surplus than otherwise selling separate products by incentivising con-
sumption of multiple goods, the main competitive theories relate to the use of bundling
to extend market power. This can be achieved by preventing entry by a rival, or in-
creasing the competitiveness of a bundling firm in one or more markets. Bundling
can also be used as a means to soften price competition by differentiating suppliers
as per Klemperer [1992]. The two separate themes - price discrimination and exclu-
sion - differ in the impact of the correlation of consumer valuations for the products.
Price discrimination to extract consumer surplus is most effective with negative corre-
lation[Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010], whereas exclusion is most effective with positive
correlation [Nalebuff, 2004].
Of particular relevance to the current investigation of multi-product suppliers of
communication products are both Nalebuff [2004] and Whinston [1990]. Both authors
illustrate how bundling can be used by a dominant firm in one market to foreclose
another under a range of conditions. Nalebuff demonstrates that where consumer val-
uations are correlated a bundling incumbent can potentially price at such a level that
it earns a higher profit than it would do in the case that if were a monopolist in two
separate-selling markets. The application of this rationale to the present case is logical,
since there are a number of firms in the sample which dominate their primary mar-
ket (pay-TV in the case of Sky) which are offering bundled goods in secondary markets.
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Continuing the theme of bundling as a tool of exclusion, Bakos and Brynjolsson [2000]
in their theoretical analysis of the economics of aggregation also find an effect whereby
bundling of large numbers of services (such as aggregation of internet content) can lead
to exclusion of standalone suppliers. This results in a best response to a competitor
bundling being retaliatory bundling.
A similar ‘head-to-head’ result is also reported in Klemperer [1992] which introduces
demand for multiple products. The author finds that where consumers have inelastic
demand for products, but face travel costs to purchase from more than one supplier,
firms which non-cooperatively offering identical product lines can yield higher indus-
try profits than the case where firms offer differentiated product lines - this results in
softened, rather than intensified, competition.
Both Chen [1997a] and Thanassoulis [2011] find the opposite result to the above where
the best-response to a pure-bundling rival is to remain a single-product firm owing to
the increased competitive environment stemming from head-to-head competition. In
the case of Chen [1997a] this result derives from a product differentiation effect but relies
on one market (A) being a duopoly with uniform valuation for the product, and the sec-
ond market (B) being competitive with non-uniform valuations. This result dominates
the case where one firm chooses to adopt a mixed-bundling strategy. The Thanassoulis
[2011] result stems from discrimination between two types of consumers, those which
demand a whole bundle, and those which demand only individual components; this
author predicts that the intense competition following the full-convergence (retaliatory
bundling) outcome prompts some firms to remain as single-product providers.
The above literature relating to bundling presents two avenues for investigation: the
relationship between bundling and switching; and the relationship between firms which
offer products as a bundle and those that offer standalone services.
A section of the literature focusses on the use of bundles as a means to reduce search
costs and facilitate customer acquisition by encouraging consumers to single-home their
purchases [Bakos and Brynjolsson, 2000]. This literature does not, however, extend to
the dynamic setting characterised by Klemperer [1984] and Chen [1997b] with respect
to the switching literature. This present paper aims to offer evidence that would sup-
port either a notion that bundling either increases switching costs or otherwise that it
facilitates switching.
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Secondly, the literature concerning bundling indicates divergent predictions concern-
ing the best response to a bundling rival dependent upon the degree of competition
and also the structure of consumer valuations. The present investigation tests these
predictions by examining the likelihood of switching provider when purchasing bundled
services from integrated providers relative to those individuals who subscribe to stan-
dalone service providers.
4.2.3. Empirical Studies of Bundling and Switching
There have been several notable empirical investigations into switching costs - both in
terms of quantification and determinants, and also relating to the market outcomes in
the presence of switching costs. The findings of studies into switching are examined,
since they have informed the process which elicited our data, before examining in more
depth the few empirical studies of the impact of bundling on switching.
Although this present study utilises survey data, the existing empirical literature
also examines observed real-world data, and there is a limited literature which utilises
experimental data.
Observed Data
Pomp et al. [2005] offer a review of empirical investigations utilising a range of obser-
vational data, examining both switching costs and consumer switching behaviour. The
studies encompass both the quantification of switching costs and also the factors which
influence consumer switching behaviour. Although the various findings regarding the
level of switching costs is informative, it is the latter which most informs this study.
The authors highlight a range of findings from across the literature - they divide it
into the effects on switching of both product- or firm-specific characteristics, and also
individual-specific characteristics.
Universal across the literature reviewed by the Pomp et al. [2005] is the pervasion
of the analysis of demographic variables; these studies inform the inclusion of various
variables in this present study. Featured in the review, Hausman and Sidak [2004]
examines subscription to long-distance calling plans and finds a positive relationship
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between price sensitivity and both income and education (where price sensitivity leads
to switching to lower-priced calling plans).
Royalty and Solomon [1999] in their study of price elasticities in choice of healthcare
plan find decreased price sensitivity is associated with increased age and wealth. The
relationship between age and switching is interesting since the age of respondents deter-
mines the type of market in which these individuals are used to operating. In terms of
subscriptions to utilities such as telecom, older individuals may have experience of pur-
chasing from state monopolist provider, in which case the culture of switching provider
may present greater cognitive barriers than for younger people (for whom switching of
provider is more commonplace).
Pomp et al. [2005] also discuss firm-specific variables which affect individuals’ willing-
ness to change provider. The significance of these determinants is particularly relevant
as it implies that firm behaviour can mediate consumer switching behaviour. Both
Chen and Hitt [2002] in their study of online investment brokers, and Carlsson and
Lo¨fgren [2004] (concerning airline choices), identify that perceived quality of an indi-
vidual’s own supplier increases the cost of switching. Of specific interest is the finding
by Chen and Hitt [2002] that their variable ‘resources’ - a proxy for the breadth of
services offered by a firm - is negatively correlated with switching and a positively cor-
related with customer acquisition. This indicates that the increased number of services
offered by a single supplier both inhibits switching away and also attracts individuals
from other suppliers.
Finally, Ranganathan et al. [2006] explicitly discusses the role of bundling in a mo-
bile telecommunications environment. The authors utilise a dataset of 30,590 North
American mobile subscribers who reach the end of their fixed-contract period with
their current supplier and find that those individuals which make more ‘relational in-
vestments’ with their provider are less likely to switch. The investments include the
duration of the subscription, the level of usage, and whether the user bundles services -
where ‘services’ in this instance represents ‘soft’ services such as the inclusion of voice-
mail or browsing services with the standard voice-minutes and SMS messages contract.
In this study these bundled add-ons services reduce the likelihood of switching.
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Survey Data
An advantage with survey data is that it can elicit consumers’ expectations, beliefs,
and information that would otherwise be unknown by examining only their behaviour
and revealed preferences.
The role of potential monetary savings cannot be underestimated in examining con-
sumers’ switching decisions; Wilson and Waddams Price [2010] find that 77% and 86%
of respondents in the two surveys used in their study cite pecuniary motivations as a
major incentive for switching. Giulietti et al. [2005] examines retail gas markets and
also finds monetary savings to be significant, especially where there is little expectation
that the individual’s incumbent supplier will match the lower price.
Waddams Price and Webster [2011] examine switching across multiple markets in-
cluding landline telephone and mobile telephone and also find a significant relationship
between expected saving and switching. Though there are significantly different ex-
pectations concerning the rate of switching across these different sectors. The authors
also investigate demographic variables and (unlike Royalty and Solomon [1999]) find a
non-linear ‘U-shaped’ relationship between age and switching. This suggests that the
oldest individuals are actually more likely to switch and so too are the youngest. The
authors suggest that this may have its basis in the degree of spare time available to
older (retired people). The authors also find a positive relationship between switching
and education in concurrence with previous papers.
Waddams Price and Webster [2011] also assert that factors which alter the oppor-
tunity cost of search time will alter the propensity of individuals to search and switch.
Specifically the authors suggest that higher income level of respondents would create a
disincentive to search since income level is a proxy for the value of an individual’s time.
The authors instead find income is an insignificant determinant of switching behaviour,
and only mildly positively significant in the case of searching. The opportunity cost
rationale was also used to explain the education result (above), since higher levels of
education could either reduce the time spent searching, or reduce the ‘onerous’ nature
of searching. The opportunity cost rationale is utilised in this present study to include
other household factors which limit (and stifle supply) of time available for switching,
increasing its opportunity cost; this is discussed in relation to the results in section 6.3.
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Examining previous studies in home communications products, the US Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) conducted survey research in 2010 examining consumer
switching behaviour. Amongst the findings the FCC found that the main stated rea-
sons for broadband switching were either to switch to a superior service or alternatively
a cheaper service (49% and 47%). Only 28% stated that poor service from their ex-
isting supplier was the reason for an eventual switch. Of particular importance and
relevance for the subsequent analyses is that 44% of those who had switched a service
(without moving house) stated a major reason as ‘getting a bundle of services from a
single supplier’. Moreover, of those that hadn’t switched, 39% stated that having to
change a bundle of services was a major reason for this. This indicates a preference for
bundling from some consumers and matches the Ofcom [2008] findings that consumers
value bundles per se, and have an aversion to unbundling once subscribed.
The UK communications regulator Ofcom has been active in examining bundling as
an extension of its existing policy focus of enabling and empowering consumer switch-
ing. The regulator states: ‘... competitive communications markets are more likely to
work well for consumers when it is quick and easy to switch between providers’ [Ofcom,
2008]. The regulator carried out a series of interviews in 2008 designed to elicit indi-
viduals’ views on bundled products, this study consisted of initial screening interviews,
followed by interviews with individuals that had switched (or considered switching)
services recently.
Investigating the differing effects of various configurations of bundled services, there
were different attitudes to bundles with ‘triple-play’29 subscribers placing high value
on the convenience of the bundle. This was not only in terms of an unwillingness to
switch away from the supplier, but also in terms of their unwillingness to unbundle the
services. Those individuals which bundled broadband with a fixed landline still stated
a preference to remain bundled, but were more inclined to switch supplier. Those indi-
viduals which subscribed to a bundle containing pay-TV were least likely to switch or
unbundle - owing to the complexity of changing pay-TV supplier. Of those which had
attempted to switch, many reported obstructive behaviour from their existing supplier.
It was found that those with lower education were less likely to successfully switch
owing to the complexity of the switching process - confirming the findings of previous
research. The study further found that those who worked full-time stated an unwilling-
ness to switch due to the need to take time off work in order to be at home for engineer
29Triple-play is the term used to describe the bundle of landline, pay-TV, and home broadband.
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visits relating to the switch of supplier.
Ofcom [2008] also found an unwillingness from consumers to switch supplier if a they
had been with their existing supplier for a long time. Specifically, it was stated that
customers felt some degree of loyalty to existing suppliers where a long-term relation-
ship existed30.
Prince and Greenstein [2011] is one of very few papers which empirically analyses the
role of bundling in consumers’ switching decisions by utilising a survey-elicited panel31
approach to examine persistence of subscription to services and particular providers.
The authors find similar results to earlier literature such as Chen and Hitt [2002] in
that when individuals bundle services they are less likely to discontinue their use of
that service (lower attrition rates). Specifically, for those services with declining rates
of subscription (pay-TV and landline in this case), the decline was less marked amongst
those subscribers which bundled the services with home broadband. A key result is
that the authors estimate that suppliers earned in the region of $259 million per annum
as a result of lower attrition of customers services - an amount which would have been
lost without bundling.
Experimental Evidence
Although there is limited experimental literature concerning bundling or switching,
Harris and Blair [2006] provides evidence that individuals bundle products to minimise
search costs (in accordance with much of the theoretical literature). The authors found
that, when presenting participants with a catalogue of audio Hi-Fi components, early
advertising of bundles significantly increased the likelihood that the bundle was chosen
- thus avoiding further search for separate components. The evidence for effort minimi-
sation (as opposed to primacy effects) was supported through further interviews with
participants.
30Ofcom [2008], p. 11.
31The authors actually use a pseudo-panel constructed using three demographically-similar annual
surveys.
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4.2.4. Contribution
This paper makes a substantial contribution to the understanding of the role of bundling
practices and their effect on consumer switching of provider. It is the first paper to
empirically test the role of service bundling on the likelihood of switching across a range
of contested UK communication markets. It does this while also controlling for hetero-
geneity amongst the different suppliers and a range of different demographic variables
which have been shown to be significant in previous studies.
To the best of the author’s knowledge the only other papers which have empiri-
cally approached the role of bundling in consumers’ switching decisions are Prince and
Greenstein [2011] and Ranganathan et al. [2006]. Both of these find that bundling of
services with a single provider significantly reduces the likelihood of switching provider.
It is against these papers that the results of the current paper are most accurately mea-
sured - testing the broad hypotheses that bundling of products reduces the likelihood
of switching provider for those products.
Beyond the issue of bundling, this paper presents an important test of the prevailing
literature’s assertions concerning demographic determinants of switching. It does so
by comparing the performance of demographic-based models against models concerned
with variables relating to the service to which an individual subscribes. The strength
of the results indicates the importance of supplier and service specific variables and il-
lustrates the flawed nature of attempts to evaluate the determinants of switching using
demographic variables alone under the implicit assumption of homogeneous providers.
Notwithstanding, because the empirical literature offers significant and robust evi-
dence that demographic factors can be a key determinant of the likelihood of an indi-
vidual to switch supplier, this paper controls for these elements. The results show that
although demographic variables alone are inaccurate predictors of switching behaviour,
controlling for individual-specific characteristics in a broader model delivers stronger
results than models featuring demographic or service-specific variables alone.
The paper concludes by empirically examining the scope for smaller single-product
providers to compete with larger multi-product firms. This has not previously been ad-
dressed in the empirical literature and tests the theoretical hypotheses of Chen [1997a]
and Thanassoulis [2011] versus those of Bakos and Brynjolsson [2000] and Klemperer
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[1992].
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5. The UK Communications Market
In examining firms’ bundling strategies and resultant consumer switching behaviour,
this part of the thesis focusses on the UK markets for household communications ser-
vices. The study utilises a survey-elicited dataset of 2,871 households designed to exam-
ine household subscriptions to, satisfaction with, and switching behaviour surrounding,
four common household communication services: subscription-based television (pay-
TV); fixed-line broadband; mobile telephone; and landline telephone.
The following sections feature an introduction to the survey and an overview of the
variables which are included in the dataset used in the investigation. Specific attention
is paid to the household communication services featured in the study, and the main
firms and their respective strategies with respect to the bundling of products. Finally,
there is an overview of the remaining variables featured in the later econometric mod-
elling including demographic variables.
5.1. The Survey
The survey used in this part of the thesis was commissioned by Ofcom and carried
out by research firm Saville Rossiter-Base in March 2010 where the participants were
chosen as the key decision makers in a household. The sample was selected in order to
be geographically representative of the UK, with a second round of interviews carried
out to ensure that minimum quotas were reached for the experimental variables. The
majority of the data (2,008 individuals) was gathered through face-to-face interviews in
the first round, while a second round of interviews took place online (863 individuals).
The results of the survey, with a large selection of summary statistics, are detailed in
Saville-Rossiter-Base [2010].
The survey was divided into several parts:
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In the first part of the survey respondents were asked to which services their house-
hold subscribed and whether they bundle any of these services by subscribing to more
than one through a single provider (and receive a single bill). They were also asked
their general level of satisfaction with their current provider. In this first part respon-
dents were also asked whether they had either switched services from one provider to
another in the preceding twelve months, or considered switching but ultimately not
switched; these were mutually exclusive options.
In the second and third parts of the survey respondents were asked to report their ex-
periences and motivations surrounding, respectively, their switching and ‘considering’
behaviour. Two latter parts concerned demographic variables, and also some questions
regarding involuntary switching (where the provider has been changed without the con-
sent of the individual involved).
The survey itself consisted of up to 140 questions (mainly closed-form multiple choice)
of which 36 were asked in the first part, with 43 and 37 questions in the second and
third. Because this study is concerned with switching, those individuals which consid-
ered switching provider but ultimately didn’t are classed as ‘non-switchers’.
The dataset used in the current analysis is constructed using parts one and two of the
survey and examines current provider for those services which have not been switched,
and the provider at point of switching for those that were switched. From the initial
sample of 2,871 individuals, 950 switched at least one service, while 23 households
switched all four services in the twelve months preceding the survey. The distribution
of switching between individuals is shown below in table 5.1.
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Table 5.1.: Number of Services Switched by Household
Number of Services Switched Frequency Proportion
0 1,921 67%
1 565 20%
2 265 9%
3 97 3%
4 23 1%
Total 2,871 100%
5.1.1. Dataset Creation
The particular design of the survey led to several key considerations in the construction
of the dataset which influenced those variables and individuals which are included in
the dataset.
The choice of variables was constrained by inconsistencies in questions asked con-
cerning their current provider and, if applicable, their provider at time of switching.32
The variables missing from the information on previous provider includes price infor-
mation, information concerning a discount for subscribing to a service, and measures
of service quality. While explicit variables concerning these issues would have been
desirable since they are present and significant in much of the previous literature, it is
likely that service-specific metrics such as price are fairly uniform across firms, or oth-
erwise (in the case of service-specific quality) correlated with the supplier of the service.
Although the UK can be considered to be a national market for all services (as op-
posed to smaller regional sub-markets) there do exist some geographical limitations
to the provision of some services by specific providers, specifically in rural areas. A
small number of the observed switches in the survey occurred because an individual
has moved house and the individual’s initial provider for a service was not available at
the new address. Because these services have been involuntarily switched33 they are
excluded from the analysis.
32In section two respondents were asked a different set of questions to those in section one.
33These switches are involuntary because the subscriber may have wished to remain with their previous
provider.
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Time constraints in carrying out the survey also led to the non-collection of some
data for those individuals which have switched many services. For these individuals,
the excluded services were determined by a process of prioritisation, as per table 5.2.
Table 5.2.: Survey Priorities
Priority Action
1 Switched Bundle
2 Switched Pay-TV
3 Switched Broadband
4 Switched Mobile Phone
5 Switched Landline
The above factors result in the total number of 2,871 respondents being reduced to a
workable sample of 2,856 while the loss of observations across the separate services are
shown in table 5.3. The term ‘Service history’ implies that the switched service was of
sufficiently high priority to provide data on the previous supplier, and ‘Movers without
choice’ illustrates those individuals which moved house and were unable to keep their
existing supplier.
Table 5.3.: Sample Selection
Pay-TV Broadband Mobile Landline Total
Subscribers 1,721 2,052 2,630 2,508 8,911
Non-switchers (a) 1,536 1,550 2,222 2,125 7,433
Switched 185 502 408 383 1,478
Service history (b) 154 489 340 334 1,317
Movers without choice (c) 25 48 11 38 122
Total included (a+b-c) 1,665 1,991 2,551 2,421 8,628
Loss of observations 56 61 79 87 283
Table 5.3 indicates the number of total subscribers for each of the service lines where
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an individual may have up to four separate subscriptions and therefore data points
regarding switching within the dataset. Because the excluded individual-service data
points all concerned incidents of switching their exclusion is, on estimation, likely to
bias the baseline likelihood of switching downward, if this is the case then this will
be reflected in a more negative constant. Furthermore, the exclusion of observations
based upon the prioritisation of services employed during data collection could lead to
concern that the excluded observations are correlated with particular services; a simple
probit analysis of instances of excluded observations against service-type indicates that
this is not the case.
5.1.2. Variable Selection
The variables used in the econometric analysis are split into two categories; service-
specific variables which vary between each service to which an individual subscribes,
and individual-specific demographic variables which are uniform across an individual’s
subscriptions. Service-specific variables are focussed on the types of service to which a
household subscribes, the firms which provide (or previously provided) those services,
whether a household bundles multiple services with a single provider, and whether
the household has switched provider for the service. Demographic variables reflect the
properties of either the household (such as the number of children), or otherwise the
characteristics of the key decision maker in the household (such as education).
Almost all the variables included in the study dataset are of a categorical nature
and as such are represented by a series of dummy variables where the significance of
a particular category will be measured relative to a base category, and where the base
category for each variable is chosen such that it is an informative category34 which is
excluded.
Because of the large number of variables employed in the final analyses, where the
data is fully laid out in the subsequent sections, each table clearly indicates the sym-
bols used to represent the coefficient pertaining to each variable in the econometric
specifications of section 6.2 (page 141).
34An example of an informative category within the DURATION variable would be ‘7 to 12 months’
as opposed to ‘Don’t know’ since it is difficult to determine the significance of duration categories
relative to ‘Don’t know’.
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5.2. Household Communication Services
This study concerns the four UK household communication services featured in the
2010 Ofcom survey: subscription-based TV services (pay-TV); fixed-line broadband;
mobile telephone; and landline telephone.
In the UK each of the services is available in many cases as a standalone product
from a number of firms which operate on a national basis. The history of provision,
mode of delivery, regulatory considerations, and geography have impacted on which
firms choose (or are able) to offer specific services. The following sections introduce
the respective services and offer an outline of the technological considerations facing
providers, before the data relating to communication services is summarised in section
5.2.5.
5.2.1. Subscription-based Television
Subscription-based television, or pay-TV, is the term used to describe TV broadcast
services to which people pay to subscribe. This is different to those television channels
which are freely available (disregarding the annual television licence fee which must be
paid in the UK). A pay-TV subscription can vary in price and size (as measured by
number of channels), where premium content such as sports or films can be included
in a subscription for an additional fee. The largest provider in the pay-TV market is
Sky which is a vertically integrated firm which is involved in both the broadcasting by
satellite, and production of, TV content. In the current dataset the broadcaster Sky
has a share of around 66% of pay-TV subscriptions while the next largest operator is
Virgin with a share of around 27%.
The technology required to deliver and receive pay-TV used to be limited to satel-
lite or fibre-optic cable Changing technology and access regulation (Sky is required to
allow other broadcasters to show some of its channels where it has exclusive content
such as films or sport) have meant, however, that content can increasingly be broad-
cast by other means. Recent technological advancements have enabled other providers
to enter this market by broadcasting premium content over fixed broadband (notably
BT Vision). The mandated access to Sky’s premium content (through the UK regula-
tor Ofcom’s wholesale must-offer obligation [Ofcom, 2012a]), coupled with the existing
broadband infrastructure, have meant that the entry costs into this sector are currently
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far lower than they have been historically when provision of Pay-TV was inextricably
linked to the need to create a broadcasting TV-specific infrastructure.
5.2.2. Fixed-line Broadband
Fixed-line broadband is the term used to describe a broadband connection which is
installed in the home and enables the user to access the internet or stream content such
as music, films, or live TV. This service definition does not include that broadband
which is delivered wirelessly; this service is typically offered by dedicated mobile phone
service providers but is not included in our study.35 Fixed-line broadband is generally
delivered over a home landline connection (see section 5.2.4) and as such often requires
the subscriber to subscribe to a landline (though this may not necessarily be provided
by the same firm). The adoption of broadband by homes has increased rapidly in re-
cent years; only 31% of homes in 2005 had broadband, while 74% of all homes had
broadband access in 2011, of which 67% used a fixed-line delivery [Ofcom, 2011].
The regulatory environment surrounding broadband is similar to that governing land-
line telephony. Because it is delivered using a conventional landline, and this landline
infrastructure in primarily owned by the ex-state-owned incumbent BT, the regulator
Ofcom has implemented a regime of mandatory access. As a result, entry costs to this
sector is low and, consequently, there are many firms which are able to offer broadband
services.
5.2.3. Mobile Telephone
While chapter 2 of this thesis featured a detailed study of the characteristics of mobile
telecommunications, the following paragraphs introduce specific information which is
relevant to UK mobile telephony.
In defining mobile telephony the study includes those providers of, and subscribers
to, voice and data communication utilising a mobile phone. Mobile telephony reached
mass-adoption in the late-1990s and ownership of mobile phones exceeded the number
of landlines in 2008 [Ofcom, 2011]. This is illustrated in table 5.5 where mobile sub-
scriptions outnumber landline by 2,630 to 2,508. Technological considerations require
35This is likely related to the novelty of the service at the time of the survey (March 2010).
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that firms must be licensed in order to operate a mobile phone network in the UK and
these licences are issued by the communications regulator, Ofcom.
This spectrum bandwidth licensing (following the 2002 bandwidth auction) resulted
in five licensed operators but this number was reduced to four in 2011 following the
merger of two firms (the UK subsidiaries of France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom).
In addition the UK regulator allows agreements between licensed operators and non-
licensed firms to allows the latter to operate a mobile network across bandwidth ‘owned’
by the former.36 The largest of these Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) is
operated by Virgin Media and has more subscribers in our sample than licensed op-
erator Three Mobile; other notable MVNOs include Tesco, and Lebara - a specialist
service offering calls abroad. Notably, MVNO access to licensed operator networks is
not mandated [Ofcom, 2012b].
5.2.4. Landline Telephone
Landline telephone is the term used to describe the traditional telephone that was
historically installed in houses or businesses. In the UK landline telephony was histor-
ically state-owned and operated by the incumbent British Telecom (BT) which is no
longer under state control. In examining the current dataset the incumbency effect of
BT is quite clear since, although privatisation of BT occurred in 1984, the firm still
has a 50% share of landline subscribers (as per table 5.5). Deregulation of the sector
since the privatisation of BT has sought to make entry into the sector easier. This
has culminated in the current scenario where access by a competitor to BT’s landline
infrastructure is mandated and access-pricing heavily-regulated. The number of sub-
scriptions to landline telephone has declined in recent years following the mass adoption
of mobile telecommunications (and the technological improvement in the mobile sector
which made it a viable alternative to a fixed telephone).
36Mobile telecom bandwidth must be rationed in a similar way to conventional household FM radio
broadcasts where each station is allocated a specific range of frequency, without rationing radio
stations (and mobile telecom networks) might try to broadcast on the same frequency resulting in
interference and a breakdown of service
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5.2.5. Service Indicator Variables
Because each dependent variable data point in the analysis pertains to a specific ser-
vice, dummy variables are included to indicate which37. The dummy variables are
intuitively titled PayTV, Broadband, Mobile and Landline. The service variables
are included as standalone dummy variables but they are also included in an interacted
form with variables concerning the supplier38, the variable indicating that a service is
bundled, and also a variable representing the number of services to which an individual
subscribes through the supplier of their given service. Table 5.4, below, indicate the co-
efficients which are relevant to the above standalone variables and also the interactions.
Table 5.4.: Service Variables
Variable Standalone Number of Interacted with:
Service name co-efficient subscribers Supplier Bundled Duration
Pay-TV TV βTV,0 1,665 βTV,1 → βTV,6 βTV,7 βTV,8 → βTV,13
Broadband BB βBB,0 1,991 βBB,1 → βBB,6 βBB,7 βBB,8 → βBB,13
Mobile Mob βMob,0 2,551 βMob,1 → βMob,6 βMob,7 βMob,8 → βMob,13
Landline LL βLL,0 2,421 βLL,1 → βLL,6 βLL,7 βLL,8 → βLL,13
The expectation of the signs for the estimated coefficients are discussed in section
6.2.1.
5.3. Service Supplier
The 2010 Ofcom survey asked respondents to indicate which of 36 providers39 they
used for each of the household communication services to which they subscribed. The
responses to the survey indicated that there are only a handful of large communication
companies with significant market shares in one or more of the individual communica-
tion markets. In addition to these few firms there are a number of smaller operators
that have emerged as a result of the regulatory intervention that has reduced barriers to
37This is identical to the ‘market’ variable used in Waddams Price and Webster [2011]
38Where multiple coefficients are listed as referring to supplier they always correspond, in ascending
order, to the six suppliers BT, SKY, Talk-Talk, Virgin, Mobile, Others.
39There were 35 closed-form options in addition to an open ‘Other Supplier’ category.
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entry. There is also a periphery of other firms to which very few respondents subscribed.
Table 5.5 shows the share of subscribers for each of the services as accounted for by
the largest 15 firms.
Table 5.5.: Survey respondents subscriptions by service provider (March 2010)
Pay-TV Broadband Mobile Landline
Firm Subs % Subs % Subs % Subs %
AOL 3 0.17 103 5.02 1 0.04 30 1.2
BT 68 3.95 487 23.73 19 0.72 1262 50.32
Kingston 0 0 10 0.49 0 0 15 0.6
O2 0 0 88 4.29 696 26.46 7 0.28
Orange 2 0.12 81 3.95 566 21.52 19 0.76
Pipex 0 0 19 0.93 0 0 11 0.44
PlusNet 1 0.06 44 2.14 0 0 8 0.32
Post Office 2 0.12 10 0.49 3 0.11 38 1.52
Sky 1140 66.24 255 12.43 5 0.19 199 7.93
Talk-Talk 7 0.41 254 12.38 13 0.49 288 11.48
‘3’ Mobile 1 0.06 7 0.34 168 6.39 0 0
Tiscali 3 0.17 76 3.7 2 0.08 35 1.4
T-Mobile 2 0.12 3 0.15 324 12.32 2 0.08
Virgin 458 26.61 508 24.76 176 6.69 493 19.66
Vodafone 2 0.12 3 0.15 503 19.13 3 0.12
Others 32 1.85 104 5.05 154 5.86 98 3.89
Total 1721 2052 2630 2508
Table 5.5 shows that some firms have dominant positions in some markets. For
instance, Sky has a particularly high market share in pay-TV whereas BT’s landline
market share is over 50% but their share of subscribers of pay-TV is much lower at
3.95%. The relative strengths of the firms can be understood as being the result of
some inherent market advantage, or ‘specific asset’ that each firm possesses which gives
the relevant firm a relative superiority in the provision of some services. The theory
of specific assets40 specifies that, where a firm possesses a specific asset, resources di-
rected toward this activity have greater effectiveness they would for other firms, either
40Specific Assets are introduced in Williamson [1975] in the context of international trade and process
internalisation versus market transactions.
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through technological superiority, or otherwise intangible assets such as consumers’
perception of brand identity. In the current case of UK communication markets these
advantages in the provision of some services are largely the result of some historical
firm significance. This may be the status of being an ex-nationalised incumbent (which
creates an intangible psychological association between the firm and delivery of a par-
ticular service), or otherwise from being a technological pathfinder and investing early
in fledgeling technology in the case of Sky leading to a tangible technological advantage.
The relative strengths and historical context of the leading firms are discussed further
in section 5.3.1.
Since this study is focussed on the impact of bundling on switching behaviour it
is also relevant to examine the types of bundles to which households declared they
subscribe through each firm. Table 5.6 shows all possible bundle combinations, based
upon the four individual services, and the number of subscribers to each. Given the
particular survey design, subscription to a bundle of services with one firm precluded
subscription to another bundle with the same, or different, supplier (a household could
only have one bundle). The definition of bundling here is based upon that used in
the survey; where an individual receives multiple services from a single provider, and
receives a single bill. Each service is represented by a letter (pay-TV = T, broadband
= B, mobile telephone = M, landline = L) and thus, for example, the bundle TBL
represents one containing pay-TV, broadband, and landline.
Table 5.6 indicates that, similarly to the case of particular services, different firms
place different focus on product bundling. These differences are discussed in the fol-
lowing sections in addition to the outline of the relative strengths and specialities of
the main providers. Also discussed, of specific interest to bundling, is the notion of
core services which represent those services offered by firms in which they have a core
competency and which often contribute to the bundling strategy of firms.
5.3.1. Major Suppliers
As stated, though the survey requested that individuals indicate which of 36 different
suppliers they use for their service the evidence suggests that there is actually a small
number of leading suppliers; consequently the analysis in the present study focusses
on six different categories of provider. Each of the main four suppliers of multiple ser-
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vices is represented by their own category, being BT, Sky, Talk Talk, and Virgin. The
mobile phone operators which table 5.5 shows to be focussed mainly on provision of
mobile telecommunications (O2, Orange, T-Mobile, Three, Vodafone) are represented
as a single category. Finally, there is a category which represents a subscription to any
of the remaining firms. Each of these provider categories is outlined below.
British Telecom
British Telecom (BT) is the ex-nationalised incumbent landline operator which had a
monopoly over telecommunications until 1984 (when deregulation of the sector began).
The firm has an advantage in the provision of home landline services as a result of
its ex-incumbency status; it owns the infrastructure that allows it to operate landline
services as opposed to having to purchase access at regulated prices like its competitors
(to whom it has an obligation to supply). As the ex-nationalised incumbent it also has
the advantage of consumers’ psychological association of the brand with the provision
of landline services where its core business still remains and where it has over a 50%
share of subscribers in the survey. BT also has a significant presence in the home
broadband markets since many households, when adopting home broadband for the
first time, chose to subscribe through their existing landline operator [Ofcom, 2011].
This is readily understood when considering that the two services are delivered through
broadly similar means.41 Many smaller firms which specialise in the provision of stan-
dalone broadband services also require their subscribers to subscribe to BT landline
services - this stems from the technological aspects of broadband provision across the
existing landline network infrastructure (primarily owned by BT).
The success of BT in leveraging its existing customer base is keenly illustrated since
345 survey respondents declared that they subscribe to bundled products through BT,
moreover this number is dominated by the broadband-landline bundle (299). In total
336 of those respondents which bundled with BT had both broadband and landline
as components in the bundle. Given that BT has 487 subscribers to its broadband
service (table 5.5), this implies that 69% of these broadband subscribers subscribe to
the service as part of a bundle.
BT is also one of the earliest firms to offer subscription-based TV services over broad-
41The role of delivery method of a bundle is discussed in Ofcom [2008].
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band, again the majority of subscribers to these services do so as part of a bundle with
BT’s core landline service (42 out of 68).
Sky
Sky are the main provider of subscription-based TV services in the UK and account
for 66% of the subscribers to pay-TV services in the survey. Sky’s dominance is
largely the result of the first-mover advantage they have maintained in the provision
of subscription-based TV services and the firm’s vertical integration into broadcast of
high-profile premium content. Sky primarily deliver their pay-TV services via satellite
broadcast42 and are the only main operator to do so, requiring users to install a satellite
dish at their property (which can potentially increase the costs of switching to or from
Sky). The dominance of Sky in the pay-TV market has led the sector regulator to re-
quire that Sky allow rival providers to broadcast a selection of their premium channels,
specifically sports and films at a regulated price.
Sky also offers landline and broadband services which are delivered via a conventional
landline connection (owing to the access requirements placed on BT, owner of the land-
line network). Almost all subscribers to these services through Sky do so as part of a
bundle with Sky’s core TV service (236 out of 255 subscribers to Sky broadband, 176 out
of 199 for landline). However, the majority of individuals in the survey who subscribe
to Sky’s core pay-TV service, do so as a standalone subscriber without bundling (86%).
Talk Talk
Talk Talk is a provider, demerged from UK cellphone retailer Carphone Warehouse in
2010, which specialises mainly in the provision of landline and home-broadband ser-
vices. It has grown largely through acquisitions of smaller firms which emerged through
the deregulation of landline, and also the growth of broadband services (Talk Talk ac-
quired AOL’s UK broadband service in 2007). This focus on these services is reflected
in the survey response data where it has an 11-12% market share in both services (254
and 288 subscribers for broadband and landline respectively). Notably, most of the
subscribers (around 80%) to these services through Talk Talk receive both as part of a
42Though technological advances now allow subscribers to stream content online.
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broadband-landline bundle.
Talk Talk, unlike many of the other firms, does not have some technological core
competency or infrastructure advantage. It has instead grown out of the change in the
regulatory environment allowing increased competition in the UK landline sector (via
which both of its main services are delivered).
Virgin Media
Virgin Media are an integrated communications firm with a significant share of around
20% of subscribers across pay-TV, broadband, and landline services. It is also the only
firm specialising in these areas which has a notable presence in mobile telecommuni-
cations; this is despite the firm’s lack of a formal mobile operator licence (see section
5.2.3). Virgin were the first firm to offer a truly integrated package at a time that the
other suppliers were offering standalone services. The firm still primarily offers services
as bundles with the incremental cost of adding additional services to the bundle gen-
erally lower than the equivalent standalone price for the service. Virgin Media is also
different from its rival providers of broadband, or pay-TV, in that it delivers almost all
content in these services via a fibre-optic cable. Like Sky’s satellite delivery, installa-
tion of a fibre optic cable to the home represents a switching cost to subscribers. The
use of fibre-optic provision allows faster broadband speeds (enabling faster downloads
or display of web pages) than broadband provision via a conventional landline, giving
Virgin a technological advantage over its rivals such as BT which have only recently
(post-2010) begun investing in fibre-optic infrastructure.
Virgin Media does not have a clear core service, in the way the Sky have TV. While
this may be related to the unique delivery method, it has the result that subscribers to
Virgin services are very likely to bundle. This high bundling rate is persistent across
pay-TV, broadband, and landline where 90%, 84%, and 92% of subscribers to the re-
spective services do so as part of a bundle. These headline figures are particularly high
compared to bundling rates for those firm-specific core services such as pay-TV through
Sky, or landline through BT.
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Mobile Operators
Mobile operators are categorised as those firms which possess a Wireless telegraphy Act
Licence (WTA) which allots them a segment of the available bandwidth for broadcast
of mobile telephone signals. This consists of Orange, O2, T-Mobile43, Three Mobile,
and Vodafone. Collectively these firms account for 2,257 out of 2,630 of respondents in
the survey which subscribed to a mobile telephone service but much lower proportions
for other services such as fixed broadband. This concentration of subscribers in the
core service of the mobile firms is similar to Sky which has a unique method of delivery
for its core service, with peripheral services delivered by different means.
Other Firms
The other firms featured in the survey are all small firms which tend to offer only one
or two services and where landline or broadband services are heavily represented. Also
included in the list of other firms are those small mobile phone MVNO operators such
as Tesco, and other single-product focussed firms. The data suggests that generally
subscribers to other firms are less likely to bundle, being that these firms account for
around 4% of subscribers, but only 2% of bundles.
Given the lower likelihood of bundling through these smaller providers, it can be
interpreted that many of these suppliers are single-product firms, and as such are fo-
cussed on a single ‘core’ service.
Provider Summary
Table 5.7 summarises the position of the main operators with respect to the main
service delivery methods and their respective core and peripheral services. The core
services represent those with which the firm is most clearly identified, and those firms
that have multiple core services are known for their bundling of those services.
43Orange and T-Mobile have, subsequent to the survey, merged their UK operations.
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5.3.2. Service Indicator Variables
In the econometric analysis, for each data point regarding switching, a dummy variable
is used to indicate the relevant provider for the service. Table 5.8 indicates the variable
names for each provider category and also the coefficients representing the standalone
supplier variable and also those variables with which it is interacted. As per table 5.4
the relevant symbol for each variable is also shown. The frequency of subscription to
each supplier in the final dataset (after the restrictions of table 5.3 were applied) is also
displayed.
Table 5.8.: Provider Categories
Variable Standalone Number of Interacted with:
Provider name coefficient subscribers Bundled Duration
British Telecom BT βBT,14 1,895 βBT,15 βBT,16 → βBT,21
Sky Sky βSky,14 1,530 βSky,15 βSky,16 → βSky,21
Talk-Talk Talk βTalk,14 478 βTalk,15 βTalk,16 → βTalk,21
Virgin Virg βVirg,14 1,483 βVirg,15 βVirg,16 → βVirg,21
Mobile Firm Mobfirm βMobF,14 2,386 βMobF,15 βMob,16 → βMob,21
Other Other βOth,14 856 βOth,15 βOth,16 → βOth,21
5.4. Other Service-specific Variables
In addition to the type of services and providers to which households subscribe, re-
spondents were asked (as per table 5.6) whether they bundled those services, and also
the duration for which they have subscribed to the service through the stated supplier.
This data is also included in the econometric investigation and is shown in tables 5.9
and 5.10.
5.4.1. Bundle Status
This binary variable is core to the investigation and is equal to 1 where the particular
service is subscribed-to as part of a bundle of other services from a single supplier,
otherwise it is zero. The significance of the estimated coefficient attached to the ‘bun-
dle’ variable will indicate whether bundling of services has a significant effect on the
likelihood of switching supplier, though this will be mediated by the significance of the
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interaction variables containing the ‘bundled’ variable.
The prioritisation of the certain switching behaviour in the dataset may lead to a
priori expectation that non-bundled products would be more likely to be excluded lead-
ing to bias in the dataset,robustness checks indicate that this is not the case.
Table 5.9.: Bundling by Service Type
Bundle Variable Bundlers by service type: Interacted with:
status name Coefficient Pay-TV Broadband Mobile Landline Duration
Yes=1 Bundled β22 628 1,126 55 1,094 β23 → β28
No=0 - - 1,037 865 2,496 1,327 -
5.4.2. Duration
The duration of an individual’s subscription to a service with a given supplier is in-
cluded as discrete duration categories. In the results, a relatively smaller coefficients
relating to longer duration categories would signify a negative relationship between
duration of subscription and probability of switching. Relatively larger and positive
coefficients attached to longer duration would indicate a positive relationship. Again,
table 5.10 reports the respective coefficients for each category and also the frequency
of the categories in the dataset by service type.
Table 5.10.: Duration of Subscription by Service Type
Variable Duration by service type:
Duration name Coefficient Pay-TV Broadband Mobile Landline
6 months or under DUR Sub-6m β29 102 109 85 123
7 to 12 months DUR 6m-1yr β30 130 156 163 164
13 to 24 months DUR 1yr-2yr β31 293 555 511 464
25 to 48 months DUR 2yr-4yr β32 295 451 451 392
Over 48 months DUR over-4yr β33 780 654 1,227 1,182
Don’t know DUR Don’t know β34 65 66 114 91
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5.5. Individual-specific Variables
There are a number of demographic variables which have been identified in the existing
empirical switching literature as having a statistically significant impact on individuals’
switching behaviour. Questions relating to demographic factors were also included in
the 2010 Ofcom survey.
The collection of the data by Saville Rossiter-Base was carried out such that par-
ticipants were chosen to be representative sample based upon three criteria: age; gen-
der; and socio-economic group. Furthermore, the respondents were geographically dis-
tributed between sampling units based upon UK census Output Areas, ensuring that
the demographic profile of the sample is representative of the UK population. Finally,
the sample was selected such that a minimum quota of subscribers to each service was
satisfied to allow meaningful analysis of the data.
Like the service-specific variables individual-specific demographic variables are cat-
egorical (owing to the closed-form of the questions) and thus included as series’ of
dummy variables. The following sections outline distribution of the variables included
in this present analysis for the experimental sample.
5.5.1. Household Income
Household income is included as a series of income categories in the survey. A positive
relationship between income and switching-likelihood would result in a larger estimated
coeffiecient attached to those dummy variables for higher income categories, a nega-
tive relationship would result in larger coefficients attached to those dummies for lower
income. The number of households in each of the income categories in the survey is
shown in table 5.11.
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Table 5.11.: Household Income Categories
Household Variable
income level name Coefficient Frequency
Under £11,500 INCOME sub-11500 γ1 396
£11,500-£17,499 INCOME 11500-17499 γ2 298
£17,500-£29,999 INCOME 17500-29999 γ3 480
£30,000-£49,999 INCOME 30000-49999 γ4 463
£50,000 and over INCOME 50000+ γ5 250
Don’t know INCOME Don’t know γ6 269
Refused INCOME Refused γ7 700
5.5.2. Children
The analysis contains a dummy variable equal to 1 if there are children in the household.
Table 5.12.: Children in Household
Variable
Children? name Coefficient Frequency
Yes=1 Children γ8 947
No=0 - - 1,909
5.5.3. Employment Status
The employment status dummy variables represent the different options in the survey.
If individuals who work full-time are (for example) less likely to switch relative to those
that work part-time then it would be expected that the estimated coefficient relating to
full-time employment (γ9) would be more negative than that for the part-time dummy.
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Table 5.13.: Employment status
Employment Variable
status name Coeffiecient Frequency
Full-time (30+ hours per week) EMPLOY Full-time γ9 1,110
Part-time (under 30 hours per week) EMPLOY Part-time γ10 412
Looking for work EMPLOY Looking γ11 91
Full-time education EMPLOY Education γ12 108
Retired EMPLOY Retired γ13 690
Not working EMPLOY Not γ14 430
Refused EMPLOY Refused γ15 15
5.5.4. Gender
Gender is represented in the study by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent
is male; table 5.14 suggests that slightly more household decision makers were women:
Table 5.14.: Gender of Respondents
Variable
Gender name Coefficient Frequency
Female=0 - - 1,474
Male=1 Gender γ16 1,382
5.5.5. Education
Respondents were asked at what age they finished (or expected to finish) full-time
education according to discrete categories which were designed to roughly proxy the
educational achievement level of the individual. Under-17 would be the lowest level
of academic achievement (known as O-level or GCSE dependent upon the age of the
respondent), 17-18 would represent additional academic achievement (A-level) or some
basic vocational training, 19-20 may indicate more advanced vocational training, while
aged over 21 would indicate a university qualification. If education and switching
behaviour are positively correlated then it would be expected that those coefficients
relating to a later education leaving age would be significant and more positive relative
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to those for individuals who left education earlier.
Table 5.15.: Age at Finishing Education
Age Variable
left education name Coefficient Frequency
Aged under 17 EDU under-17 γ17 1,152
Aged 17-18 EDU 17-18 γ18 605
Aged 19-20 EDU 19-20 γ19 249
Aged 21 and over EDU 21+ γ20 805
Don’t know EDU Don’t know γ21 35
Refused EDU Refused γ22 10
5.5.6. Age
In the survey data the age of respondents was recorded in discrete categories, these are
shown in table 5.16, and the respondents were chosen in order to be a representative
sample of the UK population.
Table 5.16.: Age of Respondents
Variable
Age name Coefficient Frequency
Aged under 18 AGE under-18 γ23 35
Aged 18-24 AGE 18-24 γ24 222
Aged 25-34 AGE 25-34 γ25 562
Aged 35-44 AGE 35-44 γ26 535
Aged 45-54 AGE 45-54 γ27 491
Aged 55-64 AGE 55-64 γ28 465
Aged 65-74 AGE 65-74 γ29 383
Aged 75 and over AGE 75+ γ30 163
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6. Investigating Bundling and Switching
This part of the thesis analyses the impact of the ‘bundling’ of communication services
with a single supplier on the likelihood of an individual switching their subscription for
a service to a different provider. It utilises a discrete-choice cross-sectional survey data
of 2,871 individuals which responded to questions regarding their switching behaviour
over the four services of interest: pay-TV; home broadband; mobile telephone; and
landline telephone.
6.1. Econometric Methodology
Using survey data this study analyses an individual’s decision to switch provider of an
existing service as a binary choice determined by both the characteristics of the service
such as the provider, and also determined by the measurable characteristics of the in-
dividual such as age or education level. The switching decision is similarly expressed
to that in Waddams Price and Webster [2011] where a dummy variable is included to
indicate the particular market in which the switch took place (pay TV, broadband,
mobile phone, or landline).
The present study focusses primarily on those variables concerning the supplier at
time of switching in order to capture the impact that the bundling of a service with
other services from a single supplier has on the probability of switching that service.
Specifically, by controlling for other supplier-specific variables which are likely to be
influential, it is possible to isolate the pure effect that bundling at the time of switching
has on the subsequent likelihood of switching.
From the findings in the previous literature in chapter 4.2.1 the propensity to switch
provider is likely to be some function of a range of variables, such that:
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Switching propensity = S (Service, Bundled, Duration, Supplier,
Duration×Supplier, Duration×Service, Duration×Bundled,
Supplier×Service, Supplier×Bundled, Service×Bundled,
Income, Employment, Children, Education, Gender, Age)
Where ‘Service’ represents which of the four services in the study is under consider-
ation, ‘Bundled’ concerns whether this service is part of a bundle,‘Duration’ represents
the length of time that the individual has subscribed to the service, and ‘Number of
services’ is the number of services to which the individual subscribes with the same
supplier. The variables which are used to represent all these factors are described and
summarised in section 5.1.
Chapter 5 of this thesis indicated that bundling strategies and service specialities are
specific to each each of the providers in the UK market and, furthermore, that bundling
likelihood is different depending upon the service. The inclusion of interaction variables
in equation (6.6) is designed to capture and control for these effects. Specifically, it
is not sufficient to examine bundling as being independent of providers or service, be-
cause the bundling rate across firms or services is fundamentally different. Interacting
bundling with service or supplier actively accounts and allows for these heterogeneities.
Similarly, by interacting service and supplier the model takes into account the obser-
vation that switching rates for each service are different depending upon the supplier.
The presence of multiple interaction terms presents challenges in terms of model in-
terpretation. It means that in order to interpret to estimated coefficients it is necessary
to explore the estimated propensities to switch under different service-supplier-bundling
combinations, or otherwise explore the marginal effect for a change in variable from
one state to another (i.e. unbundled to bundled). Section 6.2.1 outlines this process.
The interaction terms are limited to service-specific elements and although there
may be demographic-related interaction terms, parsimony dictates that these are not
included.
The problem faced in the analysis is that although all the above factors are influen-
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tial in the individual’s propensity to switch the supplier for the services to which they
subscribe, it is not possible to actually observe the true propensity to switch. Instead
we observe only whether an individual of particular characteristics, who subscribed to a
particular service through a given supplier, decided to switch provider. This switching
decision is therefore a binary variable. This binary nature of the dependent variable
leads this study to utilise a probit technique which places an upper bound on the de-
pendent variable, while the characteristics of the survey participants and their services
are used as independent variables in order to analyse their respective significance in
the determination of the decision to switch.
6.1.1. Binary Choice
In order to more formally understand the individual’s decision to switch provider it is
useful to interpret the choices made by the individual in a random utility framework,
as per Greene [2012]. Defining U0ik as the utility individual i gains from their existing
subscription to the service k with their current supplier, and U1ik the expected utility
they could gain from switching to a new supplier.
U0ik = (x
0
ik)
′β0 + z′iγ
0 + ε0ik (6.1)
U1ik = (x
1
ik)
′β1 + z′iγ
1 + ε1ik (6.2)
From equation (6.1), the individual’s utility from their existing subscription (U0ik)
can be expressed as some function of a vector of characteristics of the product denoted
x0ik which might include some supplier-specific elements, the age of the subscription, or
whether it is bundled with other services in a single package. The utility gained from
a service is also affected by the profile of the subscriber, thus a vector of individual de-
mographic characteristics (zi) is included in the utility function. Utility from a service
is also subject to some random error term ε0ik.
Equation (6.2) indicates a similar arrangement for utility with a new supplier of the
same service (indicated by U1ik) and so features the characteristics of the new supplier;
note that the demographic vector zi remains constant since these are individual-specific
133
Exclusivity, Bundling and Switching in Communications Markets
characteristics and do not vary with service.
An individual who wishes to change supplier for a service may also face a switching
cost (W ). This can be linked to the characteristics of the new service such as the efforts
the new supplier makes to alleviate problems the individual may face in switching44,
the characteristics of the old supplier such as the efforts it makes to hinder a switching
process, and also the characteristics of the individual such as their cognitive capacity
to understand switching processes.
W 0→1ik = (x
0
ik)
′βW0 + (x1ik)
′βW1 + z′iγ
W + εWik (6.3)
The switching equation captures the endogenous nature of switching costs in that
both existing and future suppliers can create switching costs meaning that it is depen-
dent on some or all of the firm-level variables. It also captures the reality that switching
costs vary between the service k and the supplier. Finally, it includes demographics
to account for the differences in perceived switching costs between different observable
demographic groups such as the elderly.
A consumer is assumed to switch if they receive positive net-utility following that
switch, defining net utility from switching as Nik, where W
0→1
ik represents the switching
cost associated with the switch from provider 0 to provider 1:
(Net utility)0→1ik = U
1
ik − U0ik −W 0→1ik (6.4)
If the net utility from switching is greater than zero, then the individual will switch45;
thus the probility of a switch is the probability that (Net utility)0→1ik > 0; from the
above, this is where U1ik > (U
0
ik +W
0→1
ik ):
44This is typical of bank accounts where the receiving bank will offer to transfer over standing orders
and direct debit instructions.
45A switch occurs in equation (6.5) where Switchik = 1, otherwise Switchik = 0
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Prob[Switchik = 1|x0ik,x1ik, zik] = Prob[U1ik > (U0ik +W 0→1ik )] (6.5)
= Prob[((x1ik)
′β1 + z′iγ
1 + ε1ik)− ((x0ik)′β0 + z′iγ0 + ε0ik) +
−((x0ik)′βW0 + (x1ik)′βW1 + z′iγW + εWik ) > 0|x0ik,x1ik, zik]
= Prob[(x1ik)
′(β1 − βW1)− (x0ik)′(β0 − βW0) +
+z′i(γ
1 − γ0 − γW ) + (ε1ik − ε0ik − εWik ) > 0|x0ik,x1ik, zik]
= Prob[(x∗ik)
′β∗ + z′iγ
∗ + ε∗ik > 0|x∗ik, zik] (6.6)
Where the term x∗ik in equation 6.6 represents the appended vectors x
1
ik and x
0
ik, the
the vector of relevant β terms has been similarly appended and are represented by β∗.
The term γ∗ represents the net effect of the γ terms on the service-invariant individual
characteristics (zik), expressed as γ
1 − γ0 − γW. The random error terms have been
similarly consolidated (ε∗ik).
6.1.2. Probit Estimation
Because the individual above is making their switching based upon an unobserved util-
ity function then the true decision making process (based upon the net utility calcula-
tion) cannot be estimated. The decision made by the individual is however observed
as the binary switching decision, in addition to a selection of characteristics of the
individual and also a selection of service specific variables. Although equation (6.4),
which is based upon the true utility function, may contain every possible characteristic
of individual, we have a limited set of observed variables chosen to be relevant and
measurable. As a result it is possible to estimate the decision by individual i to switch
service k as some latent variable Sik - a function of the observed characteristics included
in the vectors x and z which again correspond to, respectively, service- and individual-
specific variables. In the following equations the asterisks on the above variables are
relaxed, though the term x still represents all service-specific variables and the term β
the corresponding coefficients for the full set of service variables:
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Sik = x
′
ikβ + z
′
iγ + εik (6.7)
Equation (6.7) is based upon the earlier notation, it is identical in form to the net
utility calculation in equation (6.6) but can be calculated as it is constructed using ob-
servable characteristics. Where xik represents the subset of observable service-specific
variables for individual i and the service k to which they subscribe.zi represents those
observable individual-specific variables. Thus, much like the net utility calculation of
(6.6) the decision to switch is implicitly illustrated by the condition:
Switchik =
{
1 if Sik ≥ 0
0 if Sik < 0
}
(6.8)
Thus, from (6.7) and (6.8) the probability that the individual switches is:
Prob[Sik ≥ 1] = Prob[εik > −x′ikβ − z′iγ] (6.9)
By assuming the error term εik to be normally distributed according to εik ∼ N [0, 1]
, which is symmetrical, the above can be rewritten:
Prob[Sik ≥ 1] = Prob[x′ikβ + z′iγ > εik] (6.10)
In imposing the standard normal distribution on the error term the probit model is
being used, as such, the standard normal distribution function is used in calculating
the probability of switching (Sik > 0):
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Prob[Switchik = 1] =
∫ x′ikβ+z′iγ
−∞
φ(Sik)dSik = Φ(x
′
ikβ + z
′
iγ) (6.11)
Where φ is the standard normal distribution and Φ the cumulative density function
for the normal distribution; where Φ(Sik > 0) > 0.5, creating a positive probility of
switching. The probit model is calculated using maximum likelihood estimation.
6.1.3. Random Effects Probit
Because the participants of the survey were asked their switching decisions over a range
of services to which they subscribed, and because this analysis examines the switching
decision on a per-service level, then for each individual there exists multiple data points;
up to four (representing the four services in the study) dependent binary switching de-
cisions.
The standard probit model is an acceptable model under the assumption of inde-
pendence between different dependent variables; in the current case this would require
complete independence of the decisions of an individual. Because the probit model
estimates a single set of coefficients relating to the likelihood of switching a given ser-
vice, independence would require that the error terms relating to the each individuals
multiple service-specific switching decisions be independent. Suppose however that this
is not the case, that for services k and l, and individuals i and j:
Cov[εik, εil] 6= 0 and...
Cov[εik, εjk] = 0
This would imply that there is some exogenous deterministic element (in this case the
individual’s identity) which leads to correlation between the likelihood of switching for
the services to which a single individual subscribes, but is otherwise uncorrelated with
the rest of the variables. In this instance, pooling of the observations is not suitable
and will result in inconsistent estimators.
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The existence of intra-individual correlation in their decisions means that the analy-
sis is approached as one would approach panel data; with multiple observation points
for each individual. The probit model is adapted as a random effects model where the
estimated coefficients are fixed for each service, supplier, and demographic character-
istic, but a random individual specific error is added to all data points pertaining to a
given individual. As such, the random effects probit estimation of the latent variable
model becomes:
Sik = x
′
ikβ + z
′
iγ + eik where eik = ui + εik, ui ∼ N [0, σ2u], εik ∼ N [0, 1](6.12)
Where the total error term eik is made up of the individual component ui and the
random component εik which is still subject to the prior assumption regarding its nor-
mal distribution.
This extra error term allows for some undefinable individual difference in the prob-
ability of switching that cannot be accounted for by that individual’s observable char-
acteristics; it may be related to background or personal experience which cannot be
readily quantified. The probability of switching, as per the model of equation (6.11),
becomes as follows:
Prob[Switchik = 1] = Φ(x
′
ikβ + z
′
iγ + ui) (6.13)
This indicates that the probability of switching is still determined by the cumulative
density function of the standard normal (as determined by the distribution of εik), but
the function of the latent variable is now augmented by the individual-specific error
component, ui, which is normally distributed according to ui ∼ [0, σ2u].
6.1.4. Testing the Random Effects Specification
Although this investigation utilises the random effects probit model there are a number
of other methods that could alternatively have been used. These include pooling the
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data and thus disregarding individual-specific heterogeneity which would be appropri-
ate where the differences between individuals are likely to be small or insignificant.
Otherwise it would be possible to relax the assumption that the standard errors of esti-
mated coefficients are independently distributed - allowing them to be non-independent
for within-individual observations. This latter approach affects the standard errors of
the estimated coefficients, but the log-likelihood and coefficients remain unbiased and
identical to the unmodified probit.
It is necessary to determine whether the random effects model provides a better
fitting model than the above approaches. The econometric specification of the latent
variable for the random effect probit model is below, where :
Sik = α+ x
′
ikβ + z
′
iγ + ui + εik︸ ︷︷ ︸
eik
Because the panel-specific error component ui is distributed according to ui ∼
N [0, σ2u] the total variance in the model is equal to 1 + σu according to the exist-
ing distributional assumptions concerning the random element εik.
The proportion of the total variance which is attributable to the panel-specific error
component, ρ, is calculated, for services k and l, as:
Corr(uik, uil, k 6= l) ≡ ρ = σ
2
u
1 + σ2u
(6.14)
In the instance that there is no panel-specific effect (and that every observation in the
dependent variable data is independent) then ρ = 0 and as such a pooled probit model
featuring all the data would be more efficient. In order to test that ρ is non-zero and
significant a likelihood-ratio test is performed against the null hypothesis that ρ = 0.
A test statistic LR is calculated as:
LR = −2(LogLikelihood0) + 2(LogLikelihood1)
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Where LogLikelihood0 is the log likelihood under the restriction that ρ = 0 which is
achieved by running a pooled probit (where all observations are assumed to be indepen-
dent), and LogLikelihood1 the log likelihood under the random effects specification.
The LR statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to
Df1 − Df0 (the difference in degrees of freedom between the experimental and null
specifications), which is 1 in this case owing to the extra individual-specific error com-
ponent. Section 6.3 details the results of the likelihood ratio test.
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6.2. Final Model Specifications
This part of the thesis follows two main avenues of investigation. It first investigates
the relative performance of a model primarily constructed using demographic variables
against one which is instead constructed using service-specific variables. It then in-
vestigates the role of service bundling on individuals’ switching decisions under the
broad hypothesis that the bundling of services reduces the likelihood of an individual
switching. The variables, and the symbols associated with their respective estimated
coefficients are as those outlined in the previous section.
6.2.1. Demographic variables versus service-specific variables
The results from this section have implications for the significance of the conclusions
elicited from prevailing literature because of its heavy focus on demographic variables.
Specifically, this line of investigation aims to demonstrate that the implicit assumption
of homogeneity of supplier, present in much of the previous literature, is flawed because
the differences between suppliers affect the likelihood of switching. The firms in the
present analysis have been shown to vary in terms of services in which they specialise
(their ‘specific’ asset). They also vary in the extent to which subscribers of their ser-
vices are likely to bundle services. Consequently where different propensities to switch
provider are associated with different services, or the bundling of services, then this
will be reflected in inter-firm differences in switching likelihood.
To examine the differences in performance between demographic-based models and
those which are service-focussed three different specifications of the random-effects pro-
bit model (detailed in section 6.1.3) are utilised. In each case, the results assess the
significance of the estimated coefficients against predictions informed by the existing
literature. The random effects specification is also tested against a pooled model for
each of the specifications being examined using a likelihood ratio test. Finally, the
performance of the three models is compared so as to determine which is most appro-
priate in terms of assessing the impact of different variables on individuals’ probability
of switching provider. This is achieved by using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC)
– a goodness of fit measure which guards against over-fitting.
The following specifications feature the latent dependent variable Sik and assumes
that the decision to switch is distributed around this variable, such that:
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Switchik =
{
1 if Sik ≥ 0
0 if Sik < 0
}
Specification One - Demographic model:
The demographic-only model is based upon those variables which have been consis-
tently significant in the prevailing switching literature. The model also controls for
the market in which the switching is taking place. This is vital and common to many
studies of switching since the underlying rate of switching varies between markets and,
as such, would lead to inaccurate estimates of coefficients if not controlled for.
The assumption in testing only demographics here is that all suppliers are homo-
geneous and that, accordingly, the likelihood of switching-to or -from is identical for
each supplier. In reality the different strategies of suppliers renders the assumption
unrealistic; this is highlighted in the discussion of section 5.
The demographics-focussed random effects Probit model is laid out below:
Sik = α+
(
βTV,0TVik
[0,1]
+ βBB,0BBik
[0,1]
+ βMob,0Mobik
[0,1]
+ βLL,0LLik
[0,1]
)
+
γ7∑
γ1
INCOME∗i + +γ8Childreni
[0,1]
+
γ15∑
γ9
EMPLOYMENT∗i +
+γ16Genderi
[0,1]
+
γ22∑
γ17
EDUCATION∗i +
γ30∑
γ23
AGE∗i + ui + εik
The variables INCOME*, EMPLOYMENT*, EDUCATION* and AGE* represent a
categorical series of dummy variables. For each individual, i, the constituent dummies
within each category are mutually exclusive such that only one of the related coefficients
has an impact, the rest are equal to zero. Similarly, because there are multiple data
points for each individual,46 and each market is examined separately, the particular
service (k) is mutually exclusive.
46Where the ‘individual’ represents a household
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Example 1: The coefficients which are included in any estimation are demonstrated
using the following example. Individual i has a household income of £33,000, has chil-
dren in the household, is in full-time employment, is female, left education at age 20,
and is 43 years old. The decision of this individual to switch service k = pay-TV in the
last twelve months is indicated by the regression:
Sik = α+ βTV,0TVik
[=1]
+ γ4INCOME 30000-49999i
[=1]
+ γ8Childreni
[=1]
+
+γ9EMPLOY Full-timei
[=1]
+ γ20EDU 19-20i
[=1]
+ γ26AGE 35-44i
[=1]
+ ui + εik
Because all the variables involved are mutually exclusive categorical variables, only
the relevant categories are included, the rest are equal to zero and drop out of the
estimation. Furthermore, since the included dependent variables all have a value of 1,
the above regression is further simplified, thus:
Sik = α+ βTV,0 + γ4 + γ8 + γ9 + γ19 + γ26 + ui + εik
Example 2: Again, utilising the relevant tables in section 5.1, suppose individual j
has household income of £18,000, has no children, is employed part-time, is male, left
education at 24, and is 30 years old; the probability of switching service k = broadband
is based upon the equation:
Sjl = α+ βBB,0 + γ3 + γ10 + γ16 + γ20 + γ25 + ui + εik
Once estimated, the coefficients for the variables in this demographic specification
are intuitively understood. Their interpretation does not rely on the calculation of
marginal effects or estimated values of Sik which are necessary in later specifications.
The categorical variables, being a series of dummy variables, are expressed relative to
some base category which is set to be informative (a comparable category rather than
‘refused’ or ‘don’t know’). The literature has informed a-priori expectations about the
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relative magnitude of the dummy variables in each category; these are commented on
in the results.
Specification Two - Service-specific model:
The service-specific model only includes variables relevant to the service to which an
individual subscribes and disregards the demographic profile of the individual. This
specification is a marked departure from much of the prevailing literature since the
implicit homogeneity of the suppliers is removed.
Different advantages in the provision of certain services and strategies concerning
bundling of products mean that the likelihood of switching provider is likely to vary
significantly depending on the identity of the incumbent supplier and the service.
Regression (6.15), below, sets out the service-specific model specification:
Much like the demographic-focussed model, the above model is constructed using a
large number of mutually exclusive dummy variables. This means that when the char-
acteristics of an individual’s subscription are specified the model collapses to a much
more manageable equation.
Example 3: The manner in which the above specification reduces is best illustrated
using a simple example. Suppose that, amongst other services, an individual i sub-
scribes to k, a pay-TV service, through Virgin and that this is included in a bundle;
furthermore the individual has subscribed to this TV service for 18 months. Because
in this instance k refers to pay-TV then the terms BBik, Mobik, and LLik are all equal
to zero, eliminating lines 3-5 of the specification. Moreover, because k is supplied by
Virgin, the terms BTik, Skyik, Talkik, MobFirmik, and Otherik are also equal to zero;
eliminating lines 6-8 and 10-11. Consulting section 5.2.5, the relevant coefficient for
for TV×Virgin in line 2 is βTV,4, and the relevant coefficient for duration 18 months is
β15. Thus the model to be estimated, with lines 2 and 9 enabled by virtue of TVik = 1
and Virgik = 1, is expressed thus:
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Sik = α+ (6.15)
+TVik
[0,1]
(
βTV,0 +
βTV,6∑
βTV,1
SUPPLIER∗ik + βTV,7Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βTV,13∑
βTV,8
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+BBik
[0,1]
(
βBB,0 +
βBB,6∑
βBB,1
SUPPLIER∗ik + βBB,7Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βBB,13∑
βBB,8
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Mobik
[0,1]
(
βMob,0 +
βMob,6∑
βMob,1
SUPPLIER∗ik + βMob,7Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βMob,13∑
βMob,8
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+LLik
[0,1]
(
βLL,0 +
βLL,6∑
βLL,1
SUPPLIER∗ik + βLL,7Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βLL,13∑
βLL,8
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+BTik
[0,1]
(
βBT,14 + βBT,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βBT,21∑
βBT,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Skyik
[0,1]
(
βSky,14 + βSky,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βSky,21∑
βSky,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Talkik
[0,1]
(
βTalk,14 + βTalk,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βTalk,21∑
βTalk,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Virgik
[0,1]
(
βVirg,14 + βVirg,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βVirg,21∑
βVirg,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+MobFirmik
[0,1]
(
βMobF,14 + βMobF,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βMobF,21∑
βMobF,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Otherik
[0,1]
(
βOth,14 + βOth,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βOth,21∑
βOth,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Bundledik
[0,1]
(
β22 +
β28∑
β23
DURATION∗ik
)
+
β34∑
β29
DURATION∗ik + ui + εik
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Sik = α+ βTV,0TVik
[=1]
+ βTV,4(TVik
[=1]
×Virginik
[=1]
) + βTV,7(Bundledik
[=1]
× TVik
[=1]
) +
+βTV,10(DUR 1yr-2yrik
[=1]
× TVik
[=1]
) + βVirg,14Virginik
[=1]
+ βVirg,15(Bundledik
[=1]
×Virginik
[=1]
) +
+βVirg,18(DUR 1yr-2yrik
[=1]
×Virginik
[=1]
) + β22Bundledik
[=1]
+
+β25(DUR 1yr-2yrik
[=1]
× Bundledik
[=1]
) + β31(DUR 1yr-2yrik
[=1]
) + ui + εik
Given that all the variables are dummy variables with the value 1, the notation can
be further reduced thus:
Sik = α+ βTV,0 + βTV,4 + βTV,7 + βTV,10 + βVirg,14 + βVirg,15 + (6.16)
+βVirg,18 + β22 + β25 + β31 + ui + εik
Like the demographic specification before, there is enough variation across the whole
sample to allow estimation of all the coefficients in the model. The interpretation of
the coefficients is not straightforward in this particular model since the majority of the
variables are included in both standalone and also interacted form; this is addressed in
discussion following specification three.
Specification Three - Unified model:
The third model specification combines the previous specifications one and two and
is designed to measure the impact of the different service-specific factors while con-
trolling for the demographic profile of the subscriber. The notation remains the same
though now the β coefficients and γ coefficients (referring to, respectively, service and
demographic variables) are present in the same model. Because the model still utilises
the dummy-variable basis it similarly reduces according to the characteristics of the
individual-service (ik) combination as per examples 1-3.
The specification of the unified model is outlined below:
Because, both in this specification and the previous, all of the service-specific vari-
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Sik = α+ (6.17)
+TVik
[0,1]
(
βTV,0 +
βTV,6∑
βTV,1
SUPPLIER∗ik + βTV,7Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βTV,13∑
βTV,8
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+BBik
[0,1]
(
βBB,0 +
βBB,6∑
βBB,1
SUPPLIER∗ik + βBB,7Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βBB,13∑
βBB,8
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Mobik
[0,1]
(
βMob,0 +
βMob,6∑
βMob,1
SUPPLIER∗ik + βMob,7Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βMob,13∑
βMob,8
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+LLik
[0,1]
(
βLL,0 +
βLL,6∑
βLL,1
SUPPLIER∗ik + βLL,7Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βLL,13∑
βLL,8
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+BTik
[0,1]
(
βBT,14 + βBT,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βBT,21∑
βBT,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Skyik
[0,1]
(
βSky,14 + βSky,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βSky,21∑
βSky,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Talkik
[0,1]
(
βTalk,14 + βTalk,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βTalk,21∑
βTalk,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Virgik
[0,1]
(
βVirg,14 + βVirg,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βVirg,21∑
βVirg,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+MobFirmik
[0,1]
(
βMobF,14 + βMobF,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βMobF,21∑
βMobF,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Otherik
[0,1]
(
βOth,14 + βOth,15Bundledik
[0,1]
+
βOth,21∑
βOth,16
DURATION∗ik
)
+
+Bundledik
[0,1]
(
β22 +
β28∑
β23
DURATION∗ik
)
+
β34∑
β29
DURATION∗ik +
+
γ7∑
γ1
INCOME∗i + +γ8Childreni
[0,1]
+
γ15∑
γ9
EMPLOYMENT∗i +
+γ16Genderi
[0,1]
+
γ21∑
γ17
EDUCATION∗i +
γ29∑
γ22
AGE∗i + ui + εik
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ables are included in an interacted form the interpretation of their estimated coefficients
is neither straightforward not intuitive. This is because the impact of a change in one
variable will be dependent upon the other variables with which it is interacted. In order
to understanding the impact of the different service-specific variables it is necessary to
estimate values of the dependent variable Sik given different service combinations.
Estimating values of Sik: Where variables are discrete and categorical in nature,
with many interactions, (but not necessarily representing any ascending or descending
pattern) it is logical to estimate the switching equation and fit certain characteristics
to the estimated model in order to gain estimated values of Sik and compare these
estimated values.
In the results section 6.3 the estimated values of Sik are compared for each service-
supplier combination under both bundled and non-bundled conditions. These are re-
ported based upon holding demographic variables constant across all calculations at
some median individual which is representative of the whole sample.47
47Specifying a median individual based upon the most common categorical variables means that all
the demographic variables can be held constant. Though, because there are no interaction terms
between demographic- and service-specific variables the marginal effects of bundling are actually
independent of demographics
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6.2.2. Goodness of Fit
One of the key aims of this paper is to determine whether models containing service-
specific variables outperform the equivalent demographic-focussed model which has
been popular in much of the literature. In order to compare the different model spec-
ifications the Akaike information Criterion (AIC), as outlined in section 3.3.1 of the
previous part of the thesis, is employed. This is a measure of goodness of fit which
penalises the inclusion of irrelevant variables.
In a maximum likelihood model, such as the probit, the AIC formula is expressed
as below, where a smaller value of AIC implies a better fitting model:
AIC = 2Df − 2 ln(L)
Where Df represents the degrees of freedom of the model and ln(L) is the log-
likelihood of the model.
The models in the present investigation involve many more variables than those em-
ployed in investigating exclusivity. As such the AIC can also be corrected for instances
where the degrees of freedom is large relative to the number of observations. In this
instance a second-order criterion (AICc) can be introduced which utilises the formula:
AICc = 2Df − 2 ln(L) + 2Df(Df + 1)
n−Df − 1
The AICc statistic converges to the standard AIC where the number of observations
(n) is large. Burnham and Anderson [2004] suggest that this second technique should
be used unless n/Df > 40 – beyond which the choice of AIC or AICc is unimportant.
If there are concerns that the degrees of freedom are large relative to the number of
observations then the AICc has a greater penalty for the inclusion of additional vari-
ables.
In the results section both the AIC and AICc results are reported.
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6.2.3. Testing the Impact of Bundling
The second major hypothesis tested in this paper is that bundling of services with oth-
ers from a single supplier reduces the likelihood of switching provider for that service.
Because, as in the previous example, the variable ‘Bundled’ is interacted with several
others it is not immediately obvious how to interpret the relevant coefficients.
Equation (6.18) indicates the marginal effect of bundling service k with at least one
other service, compared to subscribing as a single standalone service.
Marginal effect of bundling on Sik =
∂Sik
∂Bundledik
(6.18)
The marginal effect of bundling will vary depending on which supplier and service
an individual subscribes. Thus marginal effects of bundling for a specific individual
i and service k is calculated by varying only the ‘Bundling’ variable but holding all
other variables constant. In section 6.3 the marginal effects of bundling (as calculated
using (6.18)) are shown for every service-supplier combination for a specific median in-
dividual. The results indicate that, as expected, dependent upon the different suppliers
and/or services, the impact of service bundling differs.
The broad hypothesised result as informed by the literature is that, irrespective of
supplier or service, the marginal effect of bundling will always be negative in that it
reduces the likelihood of switching.
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6.3. Results and Discussion
This section summarises the findings of the empirical investigation and consists of three
main sections. The first section offers a brief description of the results and comments
upon the significance of the coefficients in the model. In this section the fitted values of
Sik are also reported for the different configurations of service and provider. The second
section determines whether the service-specific model outperforms the demographic ap-
proach as indicated by goodness of fit measures of the three specifications. The third
section discusses the impact of bundling of services on the likelihood of switching.
An additional discussion of the significance of the results with respect to the aims
of this part of the thesis is located in the conclusion, while the full results table is
reproduced in appendix C.
6.3.1. Analysing Variables
The following section examines the significance of the variables that were included
across the three specifications. For the demographic variables (and also the service
dummies in specification one), the sign and significance of the coefficients is examined
and interpreted under both specifications one and three.
For the service specific variables, owing to the number of interaction variables in-
cluded, the fitted values of Sik are reported for the different permutations of service,
supplier, and bundling status. Furthermore, in specification three the fitted values are
reported for a median individual in order to hold the demographic variables constant.
The significance of the duration variable is explored separately since this variable does
not interact with any others and can be readily interpreted.
Demographic Variables
Table 6.1 indicates the estimated coefficients for those variables relating to demographic
variables under specification one and specification three of the switching model. Be-
cause of the number of interaction variables involved in the estimation 6.1 is limited
only to the specifications which feature demographics but omits the service-specific
variables from specification three. Appendix C features the full results table for all
models including specification two.
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The first observation from table 6.1 is that, where an estimated coefficient is found
to be significant in specification one, the level of this significance generally either de-
creases or disappears when the service-specific variables are included in specification
three. The second observation is that most of the demographic variables seem to fit
with a-priori expectations, as informed by the literature. The following sections address
the results with respect to expectations.
Constant
Under both specifications the constant baseline likelihood of switching is negative
and significant (though only at a 10% level in specification three); this is a reflection
of the underlying low probability relative to the likelihood of not switching.
Service variables
The estimated coefficients relating services display the expected sign and significance
relative to the Pay-TV variable. The market study in chapter 5 indicated that switching
rates are comparatively low for pay-TV and thus the remaining services are relatively
more likely to be switched.
The results from specification one indicate that broadband is most likely to be
switched and this concurs with the characterisation of broadband markets as com-
petitive, unsettled markets with high levels of entry, exit, and consolidation; also with
high levels of switching.
That landline services appear to be those that are second-least likely to be switched
may be unsurprising given that for smaller suppliers of broadband there remains a re-
quirement that an individual also subscribes to landline through BT; resulting in lower
switching rates than otherwise, absent this constraint. Because the service variables are
interacted with other variables in specification three, the results for this specification
are not reported.
Income
The results concerning income indicate that there may be a non-linear relationship
between income level and the likelihood of switching which would fit with the seemingly
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Table 6.1.: Estimated Coefficients for Demographic Variables
Specification One Specification Three
Variable Category Symbol Coeff SE Coeff SE
Service Pay-TV βTV,0 (omitted) - -
Broadband βBB,0 0.806*** (0.067) - -
Mobile βMob,0 0.432*** (0.066) - -
Landline βLL,0 0.374*** (0.067) - -
Income Under 11,500 γ1 (omitted) (omitted)
11,500-17,499 γ2 0.161 (0.113) 0.163 (0.122)
17,500-29,999 γ3 0.276*** (0.103) 0.240** (0.111)
30,000-49,999 γ4 0.225** (0.106) 0.2* (0.114)
50,000 and over γ5 0.117 (0.123) 0.027 (0.133)
Don’t know INCO γ6 -0.008 (0.119) 0.049 (0.129)
Refused γ7 -0.371*** (0.103) -0.341*** (0.111)
Children Yes γ8 -0.148** (0.063) -0.137** (0.068)
Employment Full-time γ9 (omitted) (omitted)
Part-time γ10 0.062 (0.079) 0.045 (0.086)
Looking γ11 0.156 (0.157) 0.051 (0.169)
Full-time Education γ12 -0.109 (0.172) -0.135 (0.187)
Retired γ13 0.071 (0.105) 0.077 (0.112)
Not-working γ14 -0.04 (0.087) -0.062 (0.094)
Refused γ15 -0.141 (0.337) -0.191 (0.367)
Gender Male γ16 -0.065 (0.054) -0.092 (0.059)
Age left education Aged under 17 γ17 (omitted) (omitted)
Aged 17-18 γ18 0.115 (0.071) 0.143* (0.077)
Aged 19-20 γ19 0.254*** (0.094) 0.251** (0.102)
Aged 21 and over γ20 0.173** (0.07) 0.123 (0.076)
Don’t know γ21 -0.12 (0.269) -0.018 (0.293)
Refused γ22 0.507 (0.431) 0.818* (0.469)
Age Aged under 18 γ23 -0.458 (0.293) -0.508 (0.315)
Aged 18-24 γ24 (omitted) (omitted)
Aged 25-34 γ25 0.061 (0.118) 0.037 (0.128)
Aged 35-44 γ26 -0.095 (0.122) -0.089 (0.133)
Aged 45-54 γ27 -0.073 (0.121) -0.018 (0.132)
Aged 55-64 γ28 -0.155 (0.13) -0.143 (0.142)
Aged 65-74 γ29 -0.222 (0.153) -0.265 (0.165)
Aged 75 and over γ30 -0.674*** (0.213) -0.74*** (0.229)
Constant α -1.798*** (0.159) -0.869* (0.507)
Standard errors in parentheses
* (p <0.1), ** (p <0.05), *** (p <0.01)
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divergent predictions of Hausman and Sidak [2004] and Waddams Price and Webster
[2011]. Specifically, those households in the middle income categories with incomes
between £17,500 and £49,999 are more likely to switch than those in the lowest income
categories (under £17,500) or those with higher income (£50,000 and over), but the
positive impact on the likelihood of switching peaks in the category £17,500-£29,999.
This suggests that income is positively correlated with the likelihood of switching,
but that at higher income levels this relationship disappears. When service-variables
are included in specification three the significance level of the estimated income coeffi-
cients diminishes. An anomalous result concerns those household representatives who
refused to divulge their income level, this group were significantly less likely to switch
their services relative to all other income categories; this suggests that there may be
some unobserved characteristic that is common to individuals which refuse to divulge
information concerning their income.
Children
As predicted in Waddams Price and Webster [2011], the presence of children in the
household has a significantly negative (at 5%) impact on the probability of switching
(which diminishes to a 10% l.o.s. with the inclusion of service-specific variables). This
fits with the conjecture concerning the availability of free-time, and the opportunity
cost of time spent in switching-related activity.
Employment
The predictions of the literature are that those individuals who work full-time are less
likely owing to the same type of opportunity cost issues as discussed above in relation
to children; the results, however, indicate that there is no significant differences in the
probability of switching between any of the employment categories.
Gender
There are few instances where gender has proven to be significant in determining
the likelihood of consumer switching, though Ranganathan et al. [2006] find men to be
significantly more likely to switch their mobile service provider. This weakly suggests
that γ16 will be positive and significant, though the results in the present investigation
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do not support this prediction.
Education
The education coefficients under both specifications one and three suggest a non-
linear relationship between education and switching likelihood. Relative to the control
group of those that left education under age 17, the coefficient relating to having left
education aged 19-20 is positive and significant under both specification one and three.
Under specification one the 21-and-over variable is positive and significant (though
smaller than that for 19-20), while the 17-18 variable is positive but not significant;
this is reversed under specification three.
Age
Age has been indicated as being significant with a variety of relationships; significant
differences between the coefficients γ22 to γ29 would indicate that some ages groups are
more or less likely to switch. This would support hypotheses such as lower likelihood
from switching with increased age [Royalty and Solomon, 1999] or non-linear relation-
ships [Waddams Price and Webster, 2011].The present investigation, however, indicates
that there is no significant difference in the likelihood of switching between most of the
age categories and the base category of 18-24. The exception is the category for those
individuals aged 75 and over which is significantly negative under both specifications
one and three, indicating that individuals in the oldest age category are least likely to
switch provider.
Service-specific Variables
Specifications two and three include variables which specifically concern the services
to which individuals subscribe. In specification two these variables alone are included,
while in specification three the demographic variables are also included. Appendix C
features the full results table for all three specifications.
In order to circumvent the issues associated with reporting the impact of variables
in the presence of interaction terms the estimated coefficients from specifications two
and three are used to generate expected values of Sik. These can be used to show the
difference in switching likelihood for different combinations of values.
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The impact of duration is explored for different suppliers, holding service and bundling
status constant. The opposite difference in switching likelihood for the full range of
supplier-service combinations is examined - holding duration constant. In order to
make comparisons a median individual is introduced based upon the most common
demographic characteristics in order to hold demographic characteristics constant.
The full tables of expected values of Sik for each service-supplier-duration-bundled
combination are reported in appendix D while the results concerning the significance
of bundling are discussed later in this section.
The Median Individual
A median individual is introduced which allows the analysis of service variables while
holding demographics constant. This is possible because there are no interactions be-
tween service and individual variables - this demographic changes would only result in
step changes to switching likelihood.
The features of the median individual are those characteristics that are most preva-
lent in each category of demographic variables. This hypothetical individual, which is
used in order to hold demographic varaibles constant in the analysis of the results from
specifications two and three. The median individual is a female who is aged between
25 and 34 and has no children. Furthermore, she left full time education aged 16 or
under, works full-time, and has a household income of £30,000-£49,999.
Duration
The duration of a subscribers’ relationship with suppliers affects the likelihood of
switching in two ways; if the duration of a relationship is very short (under six months)
then it is likely that this will significantly reduce the likelihood of switching provider
owing to the prevalence of minimum-term subscription contracts. Similarly, if an in-
dividual has been with a provider for a long period of time, then this too reduces the
likelihood of switching since it indicates that an individual is either fundamentally un-
likely to switch services, or otherwise satisfied with their service.
Table 6.2 reports the expected values of Sik for unbundled broadband subscribers,
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Table 6.2.: Expected values of Sik for broadband duration categories
BT Sky Talk-Talk Virgin
Mobile
Other
Operator
6 months and under
-1.008 *** -0.506 -0.024 -1.491 *** -3.501 *** -1.628 ***
( 0.38 ) ( 0.432 ) ( 0.465 ) ( 0.459 ) ( 0.714 ) ( 0.45 )
7 to 12 months
-0.812 *** -0.589 * -0.365 -0.401 -0.222 0.2
( 0.287 ) ( 0.349 ) ( 0.393 ) ( 0.322 ) ( 0.309 ) ( 0.259 )
13 to 24 months
-0.187 0.467 * -0.165 0.072 -0.233 0.079
( 0.198 ) ( 0.249 ) ( 0.266 ) ( 0.23 ) ( 0.227 ) ( 0.178 )
25 to 48 months
0.287 0.538 * 0.014 0.428 * 0.264 0.186
( 0.189 ) ( 0.296 ) ( 0.283 ) ( 0.248 ) ( 0.235 ) ( 0.172 )
Over 48 months
-0.192 0.227 -0.509 * -0.738 *** -0.454 * -0.389 **
( 0.185 ) ( 0.269 ) ( 0.294 ) ( 0.232 ) ( 0.238 ) ( 0.166 )
Don’t know
-0.708 * 0.061 -5.831 -0.094 -1.359 * -0.226
( 0.393 ) ( 0.57 ) ( 355.187 ) ( 0.441 ) ( 0.732 ) ( 0.326 )
Standard errors in parentheses
* (p <0.1), ** (p <0.05), *** (p <0.01)
using the estimated coefficients from specification three. Broadband was chosen be-
cause switching rates are relatively high for this service. In order to isolate the effect
of duration, the service and bundling status are being held constant, while the results
are reported for each firm. Furthermore, because this table reports the expected values
of Sik, the magnitude and sign indicates the absolute probability of switching for each
combination of variables. Where a result is reported as significant, then it is estimated
to be significantly different from zero.
The results concerning duration show that when the length of an individual’s rela-
tionship with their supplier is short (6 months and under) this has a strongly negative
effect of on the probability of switching provider. This is signified by the more nega-
tive expected values of Sik for the categories representing ‘6 months and under’ and
‘7 to 12 months’. The expected values for the next two duration categories indicate
that switching is most likely for broadband services held between one and four years;
individuals which have subscribed to their broadband service for over four years are
less likely to switch.
The results for unbundled landline subscribers exhibits a broadly similar pattern
where individuals who have subscribed for only a short period, or otherwise a long pe-
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Table 6.3.: Expected values of Sik for landline duration categories
BT Sky Talk-Talk Virgin
Mobile
Other
Operator
6 months and under
-1.994 *** -1.057 ** -0.529 -1.842 *** -3.782 *** -2.174 ***
( 0.338 ) ( 0.452 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 0.513 ) ( 0.852 ) ( 0.515 )
7 to 12 months
-1.766 *** -1.109 *** -0.838 ** -0.721 ** -0.471 -0.314
( 0.274 ) ( 0.377 ) ( 0.377 ) ( 0.343 ) ( 0.515 ) ( 0.286 )
13 to 24 months
-1.197 *** -0.109 -0.694 *** -0.303 -0.538 -0.492 **
( 0.196 ) ( 0.275 ) ( 0.262 ) ( 0.279 ) ( 0.486 ) ( 0.215 )
25 to 48 months
-0.572 *** 0.113 -0.365 0.204 0.109 -0.234
( 0.178 ) ( 0.315 ) ( 0.261 ) ( 0.271 ) ( 0.485 ) ( 0.208 )
Over 48 months
-1.139 *** -0.286 -0.975 *** -1.05 *** -0.696 -0.896 ***
( 0.135 ) ( 0.289 ) ( 0.273 ) ( 0.245 ) ( 0.472 ) ( 0.211 )
Don’t know
-2.012 *** -0.809 -6.655 -0.765 * -1.959 ** -1.092 ***
( 0.388 ) ( 0.539 ) ( 355.187 ) ( 0.457 ) ( 0.852 ) ( 0.387 )
Standard errors in parentheses
* (p <0.1), ** (p <0.05), *** (p <0.01)
riod, are significantly less likely to switch and the likelihood of switching is greatest in
the middle periods. The landline results, shown in table 6.3, are particularly vivid for
those individuals who subscribe through BT where the relationship between duration
and switching likelihood is particularly strong.
Service and Supplier
The impact on switching likelihood of different service-supplier combinations can be
observed in a similar fashion to that which used to examine the impact of duration.
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the expected values of Sik for the different permutations, both
when demographic variables are included, and without. In order to show the informa-
tion the duration has been held constant at ‘13 to 24 months’; tables 6.3 and 6.2 offer
an indication of the relative impact of altering the duration.
Table 6.4 confirms the observation made in Ofcom [2008] that the likelihood of
switching varies between service, with pay-TV being the least likely to be switched
and broadband most likely. Section 5 also indicates that broadband markets are the
most contested with multiple competing suppliers, whereas pay-TV is a near-duopoly.
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While a strong pattern concerning supplier is not immediately apparent in table
6.4 the results do suggest that switching a service is least likely where the incumbent
provider of that service is the dominant provider or specialises in provision of the ser-
vice. This is evidenced in the case of BT with landline services, Sky with pay-TV, or
mobile firms with mobile phone services.
This dominant firm effect may be explained by a number of factors. It is possible
that these firms’ dominance is because they provide a product of higher quality, in
which case it would be expected that subscribers are less likely to switch away from
them, even if a lower price is offered by a rival, lower quality, supplier. Alternatively,
this quality difference my not be related to actual quality, but may instead be linked to
perceived quality and psychological prominence of the leading brand, such that there
exists a ‘fear’ of moving to an alternative provider. This latter effect can be created
artificially by the leading brands.
A third effect which may reduce switching from prime providers is that there may
be other issues relating to network effects (or similar) in the subscription to certain
subscribers. This can be through either direct effects through offers like ‘free calls to
fellow BT landline subscribers’, or otherwise indirect effects such as TV channels which
are not related to the production activities of Sky, but which are exclusively available
to subscribers to Sky’s pay-TV service.
Although the bundling of services has a dedicated section, the impact that bundling
has on individuals’ likelihood of switching provider can be seen in table 6.5. Where
previously only selected services (those in which suppliers specialised) were significantly
unlikely to be switched, when firms bundle their products the likelihood of an individual
switching provider decreases. This is particularly apparent with Virgin, a firm which
specialises in the bundling of services, such that where previously only pay-TV was
significantly unlikely to be switched at a 5% level. Under bundling all of its services
become significantly unlikely to be switched.
Testing the Random Effects Methodology
Because all three model specification employ a random effects methodology it is neces-
sary to test the condition that ρ 6= 0 and that there exists an exogenous deterministic
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variable which leads to inter-individual heterogeneity; in this case it is the identity of
each respondent. As discussed in section 6.1.4 a likelihood-ratio test is employed; the
results of which are indicated in table 6.6.
Table 6.6.: Likelihood Ratio Scores for Random Effects Probit
Specification
(1) (2) (3)
LogLikelihood0 -3304.43 -2957.38 -2899.73
LogLikelihood1 -3202.75 -2860.89 -2806.28
LR 203.37*** 192.98*** 186.90***
Standard errors in parentheses
* (p <0.1), ** (p <0.05), *** (p <0.01)
The likelihood ratio statistics for all specifications are significant at less than 1% in-
dicating that, indeed, ρ 6= 0 and as such a non-zero proportion of the total variance of
the model is provided by the individual heterogeneity associated with the different in-
dividuals. This indicates that under each of the econometric specifications the random
effects methodology is superior to simply pooling the data and running a pooled probit.
This result shows that there are significant underlying differences between individuals
which affect their likelihood of switching provider for services which are not accounted
for by variables included in the models in this paper.
6.3.2. Comparing Model Specifications
The present investigation set out to determine the effectiveness of service- and supplier-
specific variables in explaining individuals switching behaviour, contrasted against mod-
els which heavily focus upon demographic factors. Specification one was designed to
be similar in form to prevailing switching papers which take account of demographic-
specific differences in switching propensity. Specification two contains only service-
specific factors and is included as a stylised test of the demographic model against
service-specific variables. Specification three contains both; featuring both service vari-
ables and also controlling for the demographic profile of the individuals in the survey.
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Table 6.7.: Goodness of Fit (AIC and AICc)
Included
Specification variables Obs. Log-Likelihood Df AIC AICc
1 Demographic 8628 -3202.75 31 6467.50 6467.733
2 Service 8628 -2860.89 84 5889.79 5891.46
3 Both 8628 -2806.28 110 5832.56 5835.43
Akaike’s Information Criterion is employed to compare the performance of the dif-
ferent specifications, with the results shown in table 6.7 where a smaller value of AIC
indicates a better fitting model. Because small samples relative to the number of ex-
planatory variables can result in a bias in the AIC statistic, the statistics fior the
second-order information criterion AICc are also reported, though their similarity to
the headline AIC statistics suggests that there is no danger of a bias48.
Comparing the AIC statistics reveals that specifications two and three outperform
specification one; this is especially notable given that specification two features no de-
mographic variables.
Result 4 Models featuring service- and supplier-specific variables outperform those
which are constructed mainly using demographic variables, however controlling for these
variables in a service-specific model results in a better fit than service variables alone.
This result supports the idea that switching behaviour is heavily affected by the
strategies of firms in terms of the services they offer, those in which they specialise,
and the activities in which they engage in order to retain subscribers. It disproves
the notion that suppliers can be considered as being homogeneous for the purposes of
investigating switching behaviour.
48AICc converges to AIC as the sample size tends toward infinity and the number of explanatory
variables tends to one.
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Table 6.8.: Marginal Impact of Bundling on Sik
BT Sky Talk-Talk Virgin
Mobile
Other
Operator
Pay-TV
-0.125 -0.488 ** -0.655 ** -1.362 *** -0.055 0.029
( 0.242 ) ( 0.214 ) ( 0.303 ) ( 0.246 ) ( 0.447 ) ( 0.272 )
Broadband
-1.405 *** -1.768 *** -1.935 *** -2.642 *** -1.335 *** -1.25 ***
( 0.182 ) ( 0.225 ) ( 0.249 ) ( 0.227 ) ( 0.412 ) ( 0.211 )
Mobile
-0.504 -0.867 ** -1.034 ** -1.741 *** -0.434 -0.35
( 0.397 ) ( 0.416 ) ( 0.433 ) ( 0.4 ) ( 0.462 ) ( 0.413 )
Landline
-0.712 *** -1.075 *** -1.242 *** -1.949 *** -0.642 -0.558 **
( 0.179 ) ( 0.234 ) ( 0.246 ) ( 0.232 ) ( 0.422 ) ( 0.219 )
Standard errors in parentheses
* (p <0.1), ** (p <0.05), *** (p <0.01)
6.3.3. The Impact of Bundling
The impact of bundling of services with a single provider on the likelihood of an indi-
vidual switching supplier is the second key area of investigation. If bundling of services
creates switching costs which serve to restrict consumer switching then there are im-
plications concerning the ability of the handful of large multi-product incumbent firms
to foreclose markets. While this may not lead to complete monopolisation of markets,
it would serve to increase the concentration amongst a small number of firms.
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the impact that service bundling has on the likelihood of
switching. When services are bundled the probability of switching those services de-
creases significantly. The difference between the unbundled and bundled fitted values
of Sik represents the marginal effect of bundling a service, expressed as
∂Sik
∂Bundledik
.
The marginal effect of bundling is also shown in table 6.8 where duration is being
held constant at ‘12 to 24 months’.49 The results indicate that, at a highly significant
level (1% in most cases) the probability of switching a service, which is a function of
Sik , is significantly decreased for almost all services from almost all providers when
49Again, because of the interaction terms, the data and results are effectively three-dimensional. Thus
it is necessary to control for one dimension.
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that service is bundled with at least one other.
Result 5 When individuals subscribe to services as part of a bundle with other services
from a single supplier, they are significantly less likely to switch provider for that service.
The above headline result holds for almost all services with a few exceptions. Pay-
TV is not significant for all providers, implying that if an individual subscribes to
pay-TV through a provider other than Virgin, Sky, or Talk-Talk, then their probability
of switching provider is the same irrespective of whether they bundle the service. The
lack of significance of bundling for mobile telephony also implies that subscribing to
other services through a mobile provider has no significant effect on the likelihood of
switching provider for the mobile service. Consulting table 6.4 however indicates that
the likelihood of switching is significantly negative whether bundled or not.
165

Conclusion
This paper has made a significant contribution in the understanding of the role of
bundling in switching decisions. Through an empirical investigation this paper has
produced two key results concerning empirical specification and the role of bundling of
services in affecting the switching decisions of consumers.
Result 4 Models featuring service- and supplier-specific variables outperform those
which are constructed mainly using demographic variables, however controlling for these
variables in a service-specific model results in a better fit than service variables alone.
Result 5 When individuals subscribe to services as part of a bundle with other services
from a single supplier, they are significantly less likely to switch provider for that service.
The second result has particular significance in its potential to guide regulators’
policy decisions. In comparing tables 6.4 and 6.5 two significant empirical facts are il-
lustrated: they readily show that the likelihood of someone switching a service provided
by a small firm (from the ‘other’ category) is almost always higher than the equivalent
from a large supplier; they also show that this effect is magnified if the large operator
is able to bundle and the small firm not.
In order to alleviate this second effect it must be the case that all firms have the abil-
ity to offer multiple services and specifically they must be able to overcome both the
barriers to entry which prevent firms from entering some markets, particularly pay-TV
or mobile telecommunications; both of which are relatively concentrated markets.
Recent technological advances have made the broadcast of subscription television
easier through delivery methods such as online streaming of content. Despite this, the
incumbent TV operators have further advantages in their provision through the con-
tent that is typically only available to subscribers to the major operators. Although
regulatory policy in the UK requires that Sky offer mandated access to its premium
167
Exclusivity, Bundling and Switching in Communications Markets
content, the psychological association between the broadcast and broadcaster cannot
readily be overcome.
Although this study has shown that bundling of services reduces switching, a key
variable which was not included (owing to the design of the survey from which the
data was gathered) was price or discount. It is well established that bundled products
are frequently sold at a discount to the sum of the equivalent standalone products; in
this respect the welfare reducing effects stemming from the increased switching costs of
bundling may be outweighed by the positive welfare gains that stem from lower prices.
Though this argument rests heavily on the notion that the firms which offer bundles
do not artificially increase the standalone prices in order to exaggerate the belief that
a bundle offers better value.
Although the result of the model are very significant the dataset was limited by the
absence of certain variables which have been proven to be very significant in previous
studies, the foremost amongst these being price. The pecuniary incentives associated
with switching services cannot be underestimated. Similarly, measures of quality and
satisfaction would provide additional insight into ‘push factors’ which drive individuals
to seek out new suppliers.
Despite some data shortcomings this paper has produced a set of robust findings
concerning the impact of bundling on switching, indicating that consumers are signifi-
cantly less likely to switch provider of a bundled service. It has also shown that there
is definite heterogeneity between firms and services in the likelihood of switching, in-
dicating that the assumption of homogeneity in this respect is flawed. In relation to
this last point, this paper has shown that models containing provider-specific variables
outperform those that don’t.
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Final Remarks
This study focussed on two key areas; the distribution decisions of a high-tech firm,
and the difficulties faced by consumers in purchasing communication services. There
were significant results in both cases.
It was found that the market structure has a significant impact on the durability
of exclusive distribution agreements for the distribution of the iPhone mobile phone.
Further that the market structure also affects the ability to even sell the phone into a
particular market.
From the perspective of consumers, it was found that practices implemented by firms,
such as the decision to bundle technological services we very significant in consumers
ability or willingness to change supplier.
Both studies illustrated case studies with features that, if not exclusive to the provi-
sion of high-tech goods and services, are common to much of their distribution.
These studies are themselves particularly significant as standalone exercises, both in
terms of results, but also methodology. The investigations are themselves not research
‘dead-ends’. Both open the door to range of further analyses and can act as a spring-
board to long-term research agendas.
Finally, this study has focussed on the difficulties of optimal distribution, or potential
pernicious outcomes stemming from the way in which technology services are supplied.
This, however, should not distract the reader from the knowledge that technology has,
and continues to have, a profoundly positive impact. The challenge for firms, regula-
tors, and ultimately consumers, is to deal with the externalities from such progress.
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A. iPhone Dataset Correlation Coefficients
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B. iPhone Collection Dataset
The overleaf table contains collected data concerning the date at which different oper-
ators in different countries started selling the iPhone. There are a number of operators
for which the there was no firm evidence available; none of these operators are core to
the study (mainly being later entrants beyond the scope of the investigation).
The fields are as follows:
Field Description
Country The country
Operator The network operator which is selling the iPhone
Date The date at which the iPhone was first sold by the relevant operator
Include
Whether this country is taken into account in the analysis. If it is not included
this may be because the iPhone was launched outside the window for which
broader data is available, or because there are variables missing for this country.
Evidence Sources which supportbthe launch date proposed.
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C. Switching Random Effects Probit
Results
Specification One Specification Two Specification Three
Variable Symbol Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
TV βTV,0 omitted omitted omitted
BB βBB,0 0.806*** (0.067) -0.308 (0.438) -0.376 (0.439)
Mob βMob,0 0.432*** (0.066) 1.803** (0.723) 1.739** (0.73)
LL βLL,0 0.374*** (0.067) -1.289*** (0.462) -1.362*** (0.463)
BT × TV βTV,1 - - omitted omitted
BT × BB βBB,1 - - omitted omitted
BT × Mob βMob,1 - - omitted omitted
BT × LL βLL,1 - - omitted omitted
Sky × TV βTV,2 - - omitted omitted
Sky × BB βBB,2 - - 1.87*** (0.266) 1.894*** (0.269)
Sky × Mob βMob,2 - - 2.201*** (0.79) 2.176*** (0.799)
Sky × LL βLL,2 - - 2.291*** (0.278) 2.328*** (0.281)
Talk × TV βTV,3 - - omitted omitted
Talk × BB βBB,3 - - -0.47 (0.625) -0.458 (0.633)
Talk × Mob βMob,3 - - -0.427 (0.929) -0.561 (0.949)
Talk × LL βLL,3 - - -0.015 (0.625) 0.023 (0.634)
Virg × TV βTV,4 - - omitted omitted
Virg × BB βBB,4 - - 0.41 (0.269) 0.451* (0.272)
Virg × Mob βMob,4 - - 0.102 (0.444) 0.095 (0.446)
Virg × LL βLL,4 - - 1.023*** (0.271) 1.085*** (0.274)
Mobfirm × TV βTV,5 - - omitted omitted
Mobfirm × BB βBB,5 - - -0.325 (1.025) -0.216 (1.025)
Mobfirm × Mob βMob,5 - - -0.952 (1.084) -0.901 (1.084)
Mobfirm × LL βLL,5 - - 0.444 (1.072) 0.489 (1.073)
Other × LL βTV,6 - - omitted omitted
Other × BB βBB,6 - - -0.242 (0.331) -0.164 (0.333)
Other × Mob βMob,6 - - -0.84* (0.495) -0.768 (0.497)
Other × LL βLL,6 - - 0.142 (0.341) 0.276 (0.343)
Bundled × TV βTV,7 - - omitted omitted
Bundled × BB βBB,7 - - -1.275*** (0.197) -1.28*** (0.198)
Bundled × Mob βMob,7 - - -0.357 (0.392) -0.379 (0.399)
Bundled × LL βLL,7 - - -0.556*** (0.202) -0.587*** (0.204)
DUR Sub-6m × TV βTV,8 - - omitted omitted
DUR Sub-6m × BB βBB,8 - - omitted omitted
DUR Sub-6m × Mob βMob,8 - - omitted omitted
DUR Sub-6m × LL βLL,8 - - omitted omitted
DUR 6m-1yr × TV βTV,9 - - omitted omitted
DUR 6m-1yr × BB βBB,9 - - 0.361 (0.466) 0.402 (0.466)
DUR 6m-1yr × Mob βMob,9 - - -2.177*** (0.679) -2.077*** (0.688)
DUR 6m-1yr × LL βLL,9 - - 0.405 (0.496) 0.434 (0.497)
DUR 1yr-2yr × TV βTV,10 - - omitted omitted
DUR 1yr-2yr × BB βBB,10 - - 0.498 (0.413) 0.545 (0.414)
DUR 1yr-2yr × Mob βMob,10 - - -1.604*** (0.625) -1.475** (0.633)
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DUR 1yr-2yr × LL βLL,10 - - 0.452 (0.446) 0.521 (0.446)
DUR 2yr-4yr × TV βTV,11 - - omitted omitted
DUR 2yr-4yr × BB βBB,11 - - 0.667 (0.425) 0.653 (0.425)
DUR 2yr-4yr × Mob βMob,11 - - -1.85*** (0.637) -1.796*** (0.645)
DUR 2yr-4yr × LL βLL,11 - - 0.773* (0.455) 0.78* (0.456)
DUR over-4yr × TV βTV,13 - - omitted omitted
DUR over-4yr × BB βBB,13 - - 0.705* (0.412) 0.778* (0.412)
DUR over-4yr × Mob βMob,13 - - -1.779*** (0.628) -1.65*** (0.637)
DUR over-4yr × LL βLL,13 - - 0.722 (0.442) 0.817* (0.442)
DUR Don’t know × TV βTV,14 - - omitted omitted
DUR Don’t know × BB βBB,14 - - 1.246** (0.559) 1.313** (0.561)
DUR Don’t know × Mob βMob,14 - - -1.627* (0.856) -1.562* (0.869)
DUR Don’t know × LL βLL,14 - - 0.923 (0.596) 0.994* (0.597)
Bundled × BT βBT,15 - - omitted omitted
Bundled × Sky βSky,15 - - -0.376* (0.218) -0.363* (0.22)
Bundled × Talk βTalk,15 - - -0.475** (0.239) -0.53** (0.242)
Bundled × Virg βV irg,15 - - -1.236*** (0.204) -1.237*** (0.206)
Bundled × Mobfirm βMobF,15 - - 0.168 (0.414) 0.07 (0.418)
Bundled × Other βOth,15 - - 0.189 (0.208) 0.155 (0.211)
DUR Sub-6m × BT βBT,16 - - omitted omitted
DUR Sub-6m × Sky βSky,16 - - omitted omitted
DUR Sub-6m × Talk βTalk,16 - - omitted omitted
DUR Sub-6m × Virg βV irg,16 - - omitted omitted
DUR Sub-6m × Mobfirm βMobF,16 - - omitted omitted
DUR Sub-6m × Other βOth,16 - - omitted omitted
DUR 6m-1yr × BT βBT,17 - - omitted omitted
DUR 6m-1yr × Sky βSky,17 - - -0.253 (0.532) -0.28 (0.533)
DUR 6m-1yr × Talk βTalk,17 - - -0.415 (0.601) -0.537 (0.604)
DUR 6m-1yr × Virg βV irg,17 - - 0.984* (0.572) 0.893 (0.573)
DUR 6m-1yr × Mobfirm βMobF,17 - - 3.191*** (0.791) 3.083*** (0.799)
DUR 6m-1yr × Other βOth,17 - - 1.563*** (0.576) 1.632*** (0.582)
DUR 1yr-2yr × BT βBT,18 - - omitted omitted
DUR 1yr-2yr × Sky βSky,18 - - 0.129 (0.465) 0.151 (0.466)
DUR 1yr-2yr × Talk βTalk,18 - - -0.888* (0.517) -0.962* (0.52)
DUR 1yr-2yr × Virg βV irg,18 - - 0.7 (0.524) 0.741 (0.525)
DUR 1yr-2yr × Mobfirm βMobF,18 - - 2.536*** (0.742) 2.447*** (0.751)
DUR 1yr-2yr × Other βOthT,18 - - 0.84 (0.527) 0.886* (0.534)
DUR 2yr-4yr × BT βBT,19 - - omitted omitted
DUR 2yr-4yr × Sky βSky,19 - - -0.231 (0.479) -0.252 (0.48)
DUR 2yr-4yr × Talk βTalk,19 - - -1.176** (0.521) -1.258** (0.524)
DUR 2yr-4yr × Virg βV irg,19 - - 0.609 (0.525) 0.623 (0.526)
DUR 2yr-4yr × Mobfirm βMobF,19 - - 2.56*** (0.745) 2.469*** (0.753)
DUR 2yr-4yr × Other βOth,19 - - 0.51 (0.527) 0.518 (0.533)
DUR over-4yr × BT βBT,20 - - omitted omitted
DUR over-4yr × Sky βSky,20 - - -0.112* (0.461) -0.084 (0.461)
DUR over-4yr × Talk βTalk,20 - - -1.181** (0.519) -1.301** (0.521)
DUR over-4yr × Virg βV irg,20 - - -0.02 (0.511) -0.063 (0.512)
DUR over-4yr × Mobfirm βMobF,20 - - 2.41*** (0.739) 2.231*** (0.747)
DUR over-4yr × Other βOth,20 - - 0.457 (0.52) 0.423 (0.525)
DUR Don’t know × BT βBT,21 - - omitted omitted
DUR Don’t know × Sky βSky,21 - - 0.229 (0.698) 0.266 (0.707)
DUR Don’t know × Talk βTalk,21 - - -6.349 (541.401) -6.107 (355.187)
DUR Don’t know × Virg βV irg,21 - - 0.976 (0.649) 1.096* (0.654)
DUR Don’t know × Mobfirm βMobF,21 - - 1.831* (1.027) 1.841* (1.04)
DUR Don’t know × Other βOth,21 - - 1.034 (0.65) 1.101* (0.656)
Bundled β22 - - 0.262 (0.374) 0.344 (0.377)
Bundled × DUR Sub-6m β23 - - omitted omitted
Bundled × DUR 6m-1yr β24 - - 0.099 (0.393) 0.08 (0.396)
Bundled × DUR 1yr-2yr β25 - - -0.414 (0.345) -0.469 (0.348)
Bundled × DUR 2yr-4yr β26 - - -0.526 (0.35) -0.538 (0.352)
Bundled × DUR over-4yr β27 - - 0.508 (0.339) 0.434 (0.342)
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Bundled × DUR Don’t know β28 - - 1.09** (0.492) 1.107** (0.498)
DUR Sub-6m β29 - - omitted omitted
DUR 6m-1yr β30 - - -0.16 (0.525) -0.206 (0.528)
DUR 1yr-2yr β31 - - 0.334 (0.473) 0.277 (0.475)
DUR 2yr-4yr β32 - - 0.634 (0.483) 0.642 (0.484)
DUR over-4yr β33 - - 0.005 (0.466) 0.038 (0.468)
DUR Don’t know β34 - - -0.983 (0.656) -1.013 (0.66)
INCOME sub-11500 γ1 omitted - - omitted
INCOME 11500-17499 γ2 0.161 (0.113) - - 0.163 (0.122)
INCOME 17500-29999 γ3 0.276*** (0.103) - - 0.24** (0.111)
INCOME 30000-49999 γ4 0.225** (0.106) - - 0.2* (0.114)
INCOME 50000+ γ5 0.117 (0.123) - - 0.027 (0.133)
INCOME Don’t know γ6 -0.008 (0.119) - - 0.049 (0.129)
INCOME Refused γ7 -0.371*** (0.103) - - -0.341*** (0.111)
Children γ8 -0.148** (0.063) - - -0.137** (0.068)
EMPLOY Full-time γ9 omitted - - omitted
EMPLOY Part-time γ10 0.062 (0.079) - - 0.045 (0.086)
EMPLOY Looking γ11 0.156 (0.157) - - 0.051 (0.169)
EMPLOY Education γ12 -0.109 (0.172) - - -0.135 (0.187)
EMPLOY Retired γ13 0.071 (0.105) - - 0.077 (0.112)
EMPLOY Not γ14 -0.04 (0.087) - - -0.062 (0.094)
EMPLOY Refused γ15 -0.141 (0.337) - - -0.191 (0.367)
Gender γ16 -0.065 (0.054) - - -0.092 (0.059)
EDU under-17 γ17 omitted - - omitted
EDU 17-18 γ18 0.115 (0.071) - - 0.143* (0.077)
EDU 19-20 γ19 0.254*** (0.094) - - 0.251** (0.102)
EDU 21+ γ20 0.173** (0.07) - - 0.123 (0.076)
EDU Don’t know γ21 -0.12 (0.269) - - -0.018 (0.293)
EDU Refused γ22 0.507 (0.431) - - 0.818* (0.469)
AGE under-18 γ23 -0.458 (0.293) - - -0.508 (0.315)
AGE 18-24 γ24 omitted - - omitted
AGE 25-34 γ25 0.061 (0.118) - - 0.037 (0.128)
AGE 35-44 γ26 -0.095 (0.122) - - -0.09 (0.133)
AGE 45-54 γ27 -0.073 (0.121) - - -0.018 (0.132)
AGE 55-64 γ28 -0.155 (0.13) - - -0.143 (0.142)
AGE 65-74 γ29 -0.222 (0.153) - - -0.265 (0.165)
AGE 75+ γ30 -0.674*** (0.213) - - -0.74*** (0.229)
Constant α -1.798*** (0.159) -0.924* (0.481) -0.869* (0.507)
n 2856 2856 2856
obs 8628 8628 8628
Log-likelihood -3202.75 -2860.89 -2806.28
Standard errors in parentheses
* (p <0.1), ** (p <0.05), *** (p <0.01)
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D. Full Expected Values of Sik for
Specifications Two and Three
Specification Two Specification Three
Supplier Service Duration Bundled Fitted Sik SE Fitted Sik SE
BT Pay-TV 6 months or under No -0.924 * ( 0.481 ) -0.632 (0.495)
BT Pay-TV 6 months or under Yes -0.662 ( 0.531 ) -0.289 ( 0.546 )
BT Pay-TV 7 to 12 months No -1.084 *** ( 0.329 ) -0.837 ** (0.349)
BT Pay-TV 7 to 12 months Yes -0.723 ** ( 0.357 ) -0.415 ( 0.376 )
BT Pay-TV 13 to 24 months No -0.589 ** ( 0.267 ) -0.356 ( 0.29 )
BT Pay-TV 13 to 24 months Yes -0.742 *** ( 0.265 ) -0.481 * ( 0.289 )
BT Pay-TV 25 to 48 months No -0.289 ( 0.293 ) 0.01 ( 0.316 )
BT Pay-TV 25 to 48 months Yes -0.554 * ( 0.291 ) -0.184 ( 0.315 )
BT Pay-TV Over 48 months No -0.919 *** ( 0.277 ) -0.594 ** ( 0.3 )
BT Pay-TV Over 48 months Yes -0.149 ( 0.251 ) 0.184 ( 0.276 )
BT Pay-TV Don’t know No -1.907 *** ( 0.537 ) -1.645 ** ( 0.551 )
BT Pay-TV Don’t know Yes -0.555 ( 0.563 ) -0.194 ( 0.579 )
BT Broadband 6 months or under No -1.232 *** ( 0.365 ) -1.008 *** ( 0.38 )
BT Broadband 6 months or under Yes -2.245 *** ( 0.418 ) -1.944 *** ( 0.431 )
BT Broadband 7 to 12 months No -1.031 *** ( 0.263 ) -0.812 *** ( 0.287 )
BT Broadband 7 to 12 months Yes -1.944 *** ( 0.283 ) -1.669 *** ( 0.302 )
BT Broadband 13 to 24 months No -0.399 ** ( 0.166 ) -0.187 ( 0.198 )
BT Broadband 13 to 24 months Yes -1.826 *** ( 0.178 ) -1.592 *** ( 0.209 )
BT Broadband 25 to 48 months No 0.07 ( 0.154 ) 0.287 ( 0.189 )
BT Broadband 25 to 48 months Yes -1.469 *** ( 0.186 ) -1.187 *** ( 0.218 )
BT Broadband Over 48 months No -0.522 *** ( 0.145 ) -0.192 ( 0.185 )
BT Broadband Over 48 months Yes -1.027 *** ( 0.146 ) -0.694 *** ( 0.184 )
BT Broadband Don’t know No -0.969 *** ( 0.376 ) -0.708 * ( 0.393 )
BT Broadband Don’t know Yes -0.892 ** ( 0.4 ) -0.537 ( 0.419 )
BT Mobile 6 months or under No 0.879 ( 0.729 ) 1.107 ( 0.742 )
BT Mobile 6 months or under Yes 0.784 ( 0.821 ) 1.071 ( 0.835 )
BT Mobile 7 to 12 months No -1.458 *** ( 0.481 ) -1.176 ** ( 0.493 )
BT Mobile 7 to 12 months Yes -1.454 ** ( 0.569 ) -1.132 * ( 0.584 )
BT Mobile 13 to 24 months No -0.391 ( 0.384 ) -0.092 ( 0.4 )
BT Mobile 13 to 24 months Yes -0.901 * ( 0.485 ) -0.597 ( 0.501 )
BT Mobile 25 to 48 months No -0.336 ( 0.391 ) -0.048 ( 0.405 )
BT Mobile 25 to 48 months Yes -0.958 * ( 0.507 ) -0.621 ( 0.524 )
BT Mobile Over 48 months No -0.895 ** ( 0.378 ) -0.506 ( 0.395 )
BT Mobile Over 48 months Yes -0.483 ( 0.46 ) -0.107 ( 0.477 )
BT Mobile Don’t know No -1.731 ** ( 0.74 ) -1.469 * ( 0.757 )
BT Mobile Don’t know Yes -0.737 ( 0.843 ) -0.397 ( 0.863 )
BT Landline 6 months or under No -2.213 *** ( 0.319 ) -1.994 *** ( 0.338 )
BT Landline 6 months or under Yes -2.507 *** ( 0.396 ) -2.238 *** ( 0.413 )
BT Landline 7 to 12 months No -1.968 *** ( 0.25 ) -1.766 *** ( 0.274 )
BT Landline 7 to 12 months Yes -2.163 *** ( 0.279 ) -1.93 *** ( 0.299 )
BT Landline 13 to 24 months No -1.427 *** ( 0.166 ) -1.197 *** ( 0.196 )
BT Landline 13 to 24 months Yes -2.135 *** ( 0.184 ) -1.909 *** ( 0.213 )
BT Landline 25 to 48 months No -0.806 *** ( 0.144 ) -0.572 *** ( 0.178 )
BT Landline 25 to 48 months Yes -1.626 *** ( 0.183 ) -1.354 *** ( 0.215 )
BT Landline Over 48 months No -1.487 *** ( 0.079 ) -1.139 *** ( 0.135 )
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BT Landline Over 48 months Yes -1.273 *** ( 0.141 ) -0.948 *** ( 0.178 )
BT Landline Don’t know No -2.274 *** ( 0.362 ) -2.012 *** ( 0.388 )
BT Landline Don’t know Yes -1.478 *** ( 0.407 ) -1.149 *** ( 0.428 )
Sky Pay-TV 6 months or under No -2.265 *** ( 0.322 ) -2.023 *** ( 0.339 )
Sky Pay-TV 6 months or under Yes -2.379 *** ( 0.405 ) -2.043 *** ( 0.416 )
Sky Pay-TV 7 to 12 months No -2.678 *** ( 0.331 ) -2.509 *** ( 0.35 )
Sky Pay-TV 7 to 12 months Yes -2.693 *** ( 0.356 ) -2.449 *** ( 0.372 )
Sky Pay-TV 13 to 24 months No -1.802 *** ( 0.184 ) -1.596 *** ( 0.211 )
Sky Pay-TV 13 to 24 months Yes -2.33 *** ( 0.228 ) -2.084 *** ( 0.248 )
Sky Pay-TV 25 to 48 months No -1.862 *** ( 0.183 ) -1.633 *** ( 0.213 )
Sky Pay-TV 25 to 48 months Yes -2.502 *** ( 0.247 ) -2.19 *** ( 0.269 )
Sky Pay-TV Over 48 months No -2.373 *** ( 0.136 ) -2.069 *** ( 0.173 )
Sky Pay-TV Over 48 months Yes -1.979 *** ( 0.214 ) -1.654 *** ( 0.24 )
Sky Pay-TV Don’t know No -3.019 *** ( 0.577 ) -2.769 *** ( 0.6 )
Sky Pay-TV Don’t know Yes -2.043 *** ( 0.637 ) -1.682 ** ( 0.664 )
Sky Broadband 6 months or under No -0.703 * ( 0.422 ) -0.506 ( 0.432 )
Sky Broadband 6 months or under Yes -2.092 *** ( 0.441 ) -1.805 *** ( 0.448 )
Sky Broadband 7 to 12 months No -0.755 ** ( 0.331 ) -0.589 * ( 0.349 )
Sky Broadband 7 to 12 months Yes -2.044 *** ( 0.316 ) -1.809 *** ( 0.334 )
Sky Broadband 13 to 24 months No 0.258 ( 0.227 ) 0.467 * ( 0.249 )
Sky Broadband 13 to 24 months Yes -1.545 *** ( 0.196 ) -1.301 *** ( 0.219 )
Sky Broadband 25 to 48 months No 0.367 ( 0.274 ) 0.538 * ( 0.296 )
Sky Broadband 25 to 48 months Yes -1.547 *** ( 0.238 ) -1.299 *** ( 0.262 )
Sky Broadband Over 48 months No -0.106 ( 0.244 ) 0.227 ( 0.269 )
Sky Broadband Over 48 months Yes -0.986 *** ( 0.205 ) -0.638 *** ( 0.234 )
Sky Broadband Don’t know No -0.211 ( 0.55 ) 0.061 ( 0.57 )
Sky Broadband Don’t know Yes -0.51 ( 0.577 ) -0.131 ( 0.604 )
Sky Mobile 6 months or under No 1.739 * ( 0.936 ) 1.892 ** ( 0.952 )
Sky Mobile 6 months or under Yes 1.268 ( 0.989 ) 1.493 ( 1.01 )
Sky Mobile 7 to 12 months No -0.851 ( 0.784 ) -0.671 ( 0.8 )
Sky Mobile 7 to 12 months Yes -1.223 ( 0.809 ) -0.99 ( 0.835 )
Sky Mobile 13 to 24 months No 0.598 ( 0.719 ) 0.844 ( 0.734 )
Sky Mobile 13 to 24 months Yes -0.288 ( 0.755 ) -0.024 ( 0.779 )
Sky Mobile 25 to 48 months No 0.293 ( 0.711 ) 0.485 ( 0.728 )
Sky Mobile 25 to 48 months Yes -0.705 ( 0.755 ) -0.451 ( 0.781 )
Sky Mobile Over 48 months No -0.148 ( 0.728 ) 0.196 ( 0.744 )
Sky Mobile Over 48 months Yes -0.111 ( 0.756 ) 0.231 ( 0.781 )
Sky Mobile Don’t know No -0.642 ( 1.013 ) -0.417 ( 1.035 )
Sky Mobile Don’t know Yes -0.023 ( 1.092 ) 0.291 ( 1.124 )
Sky Landline 6 months or under No -1.264 *** ( 0.441 ) -1.057 ** ( 0.452 )
Sky Landline 6 months or under Yes -1.934 *** ( 0.465 ) -1.664 *** ( 0.475 )
Sky Landline 7 to 12 months No -1.272 *** ( 0.362 ) -1.109 *** ( 0.377 )
Sky Landline 7 to 12 months Yes -1.842 *** ( 0.331 ) -1.636 *** ( 0.348 )
Sky Landline 13 to 24 months No -0.349 ( 0.254 ) -0.109 ( 0.275 )
Sky Landline 13 to 24 months Yes -1.433 *** ( 0.212 ) -1.184 *** ( 0.236 )
Sky Landline 25 to 48 months No -0.087 ( 0.295 ) 0.113 ( 0.315 )
Sky Landline 25 to 48 months Yes -1.283 *** ( 0.247 ) -1.032 *** ( 0.271 )
Sky Landline Over 48 months No -0.65 ** ( 0.265 ) -0.286 ( 0.289 )
Sky Landline Over 48 months Yes -0.812 *** ( 0.218 ) -0.458 * ( 0.246 )
Sky Landline Don’t know No -1.095 ** ( 0.522 ) -0.809 ( 0.539 )
Sky Landline Don’t know Yes -0.675 ( 0.564 ) -0.309 ( 0.587 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV 6 months or under No 0.383 ( 0.798 ) 0.81 ( 0.812 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV 6 months or under Yes 0.17 ( 0.791 ) 0.623 ( 0.804 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV 7 to 12 months No -0.192 ( 0.721 ) 0.067 ( 0.736 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV 7 to 12 months Yes -0.306 ( 0.709 ) -0.04 ( 0.724 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV 13 to 24 months No -0.171 ( 0.612 ) 0.124 ( 0.63 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV 13 to 24 months Yes -0.799 ( 0.568 ) -0.531 ( 0.585 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV 25 to 48 months No -0.158 ( 0.683 ) 0.194 ( 0.702 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV 25 to 48 months Yes -0.898 ( 0.653 ) -0.53 ( 0.672 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV Over 48 months No -0.794 ( 0.674 ) -0.454 ( 0.695 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV Over 48 months Yes -0.499 ( 0.631 ) -0.206 ( 0.651 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV Don’t know No -6.949 ( 541.401 ) -6.31 ( 355.187 )
Talk-Talk Pay-TV Don’t know Yes -6.073 ( 541.401 ) -5.39 ( 355.187 )
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Talk-Talk Broadband 6 months or under No -0.395 ( 0.452 ) -0.024 ( 0.465 )
Talk-Talk Broadband 6 months or under Yes -1.883 *** ( 0.482 ) -1.49 *** ( 0.493 )
Talk-Talk Broadband 7 to 12 months No -0.609 ( 0.374 ) -0.365 ( 0.393 )
Talk-Talk Broadband 7 to 12 months Yes -1.997 *** ( 0.416 ) -1.751 *** ( 0.435 )
Talk-Talk Broadband 13 to 24 months No -0.451 * ( 0.238 ) -0.165 ( 0.266 )
Talk-Talk Broadband 13 to 24 months Yes -2.353 *** ( 0.261 ) -2.1 *** ( 0.284 )
Talk-Talk Broadband 25 to 48 months No -0.269 ( 0.257 ) 0.014 ( 0.283 )
Talk-Talk Broadband 25 to 48 months Yes -2.283 *** ( 0.286 ) -1.99 *** ( 0.312 )
Talk-Talk Broadband Over 48 months No -0.867 *** ( 0.268 ) -0.509 * ( 0.294 )
Talk-Talk Broadband Over 48 months Yes -1.846 *** ( 0.28 ) -1.541 *** ( 0.302 )
Talk-Talk Broadband Don’t know No -6.481 ( 541.401 ) -5.831 ( 355.187 )
Talk-Talk Broadband Don’t know Yes -6.879 ( 541.4 ) -6.19 ( 355.187 )
Talk-Talk Mobile 6 months or under No 1.759 * ( 0.94 ) 1.988 ** ( 0.962 )
Talk-Talk Mobile 6 months or under Yes 1.189 ( 1.01 ) 1.422 ( 1.041 )
Talk-Talk Mobile 7 to 12 months No -0.993 ( 0.751 ) -0.832 ( 0.78 )
Talk-Talk Mobile 7 to 12 months Yes -1.465 * ( 0.824 ) -1.318 ( 0.867 )
Talk-Talk Mobile 13 to 24 months No -0.399 ( 0.638 ) -0.173 ( 0.664 )
Talk-Talk Mobile 13 to 24 months Yes -1.384 * ( 0.713 ) -1.208 ( 0.749 )
Talk-Talk Mobile 25 to 48 months No -0.632 ( 0.676 ) -0.424 ( 0.702 )
Talk-Talk Mobile 25 to 48 months Yes -1.729 ** ( 0.761 ) -1.527 ** ( 0.799 )
Talk-Talk Mobile Over 48 months No -1.197 * ( 0.66 ) -0.926 ( 0.683 )
Talk-Talk Mobile Over 48 months Yes -1.259 * ( 0.73 ) -1.058 ( 0.764 )
Talk-Talk Mobile Don’t know No -7.2 ( 541.401 ) -6.695 ( 355.188 )
Talk-Talk Mobile Don’t know Yes -6.681 ( 541.401 ) -6.154 ( 355.188 )
Talk-Talk Landline 6 months or under No -0.921 ** ( 0.457 ) -0.529 ( 0.47 )
Talk-Talk Landline 6 months or under Yes -1.69 *** ( 0.49 ) -1.302 *** ( 0.503 )
Talk-Talk Landline 7 to 12 months No -1.091 *** ( 0.359 ) -0.838 ** ( 0.377 )
Talk-Talk Landline 7 to 12 months Yes -1.761 *** ( 0.404 ) -1.532 *** ( 0.423 )
Talk-Talk Landline 13 to 24 months No -1.023 *** ( 0.233 ) -0.694 *** ( 0.262 )
Talk-Talk Landline 13 to 24 months Yes -2.207 *** ( 0.258 ) -1.936 *** ( 0.282 )
Talk-Talk Landline 25 to 48 months No -0.689 *** ( 0.233 ) -0.365 ( 0.261 )
Talk-Talk Landline 25 to 48 months Yes -1.984 *** ( 0.268 ) -1.676 *** ( 0.295 )
Talk-Talk Landline Over 48 months No -1.376 *** ( 0.245 ) -0.975 *** ( 0.273 )
Talk-Talk Landline Over 48 months Yes -1.637 *** ( 0.267 ) -1.314 *** ( 0.29 )
Talk-Talk Landline Don’t know No -7.33 ( 541.401 ) -6.655 ( 355.187 )
Talk-Talk Landline Don’t know Yes -7.01 ( 541.401 ) -6.321 ( 355.187 )
Virgin Pay-TV 6 months or under No -1.822 *** ( 0.416 ) -1.565 *** ( 0.426 )
Virgin Pay-TV 6 months or under Yes -2.796 *** ( 0.49 ) -2.459 *** ( 0.505 )
Virgin Pay-TV 7 to 12 months No -0.998 *** ( 0.297 ) -0.878 *** ( 0.316 )
Virgin Pay-TV 7 to 12 months Yes -1.873 *** ( 0.356 ) -1.692 *** ( 0.372 )
Virgin Pay-TV 13 to 24 months No -0.787 *** ( 0.247 ) -0.547 ** ( 0.272 )
Virgin Pay-TV 13 to 24 months Yes -2.176 *** ( 0.261 ) -1.909 *** ( 0.284 )
Virgin Pay-TV 25 to 48 months No -0.578 ** ( 0.258 ) -0.3 ( 0.28 )
Virgin Pay-TV 25 to 48 months Yes -2.078 *** ( 0.242 ) -1.731 *** ( 0.263 )
Virgin Pay-TV Over 48 months No -1.837 *** ( 0.245 ) -1.591 *** ( 0.272 )
Virgin Pay-TV Over 48 months Yes -2.303 *** ( 0.198 ) -2.05 *** ( 0.227 )
Virgin Pay-TV Don’t know No -1.829 *** ( 0.482 ) -1.482 *** ( 0.495 )
Virgin Pay-TV Don’t know Yes -1.713 *** ( 0.469 ) -1.269 *** ( 0.485 )
Virgin Broadband 6 months or under No -1.719 *** ( 0.449 ) -1.491 *** ( 0.459 )
Virgin Broadband 6 months or under Yes -3.968 *** ( 0.518 ) -3.664 *** ( 0.53 )
Virgin Broadband 7 to 12 months No -0.534 * ( 0.303 ) -0.401 ( 0.322 )
Virgin Broadband 7 to 12 months Yes -2.684 *** ( 0.366 ) -2.495 *** ( 0.38 )
Virgin Broadband 13 to 24 months No -0.187 ( 0.202 ) 0.072 ( 0.23 )
Virgin Broadband 13 to 24 months Yes -2.85 *** ( 0.249 ) -2.57 *** ( 0.27 )
Virgin Broadband 25 to 48 months No 0.192 ( 0.223 ) 0.428 * ( 0.248 )
Virgin Broadband 25 to 48 months Yes -2.583 *** ( 0.241 ) -2.283 *** ( 0.263 )
Virgin Broadband Over 48 months No -1.029 *** ( 0.201 ) -0.738 *** ( 0.232 )
Virgin Broadband Over 48 months Yes -2.77 *** ( 0.201 ) -2.477 *** ( 0.227 )
Virgin Broadband Don’t know No -0.481 ( 0.421 ) -0.094 ( 0.441 )
Virgin Broadband Don’t know Yes -1.64 *** ( 0.398 ) -1.161 *** ( 0.421 )
Virgin Mobile 6 months or under No 0.083 ( 0.581 ) 0.269 ( 0.597 )
Virgin Mobile 6 months or under Yes -1.248 * ( 0.722 ) -1.004 ( 0.742 )
Virgin Mobile 7 to 12 months No -1.271 *** ( 0.334 ) -1.121 *** ( 0.351 )
Virgin Mobile 7 to 12 months Yes -2.503 *** ( 0.512 ) -2.314 *** ( 0.529 )
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page
Specification Two Specification Two
Supplier Service Duration Bundled Fitted Sik SE Fitted Sik SE
Virgin Mobile 13 to 24 months No -0.487 ** ( 0.224 ) -0.189 ( 0.252 )
Virgin Mobile 13 to 24 months Yes -2.233 *** ( 0.433 ) -1.93 *** ( 0.452 )
Virgin Mobile 25 to 48 months No -0.523 ** ( 0.225 ) -0.262 ( 0.254 )
Virgin Mobile 25 to 48 months Yes -2.381 *** ( 0.44 ) -2.073 *** ( 0.461 )
Virgin Mobile Over 48 months No -1.711 *** ( 0.217 ) -1.407 *** ( 0.248 )
Virgin Mobile Over 48 months Yes -2.535 *** ( 0.4 ) -2.246 *** ( 0.421 )
Virgin Mobile Don’t know No -1.551 ** ( 0.637 ) -1.211 * ( 0.658 )
Virgin Mobile Don’t know Yes -1.793 ** ( 0.755 ) -1.377 * ( 0.778 )
Virgin Landline 6 months or under No -2.088 *** ( 0.505 ) -1.842 *** ( 0.513 )
Virgin Landline 6 months or under Yes -3.618 *** ( 0.557 ) -3.322 *** ( 0.57 )
Virgin Landline 7 to 12 months No -0.859 *** ( 0.325 ) -0.721 ** ( 0.343 )
Virgin Landline 7 to 12 months Yes -2.29 *** ( 0.364 ) -2.122 *** ( 0.38 )
Virgin Landline 13 to 24 months No -0.602 ** ( 0.255 ) -0.303 ( 0.279 )
Virgin Landline 13 to 24 months Yes -2.546 *** ( 0.254 ) -2.252 *** ( 0.277 )
Virgin Landline 25 to 48 months No -0.071 ( 0.247 ) 0.204 ( 0.271 )
Virgin Landline 25 to 48 months Yes -2.127 *** ( 0.225 ) -1.815 *** ( 0.25 )
Virgin Landline Over 48 months No -1.381 *** ( 0.217 ) -1.05 *** ( 0.245 )
Virgin Landline Over 48 months Yes -2.403 *** ( 0.179 ) -2.096 *** ( 0.209 )
Virgin Landline Don’t know No -1.172 ( 0.436 ) -0.765 * ( 0.457 )
Virgin Landline Don’t know Yes -1.613 *** ( 0.417 ) -1.138 *** ( 0.438 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV 6 months or under No -3.216 *** ( 1.225 ) -2.909 ** ( 1.235 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV 6 months or under Yes -2.786 ** ( 1.236 ) -2.495 ** ( 1.246 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV 7 to 12 months No -0.185 ( 1.068 ) -0.032 ( 1.074 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV 7 to 12 months Yes 0.344 ( 1.072 ) 0.462 ( 1.076 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV 13 to 24 months No -0.346 ( 1.024 ) -0.185 ( 1.029 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV 13 to 24 months Yes -0.33 ( 0.997 ) -0.24 ( 0.999 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV 25 to 48 months No -0.022 ( 1.032 ) 0.202 ( 1.037 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV 25 to 48 months Yes -0.118 ( 1.005 ) 0.079 ( 1.008 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV Over 48 months No -0.802 ( 1.044 ) -0.64 ( 1.049 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV Over 48 months Yes 0.136 ( 1.021 ) 0.208 ( 1.024 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV Don’t know No -2.368 ** ( 1.153 ) -2.08 * ( 1.165 )
Mobile Firm Pay-TV Don’t know Yes -0.848 ( 1.177 ) -0.56 ( 1.195 )
Mobile Firm Broadband 6 months or under No -3.849 *** ( 0.695 ) -3.501 *** ( 0.714 )
Mobile Firm Broadband 6 months or under Yes -4.694 *** ( 0.825 ) -4.367 *** ( 0.846 )
Mobile Firm Broadband 7 to 12 months No -0.457 ( 0.286 ) -0.222 ( 0.309 )
Mobile Firm Broadband 7 to 12 months Yes -1.203 ** ( 0.511 ) -1.009 * ( 0.527 )
Mobile Firm Broadband 13 to 24 months No -0.481 ** ( 0.2 ) -0.233 ( 0.227 )
Mobile Firm Broadband 13 to 24 months Yes -1.74 *** ( 0.419 ) -1.568 *** ( 0.436 )
Mobile Firm Broadband 25 to 48 months No 0.012 ( 0.209 ) 0.264 ( 0.235 )
Mobile Firm Broadband 25 to 48 months Yes -1.359 *** ( 0.43 ) -1.14 ** ( 0.448 )
Mobile Firm Broadband Over 48 months No -0.73 *** ( 0.21 ) -0.454 * ( 0.238 )
Mobile Firm Broadband Over 48 months Yes -1.067 ** ( 0.436 ) -0.885 * ( 0.454 )
Mobile Firm Broadband Don’t know No -1.755 ** ( 0.719 ) -1.359 * ( 0.732 )
Mobile Firm Broadband Don’t know Yes -1.51 * ( 0.841 ) -1.118 ( 0.866 )
Mobile Firm Mobile 6 months or under No -2.365 *** ( 0.335 ) -2.071 *** ( 0.352 )
Mobile Firm Mobile 6 months or under Yes -2.293 *** ( 0.633 ) -2.037 *** ( 0.652 )
Mobile Firm Mobile 7 to 12 months No -1.512 *** ( 0.162 ) -1.271 *** ( 0.193 )
Mobile Firm Mobile 7 to 12 months Yes -1.34 *** ( 0.514 ) -1.157 ** ( 0.53 )
Mobile Firm Mobile 13 to 24 months No -1.099 *** ( 0.086 ) -0.823 *** ( 0.137 )
Mobile Firm Mobile 13 to 24 months Yes -1.441 *** ( 0.461 ) -1.257 *** ( 0.478 )
Mobile Firm Mobile 25 to 48 months No -1.021 *** ( 0.088 ) -0.756 *** ( 0.139 )
Mobile Firm Mobile 25 to 48 months Yes -1.474 *** ( 0.474 ) -1.259 ** ( 0.493 )
Mobile Firm Mobile Over 48 months No -1.73 *** ( 0.074 ) -1.452 *** ( 0.13 )
Mobile Firm Mobile Over 48 months Yes -1.15 ** ( 0.467 ) -0.983 ** ( 0.484 )
Mobile Firm Mobile Don’t know No -3.144 ( 0.494 ) -2.805 *** ( 0.504 )
Mobile Firm Mobile Don’t know Yes -1.982 *** ( 0.747 ) -1.663 ** ( 0.769 )
Mobile Firm Landline 6 months or under No -4.062 *** ( 0.837 ) -3.782 *** ( 0.852 )
Mobile Firm Landline 6 months or under Yes -4.188 *** ( 0.903 ) -3.956 *** ( 0.925 )
Mobile Firm Landline 7 to 12 months No -0.626 ( 0.503 ) -0.471 ( 0.515 )
Mobile Firm Landline 7 to 12 months Yes -0.652 ( 0.592 ) -0.565 ( 0.608 )
Mobile Firm Landline 13 to 24 months No -0.739 ( 0.472 ) -0.538 ( 0.486 )
Mobile Firm Landline 13 to 24 months Yes -1.28 ** ( 0.515 ) -1.18 ** ( 0.533 )
Mobile Firm Landline 25 to 48 months No -0.094 ( 0.47 ) 0.109 ( 0.485 )
Mobile Firm Landline 25 to 48 months Yes -0.747 ( 0.517 ) -0.602 ( 0.537 )
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page
Specification Two Specification Two
Supplier Service Duration Bundled Fitted Sik SE Fitted Sik SE
Mobile Firm Landline Over 48 months No -0.926 ** ( 0.458 ) -0.696 ( 0.472 )
Mobile Firm Landline Over 48 months Yes -0.544 ( 0.516 ) -0.435 ( 0.534 )
Mobile Firm Landline Don’t know No -2.291 *** ( 0.839 ) -1.959 ** ( 0.852 )
Mobile Firm Landline Don’t know Yes -1.327 ( 0.91 ) -1.026 ( 0.935 )
Other Pay-TV 6 months or under No -1.276 *** ( 0.48 ) -1.088 ** ( 0.496 )
Other Pay-TV 6 months or under Yes -0.825 ( 0.61 ) -0.59 ( 0.628 )
Other Pay-TV 7 to 12 months No 0.127 ( 0.357 ) 0.338 ( 0.375 )
Other Pay-TV 7 to 12 months Yes 0.677 ( 0.479 ) 0.916 * ( 0.494 )
Other Pay-TV 13 to 24 months No -0.101 ( 0.284 ) 0.074 ( 0.305 )
Other Pay-TV 13 to 24 months Yes -0.065 ( 0.372 ) 0.104 ( 0.389 )
Other Pay-TV 25 to 48 months No -0.132 ( 0.305 ) 0.072 ( 0.324 )
Other Pay-TV 25 to 48 months Yes -0.207 ( 0.387 ) 0.033 ( 0.402 )
Other Pay-TV Over 48 months No -0.814 *** ( 0.294 ) -0.627 ** ( 0.314 )
Other Pay-TV Over 48 months Yes 0.144 ( 0.37 ) 0.305 ( 0.387 )
Other Pay-TV Don’t know No -1.225 *** ( 0.399 ) -1 ** ( 0.416 )
Other Pay-TV Don’t know Yes 0.316 ( 0.593 ) 0.605 ( 0.609 )
Other Broadband 6 months or under No -1.826 *** ( 0.429 ) -1.628 *** ( 0.45 )
Other Broadband 6 months or under Yes -2.65 *** ( 0.538 ) -2.41 *** ( 0.559 )
Other Broadband 7 to 12 months No -0.062 ( 0.234 ) 0.2 ( 0.259 )
Other Broadband 7 to 12 months Yes -0.787 ** ( 0.343 ) -0.502 ( 0.361 )
Other Broadband 13 to 24 months No -0.153 ( 0.14 ) 0.079 ( 0.178 )
Other Broadband 13 to 24 months Yes -1.391 *** ( 0.214 ) -1.171 *** ( 0.241 )
Other Broadband 25 to 48 months No -0.015 ( 0.134 ) 0.186 ( 0.172 )
Other Broadband 25 to 48 months Yes -1.364 *** ( 0.232 ) -1.134 *** ( 0.258 )
Other Broadband Over 48 months No -0.66 *** ( 0.121 ) -0.389 ** ( 0.166 )
Other Broadband Over 48 months Yes -0.975 *** ( 0.218 ) -0.736 *** ( 0.246 )
Other Broadband Don’t know No -0.529 * ( 0.302 ) -0.226 ( 0.326 )
Other Broadband Don’t know Yes -0.263 ( 0.485 ) 0.099 ( 0.506 )
Other Mobile 6 months or under No -0.313 ( 0.493 ) -0.118 ( 0.513 )
Other Mobile 6 months or under Yes -0.219 ( 0.707 ) 0.001 ( 0.728 )
Other Mobile 7 to 12 months No -1.088 *** ( 0.337 ) -0.768 ** ( 0.355 )
Other Mobile 7 to 12 months Yes -0.895 ( 0.554 ) -0.57 ( 0.572 )
Other Mobile 13 to 24 months No -0.742 *** ( 0.211 ) -0.431 * ( 0.243 )
Other Mobile 13 to 24 months Yes -1.063 ** ( 0.453 ) -0.781 * ( 0.474 )
Other Mobile 25 to 48 months No -1.018 *** ( 0.237 ) -0.754 *** ( 0.264 )
Other Mobile 25 to 48 months Yes -1.451 *** ( 0.485 ) -1.173 ** ( 0.504 )
Other Mobile Over 48 months No -1.63 *** ( 0.233 ) -1.307 *** ( 0.262 )
Other Mobile Over 48 months Yes -1.029 ** ( 0.454 ) -0.754 ( 0.474 )
Other Mobile Don’t know No -1.889 *** ( 0.549 ) -1.592 *** ( 0.57 )
Other Mobile Don’t know Yes -0.705 ( 0.8 ) -0.366 ( 0.822 )
Other Landline 6 months or under No -2.423 *** ( 0.501 ) -2.174 *** ( 0.515 )
Other Landline 6 months or under Yes -2.528 *** ( 0.594 ) -2.263 *** ( 0.611 )
Other Landline 7 to 12 months No -0.616 ** ( 0.265 ) -0.314 ( 0.286 )
Other Landline 7 to 12 months Yes -0.621 * ( 0.355 ) -0.324 ( 0.372 )
Other Landline 13 to 24 months No -0.797 *** ( 0.184 ) -0.492 ** ( 0.215 )
Other Landline 13 to 24 months Yes -1.316 *** ( 0.22 ) -1.049 *** ( 0.247 )
Other Landline 25 to 48 months No -0.506 *** ( 0.176 ) -0.234 ( 0.208 )
Other Landline 25 to 48 months Yes -1.137 *** ( 0.238 ) -0.861 *** ( 0.265 )
Other Landline Over 48 months No -1.24 *** ( 0.178 ) -0.896 *** ( 0.211 )
Other Landline Over 48 months Yes -0.837 *** ( 0.23 ) -0.551 ** ( 0.256 )
Other Landline Don’t know No -1.449 *** ( 0.373 ) -1.092 *** ( 0.387 )
Other Landline Don’t know Yes -0.465 ( 0.536 ) -0.074 ( 0.548 )
Standard errors in parentheses
* (p <0.1), ** (p <0.05), *** (p <0.01)
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